Kosteska v Magistrate Manthey & Anor  QCA 105: http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinod ... 3/105.html
Kosteska appears to have requested judicial review of a court magistrate and municipal registrar having decided against Kosteska in some minor offences. Her objective?
The application for leave to appeal is expressed to be made by “Lille: of the Kosteska family (as commonly known)” and “as well for the Queen as for herself and ... made with a view to correcting serious defects in the manner in which legal affairs especially of the nation generally, and the State of Queensland particularly, are presently conducted, and have been for a very long time”. (para. 9)
And the court isn’t impressed:
In bringing this application, the applicant extends a line of similar, hopeless cases. Notwithstanding that her arguments, if correct, would mean that the Supreme Court had no power to grant the orders she seeks, she persists in her applications. The irony of her position seems to have escaped her. But it has not dulled her appetite for wasting the time of courts and the unfortunate respondents to these pointless exercises. (para. 10)
Like any good Freewoman-on-the-Land, Kosteska was alert for symbols and signs of hidden intent. Like that crest on the wall. It must mean something!
It was also argued that her Honour was “severely constrained” in respect of the orders she could make by the “British Coat of Arms” which appeared above the bench. Apparently, the presence of this representation (of what is actually the Royal Coat of Arms) required that the law which was to be upheld in all proceedings was the common law of England “in all of its might and majesty”. But, says Ms Kosteska, that requirement was ignored. There are occasions (thankfully very rare) when a submission is made that is so misguided, so erroneous and so lacking in any understanding of the basics of Australian law that one is faced with a truly sublime absurdity. This is such an argument. The presence of a coat of arms in a courtroom is merely a symbol of authority. It provides no power. It creates no duty. (para. 15)
Yep, it’s a kind of Turing test, and Kosteska failed.
The Court thoughtfully at para. 18 offers a brief excerpt from her written arguments on the broad deficiency in the Australian state:
“3. ...the essential basis is that, as there has NOT been – since at least 3 March 1986 at 5.00 am GMT, when the now notorious Australia Act (Imp) 1986, purportedly enacted by the Imperial Parliament at Westminster on behalf of, and at the behest of, the Australian ‘authorities’ of the day, ostensibly came into force here at that time – ANY proper basis in law CONSTITUTIONALLY upon which ANY of the now ‘very many’ enactments which have purportedly ‘become law’ in this country since that time, then ALL such laws purportedly now ‘in force’ are NOT so, since they have ALWAYS ‘utterly lacked’ ANY proper ‘constitutional’ foundation, and therefore they ALWAYS HAVE BEEN NULL AND VOID AT LAW from the time of their enactment, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.
4. This ‘most unlikely’ situation arises as a consequence of a ‘very fundamental procedural error’ in the process whereby that enactment was made, in that, as the referenda, required by the State Constitution Acts then in force in both Western Australia and Queensland to sanction ANY change to the ‘powers of the Office of State Governor’ of the type envisaged by, and indeed expressly in, the Australia Acts (Request Acts) 1985, had NOT been held before those Acts were signed into law by the respective Governors of those States, then the requisite formal agreement of ALL States and Territories, necessarily required FROM ALL States and Territories for such an enactment to be PROPERLY made at law by the Imperial Parliament, HAD NOT IN FACT AND IN LAW BEEN OBTAINED to properly sanction such a change. The necessary consequence HAS TO BE therefore, as stated above.”
[I have reproduced the style as it was in the judgment. One has to wonder, was this coloured too?]
The Court’s response at para. 19 is lovely:
It is not easy to summarise what is said in the written submissions filed by the applicant. In some respects it resembles the stream of consciousness style of writing used (more entertainingly) by authors such as Jack Kerouac. There are, for example, contentions that “some very influential people” commonly known as the “the Elite” have been responsible for the unlawful act of subtly removing the common law and replacing it with commercial law so that, amongst other things, the Supreme Court is now an unconstitutional Court of Admiralty which operates under the international law of the sea.
I think the Kerouac comment deserves wider citation.
Like a good Freewoman, Kosteska loves rhetorical questions:
No arguments are advanced to support any of this. Rather, in keeping with the style of all the submissions made by Ms Kosteska, questions are asked which are apparently intended to raise matters of great import. For example:
“Is it also not so that a contract is not deemed valid if it is all factors have not been fully exposed and excepted [sic] by all parties involved, in which case the imposition or enforcement of all such CONTRACTS or CORPORATE REGULATIONS called STATUTES, are in fact not valid or void at law?
Is it also not true that the pseudo Judges of these pseudo Courts have NO powers without the Consent of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant [AND] in every case the Judge must determine that he has Consent; Personam and Subject Matter Jurisdiction before he can act or access the Cesta Que Trust?
Is it also not so that a corporation is a fiction and cannot be sovereign?
Is it not so that as I can touch, feel, smell, bleed, and am in fact a living, breathing Child of God, I am in FACT a Sovereign and have higher authority over any fiction?”
