Kay Sieverding is an MIT graduate who believes that she has now lost the rights of all people to vindicate their rights in court unless they are rich or are one of the 1/10th of 1% of cases accepted by the ACLU. At MIT she completed a bachelors and masters degree in city planning under the name Kay Anderson. She has no criminal record. No Rule 11 c . 6 orders have ever been issued against her. She was never even accused of disrupting a court hearing. She has never been sued for defamation or anything else. In the lawsuits in which she lost the rights of all people, there was never any evidentiary hearing of any type. The defendants never submitted any evidence about anything. There was never any discovery. They did not file a summary judgment motion. She verified everything she wrote under penalty of perjury but they did not verify their motions or objections.
She filed a lawsuit in the District of Colorado, 02-1950, for injunctive relief and financial compensation for damages she suffered in Steamboat Springs CO. There she lived on the corner of Princeton and Pahwintah Ave. The president of the City Council, Kevin H. Bennett, lived across the street. He fenced off a 60 feet wide and 100 feet long portion of the street adjoining their 3/4 acres. There was a 24 foot wide paved portion and the rest was city owned land used for snow storage. The family's business was threatened by his lawyer and they were threatened with assault by his son. This is documented by a letter from his lawyer and a police report. The City then sent her a letter saying that she had to have a permit to mow the grass, fertilize or plant flowers, on the snow storage area between the pavement and her property line, even though the city did not mow or otherwise maintain this area and even though the city never granted a gardening permit to any other citizen or landscaping company and had no gardening permit form. She was then accused of violating the gardening permit because her landscaper trimmed a tree hanging over her drive. This was to be prosecuted in municipal court which has statutory authority to jail for 6 months for violation of any city statute.
Two lawyers working for the City of Steamboat then told my husband and myself that I would be prosecuted unless I came to an agreement with Kevin Bennett, the City Council President. This involved giving up our rights to the 60 feet of the street that adjoined our property and selling him land for $1. My husband complained to the police that that was criminal extortion but the d.a. said that was a civil matter.
After getting the land, Kevin and Jane Bennett built 3 buildings on it. One was two story and had central heating and plumbing. Another had a bathroom and kitchen. Their driveway was installed as an extension of the street but the law required a minimum street angle of 60 degrees and a city owned road terminus. My position is that these buildings violated the local development ordinances and that as an adjoining property owner I had a right to have the Bennetts keep their construction within the limits of the law. However, the former city planning services director Wendie Schulenburg said under oath that these buildings totally complied with the local laws and that she was a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners. The AICP has confirmed that they never had a member named Wendy or Wendie Schulenburg. It is difficult to become a certified planner and requires years of specialized work experience, education, testing, references and commitment to an ethics program that allows public censure.
The Bennett's property is known as 701 Princeton Ave. The Routt County tax rolls show that there is only one building on the property and that it was built in 1950 and is in 1970 condition, although articles on the Steamboat Pilot web site discuss controversies over the other buildings and I have building department applications and photos of them. The Routt County tax rolls can be viewed on the Internet. Their parcel number is 222800001. Their property can also be viewed on Googlemaps satellite photos although the "guest house" and the "tack house" are hard to see under the blue spruce. The tax rolls show that the "total building area" is only 2,343 square feet but the electrician's application shows that just one of the buildings built in 2000 is 2009 square feet and that is just an accessory building.
Colorado Judge James Garrecht sua sponte determined that I had molested Jane Bennett and based on that finding issued an order that I stay 30 feet from her at all times. Jane Bennett said under oath that I hadn't been following her around, that there was no offensive touching, that I hadn't called her in years, and that she had little memory of interacting with me. The State of Colorado has no statutory authority for the issuing of restraining orders except in cases of an ongoing criminal prosecution, an employment relationship, or an intimate or family relationship. I never had any sort of intimate relationship with Jane Bennett. I was never alone with her and the only time I ever remember calling her was to tell her that UPS left her package at our house.
