Food for thought

[LPC]

So many lame responses to reply to. Where to begin.

First of all, MY BAD. There are a lot of regulations that cite these requirements.

So you've admitted you were half wrong. That's good.

I have a suggestion, though. When you start to start to pontificate about how right you are, you might want to check to see that you really *are* right, because you're not going to have much credibility if you have to go back repeatedly to explain why what you had written so patronizingly was a mistake.

Unfortunately, these regulations are not legislative,

So?

and the fact still remains that no STATUTES make any liable to pay income taxes.

What about section 6151?

Read on...

1. Regarding 26 USC Sec 6331, please cross reference the parallel table of regulations and you will find that this applies to the CFR 27, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ONLY.

Are you claiming that the "parallel table" is a "legislative regulation" and therefore has the "force of law"?

If not, how can you ignore the actual words of section 6331 and the regulations for section 6331 which appear in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations?

And when quoting regulations, PLEASE make sure that these regulations are LEGISLATIVE, meaning they are backed by a STATUTE.

That's not what is meant by a "legislative regulation." In fact, it's not even close.

Otherwise, they are INTERPETIVE OR PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS, and have NO FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW.

That's not true, as others have already pointed out.

By the way, the "overlap" garbage regarding how Congress can do whatever they want is LAUGHABLE. So you're saying they DO apply to income taxes but someone forgot to link that statute to income tax regulations?

No one forgot to do anything. As pointed out above, regulations for section 6331 appear in 26 CFR along with other income tax regulations.

Thanks for the reference to Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b), but please refer to regulations that are legislative. Or try referring to a statute. Otherwise, they are INTERPETIVE OR PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS, and have NO FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW.

Which is both wrong and irrelevant. The only reason I quoted the regulation is that *YOU* asked for it.

And why do you keep ignoring section 6151 and the Supreme Court case which held that the imposition of a tax also creates a legal obligation (which is the dictionary meaning of "impose" by the way).

3. Funny. There is a tax imposed on estate taxes (Sec 2001). But in the next section (2002), it tells you who's liable for the tax. Now, if the imposition of the tax were enough to make you liable, why the heck is there another section telling you who is liable?

Actually, section 2002 doesn't use the word "liable," but simply says that the estate tax "shall be paid by the executor."

And section 6151 says that, when a person is required to file a return (see section 6012), that person "shall pay" the tax.

If section 2002 imposes a liability, then section 6151 does also.

Which means its time for you to admit you made another mistake.

There are excise taxes and alcohol taxes and estate taxes and other taxes. They are all imposed. Does it mean I have to automatically pay them all?

Yes, if they apply to you.

4. Thanks for the MYRIAD of Supreme Court decisions. You should tell IRS.GOV to cite some as well once and a while.

That's a non-reply.

And whether or not you reply, the cases are still there, and they still contradict you, even though you choose to ignore them. (Just like section 6151 is still there even though you choose to ignore it.)

5. Regarding conflict of Supreme Court decisions with circuit court decisions, of course they do.

Name one. Provide one Supreme Court decision and one Circuit Court decision that conflict with each other.

[Prof]

So many lame responses to reply to. Where to begin.

First of all, MY BAD. There are a lot of regulations that cite these requirements.

So you've admitted you were half wrong. That's good.

I have a suggestion, though. When you start to start to pontificate about how right you are, you might want to check to see that you really *are* right, because you're not going to have much credibility if you have to go back repeatedly to explain why what you had written so patronizingly was a mistake.

Unfortunately, these regulations are not legislative,

and the fact still remains that no STATUTES make any liable to pay income taxes.

What about section 6151?

Read on...

1. Regarding 26 USC Sec 6331, please cross reference the parallel table of regulations and you will find that this applies to the CFR 27, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ONLY.

Are you claiming that the "parallel table" is a "legislative regulation" and therefore has the "force of law"?

If not, how can you ignore the actual words of section 6331 and the regulations for section 6331 which appear in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations?

And when quoting regulations, PLEASE make sure that these regulations are LEGISLATIVE, meaning they are backed by a STATUTE.

