Hanslune wrote:Well how about having him do it as rap song and dancing to the beat?
would that constitute a rap battle with the number one chief rocker?
Hanslune wrote:Well how about having him do it as rap song and dancing to the beat?
Perhaps the sanctions could be to read several tomes of OPCA filings over the weekend.
John, great work as usual. Im glad to see you having been sharing lots the last little while. I'm over in alberta and would love to get on the phone with you. I have some specific questions about interacting with the court and the government. I have no doubt you are a busy man and that many reach out to you for help. It would mean a lot to me if you would contact me so I can gain the clarity I require so I may help others free themselves. email@example.com 780-995-8874
Burnaby49 wrote:It looks like Gauthier's foreclosure is back on track. His house has now been listed for sale;
 The Statement of Claim is also unusual in that Gauthier has scratched out elements of the standard Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010 [the “Rules” or individually a “Rule”] Form 10 and replaced “Plaintiff(s)” with “Prosecutor(s)”, and “Defendant(s)” with “Wrongdoer(s).
In this particular case, Gauthier sought a decision against an RCMP officer, a Crown prosecutor and a provincial prosecutor. He accused them of trespassing on his property – in this case, the police officer for arresting him and the prosecutors apparently for handling legal documents he filed with the court.
 Gauthier interrupted the proceedings and spoke out of turn on many occasions. He “objected” to the characterization of Starr, Ferrier, and Werbiki as “Defendants”:
They are not Defendants as named on the Statement of Claim. They are actually wrongdoers. That’s a specific amendment I made.
He also demanded the proceeding advance under a special status: “... This court needs to move under the inherent jurisdiction of Queen’s Bench, I am a man of no title. ...”. When I instructed that Gauthier sit, he replied “I sit of my own volition.”
 After a further interruption I warned Gauthier that he was to wait his turn and then respond to the Defendants’ submissions, and if he did not do so he would be removed from the courtroom. Gauthier responded “Please stop talking to me like a child.” I again stressed Gauthier should wait his turn to speak.
 Gauthier also complained that Sheriffs were present in the courtroom:
Sir, they’re intimidating me, there is no reason for them to be here in a civil proceeding. This isn’t criminal. There isn’t any reason for them to be here. I’m a little nervous.
 At this point it became apparent that Gauthier was clandestinely recording the hearing with a camera which was deployed in his open briefcase on the counsel table. That led to the following exchange:
Myself: Adam, do you have a camera with you?
Gauthier: Ah yes sir, I do, for my own records in this proceeding.
Myself: Then you can shut it off. You can shut it off.
Gauthier: I don’t wish to do so.
 I then ordered Gauthier removed from the courtroom by the Sheriffs. Gauthier was not authorized to record the proceeding, and, in any case cameras, are entirely banned from the Court of Queen’s Bench (Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, “Electronic Wireless Devices Policy” (January 2012)). Gauthier had persistently refused to follow the Court’s instructions. His presence in the courtroom, in the circumstances evident, was an abuse of the process of the Court. Gauthier was also in contempt of court by his refusal to stop recording the hearing after my instruction.
 As I noted in court, normally I would have considered adjourning this matter to permit an SRL, such as Gauthier, an opportunity to file a further and better Statement of Claim. The “Notice” he presented, which I rejected as evidence but did consider as an argument and brief of law, provided additional detail on the alleged “trespassing” by the Defendants. Together, these would potentially be a basis to permit Gauthier the opportunity, as a ‘fair dealing’ SRL, to have an opportunity to continue this action.
