Yankson decision is out but not yet posted on the BC Supreme Court website. I've done a crude cut and paste of a PDF I was sent, I'll link to the actual document when the court posts it. Seems to be pretty much just an expansion of the oral decision.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Yankson v. Canada (Attorney General),
2013 BCSC 2332
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of British Columbia, and Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia
- and -
Bernard Yankson Trust
Her Majesty the Queen, Crown Corporation of Canada, Attorney General of Canada, Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, Solicitor General of British Columbia, Attorney General of British Columbia, Premier of British Columbia, City of Vancouver, Minister of Health; Terry Lake
Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Savage
Oral Reasons for Judgment
Yankson v. Canada (Attorney General)
Appearing on his own behalf:
Counsel for the Defendant, Attorney General of Canada:
Counsel for the Defendant, Attorney General of British Columbia
Counsel for the Defendant, City of Vancouver
No other appearances
Place and Date of Hearing:
October 16, 2013
Place and Date of Judgment:
October 16, 2013
 There are three applications before me by defendants in action S135934 to strike out and dismiss the plaintiff’s notice of civil claim. This action was commenced August 7, 2013. The applications are brought by the Attorney General of British Columbia, the Attorney General of Canada, and the City of Vancouver. The plaintiff in that action is styled “Bernard Yankson Trust”.
 There are three applications before me in action S135307, two applications by the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Attorney General of Canada to strike out and dismiss the plaintiff’s notice of civil claim, and an application by the plaintiff seeking “free association” rights, and “relief” specified therein. This action was commenced July 15, 2013.
 The Attorney General of British Columbia also seeks an order in action S135307 declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant requiring leave of the court before commencing any new proceedings. The plaintiff in that action is more simply styled “Bernard Yankson”.
 The plaintiff also has an application before me seeking summary judgment.
II. Application to strike claims
 Rule 9-5(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules provides the court with the authority to strike the whole or any part of a pleading on four grounds: (1) where a pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence; (2) where a pleading is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (3) where a pleading may prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial or hearing of the proceeding; and (4) where a pleading is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
 Rule 9-5(2) provides that no evidence is admissible where a party is seeking to strike a claim on the basis that the pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence.
 An application under Rule 9-5 is distinct from applications under Rule 9-6 which are concerned with the merits of claims and for which evidence is admissible. The test on application under Rule 9-5(1)(a) is whether it is plain and obvious that the pleadings disclose no cause of action: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69. It is a test with a high threshold; after all, the effect of striking pleadings in whole, is to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim: see Woolsey v. Dawson Creek (City), 2011 BCSC 751 at paras. 27-30.
 Another ground which will found an application to strike pleadings is where the matter is an abuse of process, which violates principles such as “judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice”: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at paras. 9 and 12.
III. Discussion and Analysis
 The defendants here take the position that the plaintiff’s pleadings are “utterly incomprehensible”. In one small aspect, they appear to be related to a birth certificate in action S135934, but no facts are alleged which would enable the reader to understand what is alleged. For example, there are multiple references to slavery, kidnapping, peonage, trafficking in persons, piracy, and conspiracy to kidnap.
 There are some concepts and assertions that I find impenetrable. For example, in paragraph 2 of the claim in action S135934, it is stated that “The plaintiff gives notice that the Bernard Yankson Trust - T3 4141 85, is a non-resident (inter vivos) master trust location in Ottawa, Ontario with Canada Revenue Agency and is managed by the grantor for the needs of protecting assets under gross negligence, aggression, breach, trespass and invasion of estate property”. No effort is made in the pleadings to relate this assertion to subsequent facts, giving rise to a cause of action, although the trust is referenced further.
 Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the notice of civil claim in action S135934 make some assertions that the notice of civil claim accomplishes certain results, such as authorizing others to do certain things, including the Canada Revenue Agency, the various defendants before this court and even the court itself. Statements in a notice of civil claim can do no such thing.
