Miykael Farad Muhammad: Traveler, Victim, Loser

[KickahaOta]

Yet another sovereign traveler has his basic human rights quashed by the courts' heartless refusal to adopt basic principles of natural law.


United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 10, 2016* Decided March 11, 2016

Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge; RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge; ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 15-2119

MIYKAEL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:13–cv–02916.
John Robert Blakey, Judge.

O R D E R

Miykael Muhammad sued the City of Chicago and others for allegedly violating his civil rights during a traffic stop when a police officer forced him to take a field sobriety test. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During discovery Muhammad failed repeatedly to answer fully the defendants’ interrogatories, even after the district court ordered him twice to do so. To sanction his obstinacy, the district court dismissed his suit with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Because we conclude that the sanction was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Discovery in this case did not go smoothly. Muhammad objected to most of the defendants’ interrogatories, so the defendants moved the district court to compel answers. Among other requests, the defendants wanted Muhammad to disclose some biographic facts: all the names “by which [he] ha[s] been known,” his “current and past driver’s license number(s),” and whether he has previously been “pulled over, stopped, or arrested.” The district court ordered Muhammad to answer the interrogatories within two weeks. It reasoned that the interrogatories do not “seek to inquire into privileged subjects,” created no “undue burden,” and were relevant to the suit.

Muhammad responded nearly a month after the deadline, but the defendants believed that his answers were incomplete, so they sought further relief. Muhammad said that “Miykael Farad Muhammad” was the name that “Allah-Jahovah-God” gave him “before” he was born in “the aboriginal year of 15062.” He failed to say whether he was known by other names. He also failed to acknowledge a driver’s license, asserting that he does not “own” any “government numbers” because God has endowed him with the “right to travel the planet.” And he refused to discuss any past traffic stops and arrests, proclaiming that he disagreed with “the meaning of the Defendant’s language.” The defendants filed a second motion to compel, which the district court referred (along with general discovery supervision) to a magistrate judge. That judge ordered Muhammad to explain why she should not recommend sanctions under Rule 37(b). Muhammad responded that he had never been served with the second motion to compel and that the defendants’ interrogatories violated his rights. The defendants countered that Muhammad’s suit should be dismissed for his intransigence.

The magistrate judge granted the defendants’ second motion to compel and ordered Muhammad to provide complete answers in 10 days. She reiterated the district court’s prior ruling that the interrogatories were relevant and not unduly burdensome and admonished that, by filing his suit, Muhammad had accepted the obligation to respond to discovery requests. As for sanctions, she concluded that because dismissal is a drastic remedy and Muhammad is proceeding pro se, she would permit a final opportunity to comply. She warned, however, that she would “view further noncompliance as willful and done in bad faith.”

Eventually the court lost its patience. Muhammad refused to amend his responses, instead remonstrating that he did not consent to proceed before a magistrate judge and disputing the conclusion that his previous answers had been inadequate. The magistrate judge recommended that the district judge dismiss the suit. She reasoned that Muhammad had squandered his opportunities to answer the interrogatories, and his repeated non-compliance—causing a five-month delay—was willful and in bad faith. She also observed that, because Muhammad was proceeding in forma pauperis, monetary sanctions would be ineffective. Two weeks later the district judge, noting that Muhammad had not objected to the recommendation, adopted it in its entirety and dismissed the case with prejudice. Muhammad moved the district court to reconsider the sanction, asserting that he had not received the recommendation. But the district court concluded that Muhammad offered no new reason to reconsider its dismissal of the suit and denied the motion.

On appeal Muhammad first argues that dismissal of his suit was improper because he did not consent to a magistrate judge. Consent was not needed because a district judge, not the magistrate judge, dismissed his case. And no consent was necessary for the magistrate judge to supervise discovery and recommend sanctions to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Egan v. Freedom Bank, 659 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2011).

Muhammad next argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the suit. He contends that the harsh sanction of dismissal was unwarranted given his lack of legal expertise. True, a dismissal under Rule 37 is a severe sanction; it requires a finding of willfulness, bad faith, or fault. See Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). But the district court reasonably found that, by twice disobeying orders to provide the names that he’s been known by, his driver’s license numbers, and traffic stops and arrests, Muhammad displayed willful, bad-faith conduct. The requests were simple and easy to answer. And they were relevant because they sought basic data about Muhammad’s identity, and his criminal history, which could affect his credibility. The district court thus permissibly concluded that Muhammad evaded these requests out of an uncooperative lack of candor, rather than an absence of legal skills, so sanctions were needed. See e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e weigh not only the straw that finally broke the camel’s back, but all the straws that the recalcitrant party piled on over the course of the lawsuit.”); Long v. Steepro, 213 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2000). And the district court considered lesser sanctions, see Maynard, 332 F.3d at 468, but reasonably found that a monetary sanction would be ineffective because Muhammad lacked funds; therefore deterrence required a dismissal.