 However, Gauthier is no innocent babe in these woods. He has already established a pattern of intentionally abusing court processes. He employs a category of vexatious litigation strategies, which I grouped as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments [“OPCA”] in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 543 AR 215. These concepts purport to give individuals special, extralegal status and immunities thanks to hidden or concealed secret alternative laws. OPCA litigation is, by its nature, vexatious: Meads v Meads, at paras 555-556, 582-584; Cormier v Nova Scotia, 2015 NSSC 352 (CanLII) at para 31, 367 NSR (2d) 295; Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 (CanLII) at paras 37-39, 368 Nfld & PEI R 80. OPCA litigants should be subjected to a broad restriction on potential litigation, because their “... sole motivation is to wreak havoc on the civil justice system ... these litigants seek only disruption as opposed to justice ...”: Tupper v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2015 NSCA 92 (CanLII) at paras 52-53, 390 DLR (4th) 651, leave denied  SCCA No 520.
 Gauthier’s next documented OPCA activity resulted in a judgment from the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench: d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2016 SKQB 101 (CanLII). This decision reports that a convicted and imprisoned offender, Luc Bernard d’Abadie, is serving an 18 month prison sentence for trafficking in marijuana: para 2. d’Abadie attempted to obtain release from prison by using OPCA tactics. Gauthier participated in this litigation.
 Initially it was d’Abadie who corresponded with the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. First was a “Notice” that the trial judge “... obstructed justice by denying the common law ...”. Next was a “Claim” by “I, a Man, Luc” “Prosecutor” that “wrongdoers” had “trespassed upon my property”, and demanding $384,000.00: paras 3-4. The similarities to Gauthier’s current litigation are difficult to miss.
 Gauthier made his appearance on February 29, 2016 when he “a man, Adam”, by email, sent a letter to the local registrar. Justice Layh inferred “a man, Adam” was “Adam Gauthier” based on the message’s email address. “I, a man, Adam” was the “next friend of Luc d’Abadie” and required a hearing date “with respect to his claim of trespass”: para 7. After some communications with the court registrar “I, a man, Adam” wrote to Justice Layh arguing “there have been several errors” with d’Abadie’s conviction and sentencing, and complaining that court staff had refused to file documents. “Adam” then requested a hearing “... to present the argument for an order of discharge in relations to the application for habeus [sic] corpus ad subjiciendum. ...” (para 6), and an application was received on March 2, 2016.
 The d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen decision, at para 12, reproduces parts of a brief of law that was prepared by Gauthier, and, at para 15, Justice Layh confirmed that Gauthier’s oral submissions were much the same:
1. d’Abadie is a man who does not hold any title;
2. d’Abadie is an idiot to legalese and not a member of the legal society;
3. under common law he has done no wrong because no man or woman has “come forward to press their claim on the record.”;
4. d’Abadie “... stands in his inherent jurisdiction at all times and was acting in a private capacity ...” and is therefore immune from legislation; and
5. marijuana production is a victimless crime and not an offence under the common law.
 Justice Layh classified Gauthier’s brief and arguments as “... pseudo-law at best, but more frankly, legal gibberish”: para 15. Layh J identified additional procedural deficiencies: that there was no evidence that Gauthier was actually authorized to represent d’Abadie, and that service of the habeas corpus application may not have been completed. In any case, the habeas corpus application was nothing more than an OPCA argument where so-called “common law” governs and legislation does not apply to those who have not entered into a contract with the state: paras 21-22. Justice Layh concluded d’Abadie was lawfully imprisoned under an unappealed criminal judgment, and the habeas corpus application was dismissed.
 As I observed at the March 31, 2016 hearing, there are more than enough indications in Gauthier’s Alberta litigation to confirm to my satisfaction that “I, a man, Adam” is none other than Adam Christian Gauthier. I agree with Justice Layh’s analysis of the OPCA schemes deployed in d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, and only have a few, additional observations. The ‘no one has made a claim’ motif has been rejected by Canadian courts. Criminal prosecution does not require an ‘injured party’: R v Desautels, 2012 SKPC 29 (CanLII) at para 54, 2012 DTC 5079; R v Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2110 (CanLII) at para 12, 107 WCB (2d) 29.