 Several paragraphs then review matters relating to the attempt by the plaintiff to obtain a birth certificate and then says “The grantor gives notice under a moral claim that all legal title and equitable title for Jamuna Moor and all derivatives not limiting middle names are the property of the Bernard Yankson Trust - T3 4141 85, which was already provide to the Ministry under the attachments issued to the Ministry of Health…” The notice of civil claim then says that this statement “…satisfies section 8 of the Escheats Act of British Columbia and the deliberate tort against the grantor (s) administration to account for (personal), equitable, and moral property is listed under the liability of the provisions of the Bernard Yankson Trust (estate)”.
 The pleadings are almost bereft of factual assertions. There are two paragraphs, paragraphs 31 and 32, which name the City of Vancouver. Paragraph 31 appears to recite part of the 1953 printing of the Vancouver Charter. Paragraph 32 then says that “…the City of Vancouver is complicit and party to the derogation of personal property rights of all people under trover and conversion and have NOT provided sufficient information or education to the (“taxpayers”) people about their right of free association under Article 2(d) of the Supreme Law of the land”. There are no facts asserted as to how this has come about.
 The plaintiff then seeks relief in the form of monetary damages for $50,000,000 for various torts including “peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons”, “trover and conversion”, “fraud”, “perjury”, “intimidation” etc. There are no facts pleaded, however, that are capable of giving rise to any of these extravagant assertions. The plaintiff asserts in argument that materials have been delivered to Buckingham Palace but does not relate this to how he might succeed in these actions.
 The pleadings in action S135307 are of the same form and character, so I will not repeat them here, except in one respect. In this action, the plaintiff claims as part of his relief, judgment in another matter, action S099298. Action S135307 is not capable of bringing about this relief.
 I have considered whether these pleadings, by amendment, might somehow be saved in whole or in part. In my view they cannot. In the result, I strike the plaintiff’s pleadings in both actions and dismiss these claims. In the result, it is unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs application for summary judgment in action S135307.
IV. Vexatious Litigant
 The defendants led by the Attorney General of British Columbia argue that the materials filed by the plaintiff and attached to his notice of civil claim bear the hallmarks of what Rooke A.C.J. called an “organized pseudolegal commercial argument” which is not capable of success and has been characterized as “an affront to the dignity of the court” and “gibberish”: see Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, at para. 165 and 191. As such, the defendants say the plaintiff should be declared a vexatious litigant.
 The requirements for finding a person to be a vexatious litigant are set out in section 18 of the Supreme Court Act:
18 If, on application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him or her an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court.
 A finding that a person is a vexatious litigant does not bar that person from using the court process. Rather, before embarking on a court action, the prospective litigant must obtain leave of the court before commencing proceedings.
 In this case the plaintiff is a party to five different actions. In one action he was a defendant in an action brought in debt. He is a plaintiff in two actions brought against the Vancouver Police Department. He is the plaintiff in these two actions, brought against the Attorney General of British Columbia, the Attorney General of Canada, the Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, Her Majesty the Queen, and entity called the “Crown Corporation of Canada”, the Solicitor General of British Columbia, the Premier of British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, and the Minister of Health.
 In my opinion, in reviewing the applications in this matter, the two proceedings before me and the pleadings and positions taken in the CIBC action, the plaintiff has commenced or defended actions with no prospect for success. He has also pled for relief that no reasonable person could reasonably hope to obtain. He has sought relief against persons without relating those claims to the persons named as defendants. The plaintiff has rolled forward, by repetition and supplementation, claims for relief referable to other proceedings. The pleadings in these two actions are, while mostly impenetrable, repetitive in their prolixity. In action S135934, for example, the notice of civil claim runs to 78 paragraphs, all of which are similar to what I have referenced earlier here. There are, I am advised, outstanding orders for costs against the litigant.
 I am cognizant that the power to order that a person must seek leave before becoming a litigant is a drastic measure that should be exercised with caution: see Koyama v. Leigh, 2001 BCSC 164. That said, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has been shown to be a vexatious litigant, and that any future proceedings should only be instituted by him upon further order of this court. The plaintiff then, is declared a vexatious litigant.
 The plaintiff’s actions are dismissed. The plaintiff is declared to be a vexatious litigant. No action may be commenced by him in this court without leave of the court.
 I dispense with the plaintiff having to approve the form of order. We are adjourned.
“The Honourable Mr. Justice Savage