- R v Stoneman  QCA 209: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/ ... 3/209.html
His grounds for appeal:
- - driving is “an unalienable right (no licence required) of the private individual to use the common ways to travel as per the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”
- only commercial vehicles are covered by motor vehicle legislation
- motor vehicle legislation does not apply to Freemen-on-the-Land, like himself
- he never consented to be a member of “the legal fiction known as the State of Queensland”
- the Crown was estopped against criminal action (presumably by a foisted unilateral agreement, but none is mentioned in the judgment)
One amusing twist is that Stoneman tried to subpoena his member of parliament to see if the MP had received Stoneman’s consent to “represent or govern him”, but the courts concluded that witness would not be useful. Most likely the poor MP had been sent a copy of Stoneman's Notice of Understanding, Intent, and Claim of Right foisted unilateral agreement.
Stoneman argued he was innocent of having breached bail, because while he had agreed to the bail terms, he had only done so under “duress”, and therefore could not be required to meet those terms. The Court of Appeal has a nice but simple response to that: “the proper use of legal process could not constitute duress.”
Stoneman’s ‘legal’ position and argument that appeal court judge below was biased because she had relied on relevant case law and precedents was also rejected:
I turn now to his allegation in his written material that the District Court judge was biased in ignoring crucial facts and failing to address his arguments. The applicant's outline of argument in this respect was not easy to comprehend. Her Honour was certainly not bound to answer every incomprehensible contention raised by him when the unremarkable proposition that he was bound by the statutory law of Queensland was a complete answer to all his claims. Her Honour, however, made a commendable effort to answer all his remarkable contentions. No fair-minded lay observer could reasonably apprehend that her Honour did not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the matters before her. The fact that her Honour received some support in her conclusions from decisions in other cases and jurisdictions is the application of the doctrine of precedent and not an indication of bias. This ground of appeal is not made out.
Stoneman’s belief, honest or not, is a mistake of law and therefore provides no defence:
He claimed that the District Court judge did not deal with his assertion that he was acting under a mistake of fact. He had, he stated, an honest and reasonable belief that he did not need to ask for permission to drive his vehicle and did not knowingly and intentionally contravene any law. This belief provides no defence. Any such mistake was a mistake of law and not a mistake of fact, and does not undermine the correctness of any of his these convictions.
All in all, a tidy little judgment. Nice use of simple legal principles to slice through Freeman gobbledygook.
I had no success when I I looked for other litigation or information on Stoneman.