 The “idiot to legalese” argument and other components of this decision betrays the identity of at least one of Gauthier and d’Abadie’s gurus: Karl Rudolph Lentz. Lentz is a US OPCA guru who uses characteristic motifs, such as “i: a man; prosecutor”, and targets “wrongdoer(s)” who “trespassed on his property”, see for example: Lentz v Robert Bentley, Docket 2:12-cv-1014-MHT, US District Court, Alabama, Northern Division; Lentz v Department of Human Resources, Docket 2:13-cv-387-MEF, US District Court, Alabama, Northern Division. Lentz’s concepts work no better in Canada than in the US. Lentz personally appeared in R v Zombori, (Williams Lake) 20130927 (BCSC), the trial of two Freeman-on-the-Land marijuana grow-op offenders, where the Court explicitly rejected Lentz as a litigation representative. Lentz appears to be nothing more than another OPCA guru fraud who has personally failed when he tried to apply his techniques. He and his ideas are not welcome in Canadian courts.
 Gauthier obviously has a history of OPCA litigation, and that continues despite him being advised to learn the real law. His litigation history also discloses other indicia of vexatious litigation. His “legal gibberish” habeas corpus application rejected in d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen is obviously a collateral attack intended to circumvent the effect of a court order: Stout v Track, 2013 ABQB 751 (CanLII) at paras 79-82, 84-87, 574 AR 59, affirmed 2015 ABCA 10 (CanLII), 9 Alta LR (6th) 341. All three of his actions are hopeless proceedings that cannot offer a reasonable expectation to provide relief: Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, s 23(2)(c); Dykun v Odinshaw, 2000 ABQB 548 (CanLII) at para 42, 267 AR 318, affirmed 2001 ABCA 204 (CanLII), 286 AR 392, leave denied  SCCA No 442.
 Gauthier has engaged in ‘escalating proceedings’ (Dykun v Odinshaw at para 42; Big Bear Hills Inc v Bennett Jones Alberta LLP, 2010 ABQB 764 (CanLII), 507 AR 21; McMeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 (CanLII) at paras 203, 205, 543 AR 132; Arabi v Alberta, 2014 ABQB 295 (CanLII) at para 104, 589 AR 249), in that he targets individuals who were involved in previous legal disputes, such as lawyers (prosecutors). There are a number of potential purposes for Gauthier’s litigation against the Defendants, such as revenge, to harass, or greed, but in any case he has obviously initiated these proceedings for an improper purpose (Judicature Act, s 23(2)(c); Dykun v Odishaw at para 42), because he knows or should know he cannot be successful.
 Gauthier’s d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen litigation is clearly a “busybody” lawsuit with him acting as an “officious buttinsky”: Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 206 (CanLII) at para 4, 510 AR 234, leave refused 2011 ABCA 277 (CanLII), 515 AR 58; Peddle v Alberta Treasury Branches, 2004 ABQB 608 (CanLII), 133 ACWS (3d) 253. Gauthier, without question, met the criteria for “engaging in inappropriate courtroom behaviour” (Judicature Act, s 23(2)(g); Allen v Gray, 2012 ABQB 66 (CanLII) at para 44, 532 AR 252, appeal dismissed for want of prosecution 2013 ABCA 176 (CanLII), 553 AR 124) by his conduct at the March 31, 2016 hearing.
 This, in total, represents seven independent bases on which I could classify Gauthier as having engaged in vexatious litigation. I therefore find, as fact, that Gauthier is a vexatious litigant.
 The only question that remains on that front is whether his access to the Alberta courts should be restricted per Judicature Act, s 23.1. I conclude he is entitled, as a matter of procedural fairness, to make submissions on that point (Lymer v Jonsson, 2016 ABCA 32 (CanLII)), though I note that Master Schulz has warned Gauthier of the implications of his OPCA litigation practices in Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier at para 103, so he cannot be unaware of this possible consequence in this Gauthier v Starr action.