I was criminally prosecuted for harassment of Jane Bennett. However, I pled not guilty and the charges were dismissed. The prosecutor refused to say what the probable cause was. There was no warrant and no affidavit of probable cause. After dismissing the case she gave an interview and said that Jane Bennett was my "victim". The prosecutor was name P. Elizabeth Wittemyer. She is married to a lawyer named Chris Wittemyer. They bought land for less than $10,000 per acre near the Stagecoach Reservoir. The City did not oppose the granting of a new ski area permit to that land and he advertised it in the WSJ for $20 million or about $75,000 per acre.
Jane Bennett complained to the police that I violated the restraining order by shopping without speaking to her or making eye contact, waiting at an intersection for the light to change before crossing the street, being in my own yard without speaking to her or looking at her, and sending notices of intent to sue to the city council. The police followed me around very publicly and went to the school to interview my son, who dropped out of school because no one would speak to him. The rumor was that I had threatened her with a gun but I never touched a gun in my entire life and we have no gun. We gave up and moved. We sold our property to the Bennett's lawyer and the father of the assistant city attorney.
I had a lawyer named William B. Hibbard. I wanted to sue the Bennetts' lawyer. He said he would not sue any lawyers because it would hurt his law practice. My family and I then sued in federal court, D of Colorado 02-1950. We submitted a conspiracy complaint that emphasized the roll of lawyers and argued that the legal profession was inadequately regulated. Hibbard read the complaint, which included statements about him, and sent me a letter finding no problems with it and offering free assistance. Hibbard specifically stated that he thought my theories about the bar associations were "interesting".
The magistrate said that my complaints against the Bennetts sounded like a hornbook textbook. However he dismissed our case without any evidentiary hearings. The docket is downloadable from the U.S. Judiciary Pacer to anyone who will pay $3 by credit card It shows no jury trial and that the defense did not apply for summary judgment. We filed a timely objection to the magistrate's report and we filed for summary judgment. The matter was reassigned to Judge Edward Nottingham. He held no evidentiary hearings. He ordered that our summary judgment motions be assigned to Magistrate Schlatter who under the magistrate's act was required to make factual findings but he did not. Judge Nottingham said that he was dismissing our case because it was "prolix, disorganized and legally twisted". Since there was no jury trial, under rule 52a findings of law and fact were required but he made none.
Judge Nottingham ordered that we pay the defense counsel $102,000. He did not say why. There were no Rule 11 c. 6 orders.
Judge Nottingham ordered that we could not represent ourselves on any matter "based on the same series of events". He did not cite a statutory authority for this nor were there any evidentiary hearings. There was no document labeling injunction. There was no injunction bond, no injunction motion, no injunction hearing.
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a damage award to a pro se litigant against the Quebec Bar Association. See Finney v. Barreau du Québec,  2 S.C.R. 17, 2004 SCC 36
We filed under Rule 60b(3) for relief in the District of Columbia saying that the first judgement there was invalid because there were no evidentiary findings and because the defense bills showed ex parte conferences. The ABA hired Carolyn Lamm of White & Case to defend them. She is supposed to be one of the most influential lawyers in the U.S. and advertises that she has the power to "change the law". She misrepresented a 5th Circuit opinion and said that the ABA's position is that Rule 65 does not apply to "vexatious" litigants.
Judge Nottingham appointed Christopher P. Beall a partner at Faegre & Benson as the prosecutor. Beall said:"“If I may, I’d just like to make sure that the record is clear with respect to some points of law. And first, the point is that this is a civil contempt proceeding. Regardless of any possibility of incarceration, Mr. and Mrs. Sieverding hold the keys to their cell They may comply with the Court’s order, at least prospectively, and they may avoid incarceration. As a result, this is civil, not criminal contempt. They do not have a right to counsel. They do not have the right to a jury trial. They do not have the right to a full and complete evidentiary hearing. Rather, this is a civil contempt proceeding, summary in form. And all that is required under the Fifth Amendment is notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (D of Col 02-1950 Document 884 p. 13-14."
Faegre & Benson was representing the Steamboat Pilot newspaper, which is owned by The World Company, a multi media company that also owns the Lawrence Journal World and other newspapers and cable operations. It purchased insurance from Mutual Insurance Limited of Bermuda.