Muhammad also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, arguing that he had provided evidence that he was not notified of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. But Muhammad’s motion did not raise any objections to the recommended dismissal, other than repeating the baseless protest to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. In any case, we have considered all of his arguments raised on appeal, and they are unavailing. The district court therefore properly concluded that Muhammad had not presented any new basis warranting reconsideration of the dismissal. See Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014).

AFFIRMED.

[morrand]

At first blush, this just looks like some poor madman trying, and failing badly, to dodge a DUI.

Ah, but if you search for Mr. Muhammad in the county recorder's office, you get this:

Clerk: Please File and Record

RECORDING PREPARED & REQUESTED BY:
Miykael Farad Muhammad

AND AFTER RECORDING MAIL TO:

Miykael Farad Muhammad
c/o 8708 [address redacted --M]
Chicago
Illinois Republic

Use the above mailing location EXACTLY AS PRINTED

MAIL ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS TO:
ISIS-ARNA
c/o 3000 Chestnut Street #42083
Shaykhamaxum (Philadelphia Pennsylvania 19101)

Doc# 1407119171 Fee: $52.00
Karen A. Yarbrough
Cook County Recorder of Deeds
Date: 03/12/2014 04:13 PM Pg: 1 of 8

Custodian of Name Correction and Nationality Documents
The indigenous nationality of Miykael Farad Muhammad is protected and governed by the Constitution of ARNA, International Law, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations Right to Remedy and reparation 60-147, and United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The above-mentioned Aboriginal is a U.S. National according to Treaty and Vol 66 stat 238 (US Statutes) & USC 8 Section 1401(b).
All applicable treaties between the Aboriginal-American & Moorish Nations and the United States of America are applicable.
Indigenous National (Miykael Farad Muhammad) is an indigenous living flesh and blood being born and domiciled in Shaykhamaxum Samal Shariq or another indigenous territory, all of which are Indigenous Lands protected under International Law as TRUST Territories.
The above action is not made to defraud anyone or to violate any laws applicable to Aboriginal Americans. It is made to remedy the genocidal acts and acts of denationalization against the political identity of the Indigenous National herein.
The Indigenous National (Miykael Farad Muhammad) is an Indigenous National of the International Indigenous Society (ISIS-ARNA) and Aboriginal Republic of North America Aboriginal Xi-Amaru (Aboriginal Cherokee-Choctaw Tribal U.A.), an Indigenous Government operating an Indigenous Plebiscite which has been noticed to and confirmed by the United States Department of States (Federal Authentication # 060131441) signed by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and in conformity with 22 CFR 131.1 & 131.2, USC Title 4 section 42 and is protected/governed by International Law UN Charter, United Nations Delcaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Article 4) - Self Autonomy Government.
[signed: Miykael Muhammad] All Rights Reserved
Authentication/Seal of Indigenous National


CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NOTARY PUBLIC
State: Illinois Republic
County: Cook County

This document was acknowledged before me on 3 Feb 2014 (Date) by Miykael Muhammad.

[signed] Antoinette Griffin
(Signature of Notarial Officer)
Civil Law Notary - Notary Public for [IL?] Cook
My commission expires February 18, 2015

XXV ARNA ©

It goes on for seven pages more, establishing that Mr. Muhammad is claiming to be a Moorish National, or one of their fellow travelers, anyway.

Linking yourself to ISIS on the public record seems a bad idea under current world conditions. It's not them, though; it's the International Society of Indigenous Sovereigns, and with a name like that...well, you know the drill.

I (Miykael Farad Muhammad) am exempt from Registration and Licensing in this State as I am a Non-Resident residing on Aboriginal Lands

Article 1 Tribal Traffic Code-Laws of Motor Vehicle Code of the 50 States

Tribal Vehicles exempt from registration. ...

"Motor Vehicle Code of the 50 States," hm? Didn't know we had one of those. Anyway, before he was Miykael, it sort of looks like Mr. Muhammad went by the name of Michael Gardner based on the last page of the file, and a name that common leads nowhere interesting. But if you want to see some authentic Moorish gibberish, with some authentic Cub Scout humor/form failure thrown in (my emphasis):

...This affidavit is made under penalties of perjury and must be responded to by a counter affidavit by and and all parties within 30 days or it will stand as undisputed fact as a matter of law
I Your Name Here declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of my Indigenous Tribal Government and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

...there's a good file for you.