 I also ordered that Gauthier is prohibited from making any further court filings in relation to the three Defendants until those court costs have been paid in a manner that is acceptable to the Defendants. I add the “acceptable to the Defendants” proviso to this order because of Gauthier’s OPCA predilections and to reinforce that he should avoid OPCA ‘money for nothing’ scams such as “A4V” (Meads v Meads at paras 531-543), promissory note and bills of exchange frauds (Meads v Meads, at paras 544-547; Re Boisjoli), and WeRe Bank cheques (Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, 2015 ABQB 700 (CanLII)).
 I invited the Attorneys General to apply to have Gauthier’s access to the Alberta Courts restricted per Judicature Act, s 23.1, at a future hearing date to be set. If the Attorneys General do not choose to take that step then the Court may do so on its own motion. I believe the former alternative is preferable as the Attorneys General may be aware of additional alleged litigation misconduct by Gauthier that is relevant to the Court’s deliberations on that point.
56] Gauthier’s litigation history and persistent OPCA litigation in the face of clear instructions to discontinue his worthless pseudolegal strategies warrants “officious buttinsky” attention. Following Peddle v Alberta Treasury Branches, I therefore order:
1. Adam Christian Gauthier is ordered to identify himself only by his legally correct name, “Adam Christian Gauthier”, in any future communications, documents, filings, or other interactions with the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal.
2. Gauthier is prohibited from acting as an agent, next friend, McKenzie Friend (from McKenzie v McKenzie,  3 All ER 1034 (CA) and Rules 2.22-2.23), or any other form of representative in court proceedings before the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal.
3. The Clerks of the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal shall refuse to accept or file any documents or other materials from Adam Christian Gauthier unless Adam Christian Gauthier is a named party in the action in question.
 Gauthier has now been warned and warned and warned again. He has been pointed to the correct law, but has preferred “Youtube videos of men scribbling on whiteboards”, books with confidence building titles such as “How To Screw ‘Your’ Bank”, and frauds like Karl Lentz. He has now spent enough time in court to know its basic procedures and rules but, apparently, in his view, those apply to someone else. His answer to court directions is “I don’t wish to do so.”
 Gauthier does not get to make up what the law is. He can learn about it, if he chooses. Law is not secret, though it is, at times, complex. Courthouses include law libraries so that members of the public can access recognized and authoritative legal resources. The CanLII website provides what is probably the best, free to the public, collection of jurisprudence and legislation in the world. But Gauthier has not taken advantage of these resources. That is his loss.
 He prefers his own special, magic law, which apparently he gets to make up and define all by himself. Unfortunately for him, if he persists on that path that will bring him no benefit, but only further hardship. In my oral decision I made an observation that Gauthier did not have the advantage of hearing, since he was outside the Court, so I will repeat it in these written reasons for his benefit. OPCA litigants can straighten up. One example was Dennis Larry Meads, the OPCA litigant in Meads v Meads. After he received a detailed explanation of why his arguments were false he abandoned those, and moved to resolve his litigation with the assistance of the Court. He chose to be a ‘fair dealer’ in his litigation, and was treated as such. Other former OPCA litigants have followed the same path. That option is open to Gauthier, though I have to admit that he appears to be less promising candidate for “waking up”, given his conduct to this date. However, one can hope for that, for his own benefit, if nothing else. At a minimum, one can only hope that with his accumulating history of in-court fiascos, no one with any sense would listen to Gauthier as a source for legal advice or information.
Gauthier’s d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen litigation is clearly a “busybody” lawsuit with him acting as an “officious buttinsky”:
 This decision deals with two separate processes. The first is a challenge by Adam Christian Gauthier [“Gauthier”] to the operation of an order of this Court which prohibits the Court Clerks from filing documents which include certain motifs that are legally meaningless, but are also both highly stereotypic and characteristic of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments [“OPCA”], as defined in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 543 AR 215. Litigation based on OPCA concepts is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of court processes: Meads v Meads at paras 554-56, 585-85, 606. Many key OPCA concepts are so notoriously false that simply employing these concepts creates a presumption that a person is in court for abusive, improper, and ulterior purposes: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 (CanLII), 40, 368 Nfld & PEIR 80.