In YOUNG v. UNITED STATES EX REL. VUITTON ET FILS S. A. ET AL., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 481 U.S. 787 (U.S. 05/26/1987), the Supreme Court ruled "“the potential for private interest to influence the discharge of public duty…"[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision… a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order" and that summary contempt procedures cannot be used in indirect contempt cases but criminal procedures must be used. That hearing on 9/2/05 was our first hearing with Judge Nottingham and was scheduled at the request of Faegre & Benson. We were not accused of disrupting a hearing or contempt in the presence of the court and there was no finding that we committed contempt in the presence of the court.
Based on the request of Faegre & Benson I was committed to the custody of the U.S. Marshals without a sentence. I asked for the statutory authority but that was denied.
In the meantime I had sued Faegre & Benson in the D of MN 04-cv-4317 for recommending to the Steamboat Pilot that they continue to publish fraudulent statements for the purpose of hurting me. That was documented on their bills.
That was dismissed on the sole basis that I did not have a law degree. Faegre & Benson sent me a letter to Judge Tunheim requesting a private conference with him. They sent me a bill for a conference with Judge Tunheim's former clerks Chester and Walborn. That is prohibited by the U.S. civil service guidelines.
I then sued The World Company in the District of Kansas, where they were located. Faegre & Benson filed a motion to have my husband put in jail if I did not withdraw that case. So I agreed to withdrew that case and I was therefore let out of jail and my husband was allowed to keep his physical liberty. Faegre & Benson filed:
“While she was still incarcerated at the Clear Creek County Jail pursuant to the Court’s order, Kay Sieverding filed an entirely new pro se lawsuit, this time in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, again based on the same series of transactions described in this case... require David Sieverding to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for assisting Kay Sieverding.” (Christopher Beall motion filed in District of Colorado 12/12/05 document 704 p.5)
I was then rearrested because I did not file the motions demanded by Judge Nottingham. Eventually I did file motions to dismiss under duress of jail. Judge Nottingham forced me to revise those motions to the wording demanded by defense counsel and said he would put me back in jail if I didn't sign my name to the document as they dictated it.
In July 2006 I filed motions for reconsideration. Faegre & Benson asked judge Nottingham to issue a bench warrant because I did so, which he did on 9/22/06. I then went to Canada for two months. While I was gone the U.S. Marshals repeatedly contacted me and my husband. However, the warrant was blank where the law was supposed to be. In the meantime, I appealed the order against self-representation to the 10th Circuit, which ruled that Judge Nottingham had no authority outside of the 10th Circuit. I filed for habeas corpus but that was denied on the basis that I was not in custody. However, the federal habeas law has a section allowing appeal of a subpoena order. I appealed that to the 10th Circuit and charged that Judge Nottingham did not state a law. They ordered Judge Nottingham to respond but he did not. He later said in court that he thought the defense counsel would respond for him.
On 5/10/07 I was again arrested at my home in WI. The police did not have a warrant. I was taken very publicly in front of the neighborhood soccer match. I had a hearing in front of Theresa Owens, a federal court clerk. The assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Anderson appeared and said that "the government is not a party to this". A federal public defender appeared and said that I had not been charged with any crime including contempt. However, Ms. Owens said that she had talked to Judge Nottingham and he wanted me put in jail and sent to him. There was no subpoena. I pointed out in court that the warrant was blank where the law was supposed to be. I was held for 22 days, strip searched at gun point, and taken to Colorado in chains. Then Judge Nottingham said "whoops" and let me go.
My husband and I appealed to the Supreme Court. A copy of our filing is downloadable for free at http://www.rightscase.com/ As with 99% of Supreme Court petitions it was denied with no explanation.