That's not what is meant by a "legislative regulation." In fact, it's not even close.

Otherwise, they are INTERPETIVE OR PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS, and have NO FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW.

That's not true, as others have already pointed out.

By the way, the "overlap" garbage regarding how Congress can do whatever they want is LAUGHABLE. So you're saying they DO apply to income taxes but someone forgot to link that statute to income tax regulations?

No one forgot to do anything. As pointed out above, regulations for section 6331 appear in 26 CFR along with other income tax regulations.

Thanks for the reference to Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b), but please refer to regulations that are legislative. Or try referring to a statute. Otherwise, they are INTERPETIVE OR PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS, and have NO FORCE AND EFFECT OF LAW.

Which is both wrong and irrelevant. The only reason I quoted the regulation is that *YOU* asked for it.

And why do you keep ignoring section 6151 and the Supreme Court case which held that the imposition of a tax also creates a legal obligation (which is the dictionary meaning of "impose" by the way).

3. Funny. There is a tax imposed on estate taxes (Sec 2001). But in the next section (2002), it tells you who's liable for the tax. Now, if the imposition of the tax were enough to make you liable, why the heck is there another section telling you who is liable?

Actually, section 2002 doesn't use the word "liable," but simply says that the estate tax "shall be paid by the executor."

And section 6151 says that, when a person is required to file a return (see section 6012), that person "shall pay" the tax.

If section 2002 imposes a liability, then section 6151 does also.

Which means its time for you to admit you made another mistake.

There are excise taxes and alcohol taxes and estate taxes and other taxes. They are all imposed. Does it mean I have to automatically pay them all?

Yes, if they apply to you.

4. Thanks for the MYRIAD of Supreme Court decisions. You should tell IRS.GOV to cite some as well once and a while.

That's a non-reply.

And whether or not you reply, the cases are still there, and they still contradict you, even though you choose to ignore them. (Just like section 6151 is still there even though you choose to ignore it.)

5. Regarding conflict of Supreme Court decisions with circuit court decisions, of course they do.

Name one. Provide one Supreme Court decision and one Circuit Court decision that conflict with each other.

Well, I guess there are Circuit cases in conflict with the Supreme Court -- but when the Circuit gets REVERSED by the Supremes, the conflict is immediately resolved in favor of the Supremes.

Too many TP's must missed civics class in high school and have no clue as to how the government works. Sad, really.

Dan: As Jack Webb said, "Just the FAQ's, Ma'm, just the FAQ's." You're a great successor to Joe Friday. Maybe you could change your nom de web or your signature line?

[ASITStands]

Got a question.

I think I understand the difference between Legislative and Interpretive regulations:

4.10.7.2.3.2 (01-01-2006)
Types of Regulations
1. Legislative and interpretative regulations are issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. If the code states "The Secretary shall provide such regulations . . ." , then the regulations issued
are legislative. Interpretative regulations are issued under the general authority of IRC section 7805(a), which allows regulations to be written when the Secretary determines they
are needed to clarify a Code section.
2. The courts consider the merit of both interpretative and legislative regulations. However, more weight is given to legislative regulations than to interpretative regulations.

Legislative regulations arise when the statute says something like, "When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary" [IRC 6011(a)], and Interpretative arise when the agency decides some sort of clarification is needed.

Both have merit and can be upheld by a court of law if they are in agreement with the statute or its legislative intent.

What's the cite on Chevron? I'd like to review that.

And, since we're citing S.Ct. decisions, I'm familiar with Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977):

Legislative, or substantive, regulations are "issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and which implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission.... Such rules have the force and effect of law." U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n 3 (1947). See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-438, 80 S.Ct. 459, 4 L.Ed.2d 423 (1960); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474, 57 S.Ct. 541, 81 L.Ed.2d 748 (1937).

By way of contrast, a court is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its expertise. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-145, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-237, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944).

And, of course, Mersky.

What I don't understand is the Action Line and Authority Line that appears at the bottom of some [but not all] regulations.