 The second part of this decision has this Court, on its own motion and authority, evaluate Gauthier’s history of litigation misconduct, and then place court access restrictions on him. While Gauthier was previously declared a vexatious litigant (Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 (CanLII), 86 CPC (7th) 348) he had not, until the present, been the subject of broad-based controls on his access to Alberta Courts. Gauthier’s continued attempts to misuse this Court’s processes warrants that additional step.
1. where a name is expressed in a “dash-colon” format,
2. where an individual marks a personal name with a copyright “©” or trademark “™” symbol,
3. that are marked by one or more ink fingerprints, or blood, or
4. which have postage stamps attached.
 The purpose of the Master Order is straight-forward. The Master Order is designed to intercept OPCA litigation at the earliest possible point so that persons attempting to file such are directed to Meads v Meads, given notice of the irregular and legally incorrect nature of OPCA schemes, and then have the opportunity to abandon pseudolegal concepts before those misconceptions lead to unnecessary, abusive, and futile litigation, and the expenditure of litigant and court resources.
B. Gauthier’s Attempts to File
 On July 18, 2017, Gauthier appeared, without notice, in Chambers before Ross J seeking a fiat to file certain documents. Gauthier explained what had led to that:
I had a little discussion with the ladies downstairs and they took a little exception because on a section of the paperwork which is a document from a previously filed, previous filing from 2014, the word independent sovereign individual is there, and they’re trying to suggest that that may make this paperwork fall into OPCA litigation.
 He further elaborated on why a fiat should be issued:I don’t even believe they had legitimate grounds to block me, right. ... They pulled out the regulation that is by the policy, that’s been permitting, they actually also pulled out also the order where I was declared vexatious by Rooke. In that order it stops me from filing anything in respect of those three defendants from a previous case that has nothing to do with this whatsoever.
 After a preliminary review of Gauthier’s documents and their subject matter, Ross J declined to immediately issue a fiat, but stated she would engage in a closer review of these items, along with any court orders that related to Gauthier. Gauthier then continued to further explain his perspective:Maybe I’ll just clarify so that you’re clear, you don’t think that I believe because I am a human being that is the reason that I am afforded the right to the enjoyment of property. That’s a common law right that existed long before the state. You guys are operating on the assumption that the statute is always in line with the Charter. I’d happily like to rebut that in this case ...
 The Master Order attached to her letter identifies at least two defects: Gauthier refers to himself as a “sovereign man”, and Gauthier uses duplicate names, with one name in all upper-case letters, the other in lower-case or mixed-case text.
 Gauthier, on July 19, 2017, responded by email with submissions concerning the July 18, 2017 documents, and asked that Ross J forward that email to me, which she did. Gauthier subsequently emailed me three additional identical emails on August 3, 8 and 10, 2017. Additional emails requesting a response were received from Gauthier on August 17 and September 11, 2017.
 That review also indicated the July 18, 2017 documents advance a further OPCA scheme where Gauthier claims to be outside state authority because he has ‘opted out’ of government and court control. He is “a man of the common law ... with full legal capacity at all times”, and an “Independent Sovereign Individual”. He has “rescinded” “the legal person GAUTHIER, ADAM CHRISTIAN, the Canadian citizen, the member of society” via a document titled a “Claim of Right”.
 That document purports to bar “... the bringing of charges under any statute or Act against Adam C. Gauthier, Independent Sovereign Individual.” [emphasis in original]. Any government, law enforcement, or court actor who interferes with Gauthier must pay “FIFTY ounces of Silver PER MINUTE” [emphasis in original]. Gauthier will enforce these fines via a Notary Public, who will:
... secure payment of the aforementioned FEE SCHEDULE against any transgressors who by their actions or omissions harm my interests or me directly or by proxy in any way.