My husband and I then sued Faegre & Benson again in the District of MN 08-cv-01064. All the proceedings there can be downloaded for 8 cents a page. We claimed damages under U.S.C. 42 section 1985. We claimed damages for assault, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. We complained that in 02-1950 Faegre & Benson didn't file a rule 11 motion nor did they receive a rule 11 c . 6 order or file a counterclaim but without a court order they garnished all our bank accounts down to $1. We complained that on the Internet they advertised that in 02-1950 they had obtained a dismissal on statute of limitations but that the publications were within the period to make claims. One publication was only two months before our claims against the Pilot were filed. We complained that Faegre & Benson acted in a criminal manner when it assumed the role of prosecutor and that it violated the Rules of Criminal Procedure and acted improperly as a prosecutor.
That case was dismissed on the sole basis that we did not have a law license. Faegre & Benson did not offer any defense or file any rule 12 motions. The judge found one grammatical error but no other errors on our part. There was no hearing. No law was cited. There was no suggestion that we had ever committed perjury although we verified all our pleadings under penalty of perjury.
The D of MN uses ECF. Their local rules require that when a motion is filed, the party email a proposed order to the judge. Faegre did not send me a copy of their email to the judge and when I asked for it they refused to send it.
We appealed that to the 8th Circuit, 08-2494. We paid, filed our notice of appeal, and filed our opening brief all on the same day. We relied on Rule 17b(1) and the State of Wisconsin law which recognizes an "absolute right" to self -representation.
Some 20 days later Faegre filed a motion suggesting summary dismissal of our appeal. They did not file a brief nor did they cite a law. Within 3 hours the panel dismissed our case. It stated no reason. There is no record of this in the 8th Circuit published decisions.
We then filed a petition for rehearing En Banc. That was denied on 8/29 7 days after it was filed. No reason was given. This is what we filed in the 8th Circuit En Banc Court:
The panel dismissal conflicts with the U.S. Judiciary Act Title 28 § 1654 and § 2074 b, the 1st and 14th Amendments, four U.S. Supreme Court decisions, (JONES V. BOCK, NAACP v. BUTTON, SHELLEY V. KRAEMER and VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH), the Wisconsin and Minnesota remedies clause, and two 8th Circuit decisions (Jaramillo v. Burkhart, and Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.) and reversal is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions with its and the Supreme Court’s previous decisions.
THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS:
“Must petitions presented by Wisconsin free citizens in the District of Minnesota be adjudicated without delay and in full conformance to law, even when the litigants are self-represented?”
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN NAACP v. BUTTON:
In a landmark civil rights Access to Courts decision, NAACP v. BUTTON, the Supreme Court ruled, that the First Amendment protects “advocacy”, such as the Sieverdings’ petitions, in court.
“Abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion…. a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights… Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for purely private gain… Although petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the protection of the First Amendment, the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed.” NAACP v. BUTTON 371 U.S. 415 (1963) U.S. Supreme Ct.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also acknowledged:
“We are not unaware or unconcerned that persons identified with unpopular causes may find it difficult to enlist the counsel of their choice”. SACHER V. UNITED STATES, 343 U. S. 1 (1952) U.S. Supreme Ct.
In this case, the Sieverdings sued lawyers for “Damages based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights”. Thus, by definition, their claim was for “vindication of constitutional rights”. At the same time, their claim is identified with an “unpopular cause”. The order against self-representation acts to obstruct and prevent the Sieverdings’ presentation to a jury of their peers.
Because lawyers are expensive, and suing lawyers is unpopular, and their claims involve federal crimes, self-representation may be the Sieverdings’ only viable method to effectively exercise their First Amendment rights:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
Because Congress is not authorized to make laws prohibiting the petitioning for a redress of grievances, the Courts are also limited as to how they can interpret laws. The court’s authority cannot be extended to prohibit or abridge the petitioning of the government thru the court. To be consistent with the First Amendment, a Court cannot prohibit or abridge First Amendment Rights, it can only recognize First Amendment Rights.
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE RULES ENABLING ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN JONES v. BOCK:
The Supreme Court recognizes that the courts cannot erect barriers to adjudication of unpopular claims thru judicial interpretation and ruled:
“We once again reiterate, however, as we did unanimously in Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Hill, that adopting different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.” JONES v. BOCK U.S. 549 01/22/07 No. 05–7058 U.S. Supreme Ct.