Her remedies are a usual assortment of orders, but there are a couple that deserve special mention:
(b) That “the Applicant’s motor vehicle Driver Licence be reinstated forthwith in a ‘unrestricted’ form, which allows her to drive her car anywhere at any time on the public roads in Australia ‘as other normal people do’”
(c) That “the Applicant be afforded forthwith by the State authorities, compensation in an appropriate quantum manner and form as recompense for the highly improper action which has been taken against her by those ‘authorities’ over the last decade and more as she sought, quite properly to ‘have corrections made’ to the unlawful aspects, constitutionally of ‘the entire government setup’ in this State”
Drum roll please .... Motion struck!
And, as a proud Canadian, I am delighted that with this decision the Meads v. Meads virus penetrates into another jurisdiction. At para. 17 the Court acknowledges that judgment provides a comprehensive review of the “characteristics, indicia, and concepts” of these folk, and later at para. 20 notes the Canadian case illustrates that litigants of this kind make “exaggerated claims” on both sides of the equator.
I was particularly intrigued by one basis for Kosteska’s fines: she had failed to vote at an election. (para. 6). Now, isn’t that a dire scheme? We all know that the state is powerless if you do not contract with it. Yet, in Australia the government has made voting mandatory! Every ballot a contract. The dire genius of it…
Two earlier cases relate to Kosteska’s driving without a license and possession of marijuana:
Kosteska v Phillips; Kosteska v Commissioner of Police  QCA 266: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/ ... 1/266.html
Kosteska v Commissioner of Police  QCA 219: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/ ... 2/219.html
The grounds of appeal seem similar to those in  QCA 105, but are much less developed. Further, Kosteska is revealed to be the cat’s paw of another more veteran problematic litigant, an Alan Skyring. Skyring had already been declared a vexatious litigant:
 QCA 219 at para. 14:
The applicant sought to rely on an affidavit sworn by Alan George Skyring on 23 July 2012. Mr Skyring swore that he was the “friend” referred to in the applicant’s submissions. His affidavit commences with a brief discussion of his observations of proceedings in the District Court on the day that the applicant’s appeal was struck out. There was no issue on this application about those matters. Mr Skyring had warmed to the task of attempting to shed doubt on the validity of various statutes, both State and Federal, and of identifying a rather vague “state of affairs” affecting the legal system “to its very core”. If there is anything relevant or admissible in the affidavit, I was unable to detect it. I would refuse leave to read and file the affidavit.
 QCA 26 at paras. 16-17:
 When I questioned the applicant about one of her submissions, she stated she was "just following directions given to me". She later said that "Alan" had helped her with her material. Mr Alan Skyring was in the back of the Court. She explained that she suffered from anxiety and was confused about dates and asked the Court to consult "Alan" if the Court wanted information which she could not supply. Mr Skyring at this point moved forward to address the Court but was quickly told that his assistance was unnecessary. He resumed his seat in the rear of the Court. It is clear from the transcript of these matters in the Magistrates and District Court and from the applicant's submissions in this Court that Mr Skyring has been present at some (if not all) of these hearings and has aided and encouraged the applicant in pursuing her appeals in which arguments were raised that he had previously raised unsuccessfully in this Court where Mr Skyring has been a frequent litigator: see for example Skyring v Commonwealth Commissioner of Taxation; Skyring v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group; Re Skyring; and Skyring v Lohe. Unfortunately it seems likely that his "assistance" to the applicant has added to her anxious and confused state and her financial difficulties about which she addressed this Court.
 Mr Skyring was declared a vexatious litigant under the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (Qld) (repealed) on 5 April 1995. Under s 16 Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld), orders under the repealed Act are taken to be orders under the current Act. It is of concern to the administration of justice that a vexatious litigant like Mr Skyring may be encouraging vulnerable people like the applicant to undertake unwinnable litigation and to pursue appeals which impose unnecessary costs on the community. It amounts to an abuse of process. It may be appropriate in like instances in the future, for the Attorney-General to consider whether an application should be made to permanently stay proceedings if it is thought that Mr Skyring may be acting in concert with another person in the institution of proceedings in Queensland Courts: see s 10 Vexatious Proceedings Act and Cameron v Peter D Beattie (in his capacity as Premier) & Ors; but cf Clampett v Kerslake (Electoral Commissioner of Queensland).
That latter paragraph is interesting. I’ve never seen so broad a vexatious litigant order – to shut down any proceeding where there is evidence that the vexatious litigant guru is simply in the background, pulling strings? Very interesting to see a court invite that step.
There are some earlier cases but they merely set the context for Kosteska’s history, and offer little of interest.
Kosteska v RS Dillon & Ors  QCA 310: http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinod ... 0/310.html
Kosteska v Webber & Ors  QCA 138: http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinod ... 0/138.html
Holmes v Dillon & Ors (No.2)  FMCA 399: http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinod ... 0/399.html
Sadly, Ms. Kosteska does not seem to have an online presence.
As for Alan Skyring, he is the subject of a simply ungodly number of reported cases. I’ll probably sort through those another time.