 Stating the obvious, these claims are nonsense.
 The July 18, 2017 documents also disclose that Gauthier, on July 13, 2017, was driving a black 2001 Ford Focus owned by Justina Beth Smith of Edmonton. The vehicle had a fake licence plate attached which read “private non commercial use only”. This attracted the attention of the Edmonton Police Service. Gauthier was stopped, detained, and arrested after he refused to identify himself. Gauthier received three tickets under Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, c T-6 for:
• s 54(1)(a) - driving without insurance,
• s 94(2) - driving while unauthorized to do so, and
• a third charge which is not legible from the traffic ticket.
The vehicle was seized per Traffic Safety Act, s 173.
 Gauthier claimed his Charter rights have been breached in relation to the July 13, 2017 event. He claimed he is due damages and return of the Ford Focus because he is outside the law. This is, again, false.
III. Prospective Control of Gauthier’s Abuse of Alberta Courts
 As stated in the introduction to this decision, the purpose of this decision is not simply to document why Gauthier’s OPCA documents were rejected, but to provide reasons for why this Court, on its own motion and under its inherent jurisdiction, is restricting Gauthier’s access to the Alberta courts. This is not, in fact, the first time Gauthier has engaged in litigation activities that abuse the Court’s processes. He has been repeatedly warned that his attempts to litigate on the basis of certain pseudolegal concepts will be unsuccessful and then result in negative consequences.
 In the face of this continuing abuse of process, it is now time to take steps to restrict Gauthier’s access to Alberta courts via what is commonly called a vexatious litigant order, so as to minimize his abuse of those institutions, and the persons he targets without a lawful basis.
 Some items in the “List of Authorities” are entirely cryptic, such as “the lost ways. Survival book.” As best I can determine, this is a text written by a Claude Davis that, among other things, teaches how to manufacture pemmican, a traditional aboriginal preserved food made from meat, fat, and berries.
 It is a principle of law, and simply common sense, that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts: Starr v Houlden, 1990 CanLII 112 (SCC),  1 SCR 1366, 68 DLR (4th) 641. Gauthier has been told he has advanced pseudolegal concepts that do not work, and will never work. He has been cautioned that continuing to use these spurious concepts may lead to negative consequences. He has, nonetheless, persisted. Since Gauthier will not listen to the Court’s warnings, it is time to control his litigation activities.
 At the conclusion of Gauthier v Starr, I invited the Attorney Generals to apply to have Gauthier declared a vexatious litigant and have his court access restricted, but “if the Attorneys General do not choose to take that step then the Court may do so on its own motion.”: para 53. The Attorneys General of Alberta and Canada did not take that step. So, in light of Gauthier’s continued litigation misconduct, it is time for this Court to act on its own motion.
 First, Gauthier’s history establishes future abusive litigation is grimly predictable. He does not take “no” for an answer. His August 3/8/10, 2017 email is explicit: he intends to take procedurally abusive action against those he considers to be wrongdoers.
 His philosophy and animus to government means he plausibly will litigate against any government, law enforcement, or court actor who will or has crossed his path. In Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier he previously advanced OPCA concepts in an attempt to frustrate collection of mortgage debts due under contract. Given these facts I cannot identify a subset or category of potential litigation targets for Gauthier’s abusive court activities. He is a threat to every Canadian.
 Similarly, Gauthier’s misconduct spans everything from illegal defenses to debt collection, to attempts to attack government workers engaged in their duties, to illegal claims on property, to springing a convicted drug trafficker from prison. I see no way to predict a focus or restriction on Gauthier’s misuse of courts. In fact, the opposite is likely, since he is so globally offended by what he (incorrectly) identifies as oppression and conspiracy.
 These two conclusions also favour broad court access restriction.