Thus, a requirement that the author of pleadings be licensed to sell legal services to others is a violation of established rulemaking practices and conflicts with the S.C. decision in JONES V. BOCK.
Also, the Judiciary Act requires Congressional approval to modify the rules of evidence, which is part of an order against self representation:
“(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress”
U.S. Judiciary Act Title 28 § 2074 b
The district court order that:
“counsel fully handles the case, including preparing all court documents and handling all filing and communication with the Court and the opposing parties” (Appendix 5 page 2)
modifies the evidentiary privileges but was not approved by Congress.
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN SHELLEY V. KRAEMER and VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH:
The U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that the 14th Amendment must be observed in litigation in state courts and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, means that the 14th Amendment must be observed in litigation in federal courts. Thus, it protects individuals against discrimination including that shown by the district court’s boycott of the Sieverdings’ complaint.
“The actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities are actions of the states within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment… The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.” SHELLEY V. KRAEMER 334 U.S. 1 (1948) U.S. Supreme Ct.
“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441(1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster City, 488 U. S. 336 (1989). In so doing, we have explained that “‘[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’” Per Curiam VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. GRACE OLECH No. 98–1288 U.S. Supreme Ct., 2000.
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 14th Amendment
If not overruled, the precedent of Sieverding v. Faegre & Benson may require that other citizens be excluded from civil court unless they have adequate financial resources to afford a lawyer “to handle all matters”. The net effect may be to exclude injured parties from use of the federal courts for civil matters unless they retain substantial financial resources after injury.
Excluding citizens from court conflicts with
“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” Title 28 Part 5 Chapter 111 § 1654. Appearance personally or by counsel
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE 8TH CIRCUIT IN JARAMILLO v. BURKHART:
The order that remedy must be delayed until a lawyer is contracted and that expenses be increased to pay for a lawyer contradicts the MN and WI remedies clause. The district court decision that the Sieverdings do not have an absolute right of self-representation is contrary to Wisconsin case law as published by the State of Wisconsin, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17b(1), and the 8th Circuit’s deferral to Wisconsin law as decided in Jaramillo v. Burkhart recognizing Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17 b (1),
“In diversity cases the state law regarding real party in interest applies.” Jaramillo v. Burkhart, 999 F.2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir. 1993)
“the capacity to sue is determined …for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity by the law of the individual’s domicile.” Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17 b (1)
The State of Wisconsin Annotated Constitution proclaims:
“Rights of suitors. § 21. [As amended April 1977]
(2) In any court of this state, any suitor may prosecute or defend his suit either in his own proper person or by an attorney of the suitor’s choice. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] Every person has an absolute right to appear pro se. Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc. 174 Wis. 2d 381, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993). A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate the guarantee that any suitor may prosecute or defend a suit personally.” Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. Wisconsin Supreme Court 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997)” [emphasis supplied]
The District of Minnesota Court ruled:
“Should Plaintiffs wish to press their claims, they must secure the assistance of an attorney prior to filing any lawsuit relating in any way to the events described in the above orders (Appendix 2)
“Plaintiffs are not being forced to surrender any rights. Moreover, the Wisconsin Constitution does not guarantee Mrs. Sieverding the “absolute right to [proceed] pro se”(denial reconsideration appendix 4)”
In Minnesota and Wisconsin:
“Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.” Minnesota Constitution Article 1 § 8/ Wisconsin Constitution Article 1 § 9 Remedy for Wrongs
DISMISSAL CONFLICTS WITH THE 8TH CIRCUIT IN COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS. CO.:
“Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. Mixed questions of law and fact that require the consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles are also reviewed de novo.” Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1995)
Because the dismissal for lack of a law license conflicts with Supreme Court and 8th Circuit cases, a “de novo” review was required.
Excluding citizens from petitioning for redress of grievances because of their financial limitations or lack of a license to sell services deprives them of basic common law rights recognized in all civilized societies.
s./David Sieverding s./Kay Sieverding
Any idea what this is about? Or which forum here it might be relevant to?