The Action Line generally gives a cite to statute or Treasury Decision together with the publishing in the Federal Register. And, the Authority Line generally gives the statute which gives the regulation authority.

Examples which confuse everybody in the tax protester movement can be found by comparing 27 CFR 70.42 [which have both lines, as illustrated below] and 26 CFR 301.6020-1 [which have none].

Authority Line
(26 U.S.C. 6020)

Action Line
[T.D. ATF-251, 52 FR 19314, May 22, 1987. Redesignated and amended by T.D. ATF-301, 55 FR 47606 and 47610, Nov. 14, 1990; T.D. ATF-450, 66 FR 29024, May 29, 2001]

You can obviously see why tax protesters believe the authority for substitute returns falls under 27 CFR. I've always overcome this by showing how there're two programs - one for individuals and another for businesses, and connecting case law which upholds the application of IRC 6020(b) to individuals.

But, how do you answer the Action/Authority Line question?

[grammarian44]

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984):

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Footnote 11, appearing immediately after the above quoted statement, refines the meaning of "permissible construction":

The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.

[iplawyer]

Ah, should courts afford Chevron, Skidmore, or no deference to an agencys interpretation of a statute or regulation. There is no better tutorial than that found at page 17 here:

http://www.fedcir.gov/opinions/04-1083.pdf


Makes me tingle just thinking about it!

[LPC]

Well, I guess there are Circuit cases in conflict with the Supreme Court --

Not on whether people are liable for the federal income tax.

If the troll returns, I'm quite sure he'll cite Gould v. Gould for the proposition that no one is liable for income taxes, and every Circuit Court opinion to the contrary is in conflict.

[ASITStands]

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984):

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Footnote 11, appearing immediately after the above quoted statement, refines the meaning of "permissible construction":

The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.

Wow! That's great. Thanks.

Now, about those Action/Authority Lines?

I put no real weight in them. It's just a curiosity. Why do they appear? Maybe I should ask someone who writes regulations.

[Kimokeo]

What about the credit union that lost honoring a levy?

Was that ever overturned or was honoring the levy the wrong thing to do?

[LPC]

What about the credit union that lost honoring a levy?

Was that ever overturned or was honoring the levy the wrong thing to do?

From the new and improved Tax Protester FAQ:

Tax protesters often like to cite the decision in Williamson v. Boulder Dam Credit Union, No. 97A014 (Boulder Township Nev. Justice Court 5/18/1997), which is an unpublished decision of a small claims court, for the proposition that there is a difference between a notice of levy and an actual levy. The judge in that case apparently got confused by the difference between a “notice of intent to levy” (which 26 U.S.C. section 6331(d) requires that the IRS give to the taxpayer before making a levy) and a “notice of levy” (which is how a levy is made in accordance with 26 U.S.C. section 6331(a)). And tax protesters never admit that the case was reversed on appeal, No. 98-A-388959-A (8th Judicial Dist. Nev. 9/8/1998).

[The Observer]

At one time, I had read the actual decision in the Boulder Credit Case. As I recall, the "judge" was really a justice of the peace, who cited pre-1954 IRC sections regarding his decision. In my recollection, he was more concerned with the Irwin Schiff-sponsored argument that there had been no judicial warrant issued to authorize the IRS levy.

[LPC]

At one time, I had read the actual decision in the Boulder Credit Case. As I recall, the "judge" was really a justice of the peace, who cited pre-1954 IRC sections regarding his decision. In my recollection, he was more concerned with the Irwin Schiff-sponsored argument that there had been no judicial warrant issued to authorize the IRS levy.

I have a copy of the "decision" around here somewhere and I poked around last summer, which is when I found that the Clark County docket was online and I could verify that the decision was in fact reversed when it was appealed to the District Court.

You're right, the decision was by a justice of the peace, and the relevant Nevada statute does not require the JP to be a lawyer. However, this particular JP was a lawyer and, surprisingly enough, was also a member of the bar of the US Tax Court, so I have no idea what he was thinking. Reading the decision, it looks to me as though he got confused by the difference between a notice of intent to levy and a notice of levy, but really, who knows.

Next up: The Credit River Decision.