 Last, Gauthier’s misconduct has occurred at all levels of court. He has made spurious appeals, such as occurred in the Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, and as reported in R v d’Abadie, 2016 SKCA 72 (CanLII). I therefore restrict Gauthier’s access to all three levels of Alberta Courts, though in taking that step I am mindful of jurisprudence from the Alberta Court of Appeal in relation to the preconditions for court access restriction in that Court which is difficult to reconcile: Hok #2; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General); 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 (CanLII).
 Gauthier’s conduct in Court has been problematic. He is not forthright with judges, and has been uncooperative with the Court Clerks. He is argumentative and disruptive. He clandestinely attempted to record court proceedings, which he says is his right. In his Claim of Right he has said that he has the right to set up his own vigilante “de jure” court, and, like Allen Nelson Boisjoli in Re Boisjoli, Gauthier claimed he can use Notaries Public to enforce property claims on those he has ‘judged’. He has misused the habeas corpus procedure (R v Abadie, 2016 SKQB 101 (CanLII), aff’d 2016 SKCA 72 (CanLII)), and as a busybody interfering third party, no less. I adopt Justice Thomas’ conclusion in Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), at paras 170-87, that abuse of habeas corpus is a special aggravating factor. If that appears in a history of vexatious litigation then stricter court access control is warranted.
 Given these facts, Gauthier’s history, and his clear animus to the persons he views as wrongdoers, I find that an additional and more unusual step is required to control his abuse of Alberta Courts. As in Re Boisjoli and Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), I also order that Gauthier is prohibited from making any leave application to the Alberta Provincial Court, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, or Alberta Court of Appeal except where that filing is made by a member of the Law Society of Alberta. This will help screen Gauthier’s future court activities to minimize further abuse of the courts and other litigants.
 I therefore order:
1. Adam Christian Gauthier is prohibited, under the inherent jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing any appeal, action, application, or proceeding in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, or the Provincial Court of Alberta, on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate, without an order of the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, of the Court in which the proceeding is conducted, or his or her designate.
2. The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may, at any time, direct that notice of an application to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding be given to any other person.
3. Adam Christian Gauthier must describe himself, in the application or document to which this Order applies as “Adam Christian Gauthier”, and not by using initials, an alternative name structure, or a pseudonym.
4. Any application for leave will only be accepted if Adam Christian Gauthier is represented by a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta.
5. Any application to commence or continue any appeal, action, application, or proceeding must be accompanied by an affidavit:
(i) attaching a copy of the Order arising from this Decision, restricting Adam Christian Gauthier’s access to the Alberta Court of Appeal, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and Provincial Court of Alberta;
(ii) attaching a copy of the appeal, pleading, application, or process that Adam Christian Gauthier proposes to issue or file or continue;
(iii) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it;
(iv) indicating whether Adam Christian Gauthier has ever sued some or all of the defendants or respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars;
(v) undertaking that, if leave is granted, the authorized appeal, pleading, application or process, the Order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the Order will promptly be served on the defendants or respondents; and
(vi) undertaking to diligently prosecute the proceeding.
6. Any application referenced herein shall be made in writing.
7. The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may:
(i) give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to:
a) the involved potential parties;
b) other relevant persons identified by the Court; and
c) the Attorney Generals of Alberta and Canada.
(ii) respond to the leave application in writing; and
(iii) hold the application in open Court where it shall be recorded.
8. Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs.
9. An application that is dismissed may not be made again.
10. An application to vary or set aside this Order must be made on notice to any person as directed by the Court.
 This order takes effect immediately.
Furthermore, I claim my FEE SCHEDULE for any unlawful transgressions by any peace officers, government principals, agents or justice system participants is FIFTY ounces of Silver PER MINUTE based upon the established precedent of $25,000.00 per 23 minutes of detention. This is in accordance with the court ruling in the matter of James C. TREZEVANT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF TAMPA, a municipal corporation, Hillsborough County Board of Criminal Justice, et al., Defendants-Appellants Nos. 83-3370, 83-3038, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 741 F.2d 336; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18863.
Central booking has two entrances. In 1979, one of the entrances was used by bail bondsmen and lawyers to post bail bonds. Through a series of halls, this entrance leads to a glass window adjacent to the central booking desk. The only other entrance was used by policemen who were taking arrestees to be booked. This second entrance opened into a large room adjacent to the booking desk. Officer Eicholz escorted Mr. Trezevant to central booking and when they arrived he frisked Mr. Trezevant and took him through the door normally used by policemen with arrestees in custody. Officer Eicholz walked up to the central booking desk and presented the jailer on duty with Mr. Trezevant and with the citations that Mr. Trezevant had refused to sign. The jailer took Mr. Trezevant's valuables and his belt and shoes and placed Mr. Trezevant in a holding cell until he could be processed. Mr. Trezevant was in the holding cell for a total of twenty-three minutes.
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the City of Tampa and HBCJ would have us find that there was no evidence of a policy that caused the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. They would each have us look at their actions in this matter individually. The City of Tampa contends that Officer Eicholz properly escorted Mr. Trezevant to central booking and turned him over to HBCJ for processing. The City argues that once Officer Eicholz reached the booking desk and handed the citations to the deputy on duty, the City was absolved of all further responsibility. Even though Officer Eicholz was present and observed that Mr. Trezevant was being incarcerated, the City believes that Officer Eicholz had no responsibility to object to the incarceration.
The HBCJ, on the other hand, argues that it did nothing wrong because all that its personnel did was accept a prisoner from Officer Eicholz on citations that were marked for arrest.3 The HBCJ would have us hold that their deputy did not do anything wrong because he believed in good faith that Mr. Trezevant was under arrest and that the deputy had no obligation to make any inquiry of Officer Eicholz concerning Mr. Trezevant's status. We cannot agree with either the city or the HBCJ.
There was evidence of Mr. Trezevant's back pain and the jailer's refusal to provide medical treatment and Mr. Trezevant is certainly entitled to compensation for the incarceration itself and for the mental anguish that he has suffered from the entire episode. This award does not "shock the court's conscience" nor is it "grossly excessive" or "contrary to right reason." Finally, there is no indication that the jury considered this amount to be punitive as opposed to compensatory.
Burnaby49 wrote:In other words, every courtroom in Alberta.
Then on to the hammer;
Since that hasn't happened in this case Rooke decided to take the initiative and do it himself!
Judge Rooke, accompanied by his clerks and prothonotaries:
Time to post another update on Adam's continuing adventures!
SteveUK wrote:An excellent write up as always. Rooke really is seriously pissed of with these idiots. I almost felt sorry for our hero litigant for a minute. A total judicial kick in the bollocks if ever there was .
I wonder , if there was a fmotl version of the Fatwa, what price would they put on his head? A billion REs, a gazillion ounces of silver ???
Burnaby49 wrote:I give up. There's just no pleasing you people. After all of your constant complaining about my purported lazy abuse of the verb stomp in respect to the actions of the Court of Queen's Bench (stomping, stomps, stomped) I made a deliberate choice to avoid using it in this posting. I had thought to start the posting with the sentence "Judge Rook inflicts another stomping on a hapless OPCA victim".
Burnaby49 wrote:After all of your constant complaining about my purported lazy abuse of the verb stomp in respect to the actions of the Court of Queen's Bench (stomping, stomps, stomped) I made a deliberate choice to avoid using it in this posting.
Burnaby49 wrote:But I drew back. I said to myself 'No, it will just result in yet more of Observer's constant whining'.
Burnaby49 wrote:Happy now Observer?
But I know how much Observer loves my boot stompin' metaphor so I decided to use that instead.
Burnaby49 wrote:I did it to mock you.
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