Maine Rejects Bogus UCC Filing

[Pantherphil]

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2009 ME 75
Docket: Ken-09-60
Submitted
On Briefs: July 8, 2009
Decided: July 23, 2009
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
v.
WILLIAM TARDIF
PER CURIAM
[¶1] William Tardif appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Kennebec County, Jabar, J.) finding that Tardif made an unauthorized UCC filing
with the Maine Secretary of State, and ordering the Secretary to remove the filing
from the UCC index. Tardif asserts that the UCC filing was proper because the
Chief Executive Officer of Mechanics Savings Bank, and the bank’s attorney, were
liable for the bank’s alleged breach of contract resulting from its compliance with a
Department of Health and Human Services order to turn over funds Tardif had on
deposit.1 We affirm the judgment and impose sanctions against Tardif for filing a
frivolous appeal.
1 Tardif also challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the Superior Court, and the constitutionality
of the Department’s actions in ordering the bank to turn over Tardif’s funds to satisfy a child support
arrearage. We find these arguments to be without merit and do not discuss them further.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In March 2005, the Department entered a child support order against
Tardif, ordering him to pay $54 per week and finding him to be $2402 in arrears.
Tardif unsuccessfully challenged the order. Tardif v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Mem 09-9 (Jan. 20, 2009). Tardif had a certificate of deposit at Mechanics
Savings Bank. In August 2006, the Department served a “withhold and deliver”
order on the bank pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2358 (2008).2 The bank promptly
complied with the order and delivered $5224 to the Department.
[¶3] In a subsequent series of correspondence with the bank, Tardif declared
a default judgment in favor of himself against the bank’s CEO in the amount of
$22,326. When the bank’s attorney sent him an explanatory letter, Tardif declared
the attorney to be a judgment debtor as well. When neither “debtor” paid Tardif’s
self-declared judgment, Tardif filed a UCC Financing Statement with the Maine
Secretary of State, showing their alleged debt to be $23,227.89.
[¶4] The Department, complying with its statutory obligation pursuant to
5 M.R.S. § 90-E (2008) and 19-A M.R.S. § 2358(8) to defend the bank officials
and hold them harmless,3 filed a petition in the Kennebec County Superior Court,
2 The statute provides that “[t]he commissioner may serve on any person an order to withhold and
deliver any property . . . that is due or belongs to the responsible parent . . . .” 19-A M.R.S. § 2358(1)
(2008).
3 Title 5 M.R.S. § 90-E(2)(A) (2008) provides that:
3
asking the court to declare that Tardif’s filing was unauthorized and therefore
ineffective. Tardif filed a motion to dismiss the petition and a request for joinder,
seeking to have the court remove the Department from the case and list the bank’s
CEO and attorney as plaintiffs; both motions were denied. On December 1, 2008,
the court entered judgment for the Department and ordered that the financing
statement be removed from the UCC index. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] The Superior Court could enter judgment in the Department’s favor
“only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 5 M.R.S. § 90-E(2)(E). Accordingly,
we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Tardif to see if the
Department was entitled as a matter of law to a declaration that Tardif’s UCC
filing was unauthorized and thus ineffective.
Any individual who asserts that the filing of a financing statement record that provides
that individual’s name as a debtor is not an authorized filing may file, at any time, a
motion for a judicial declaration that the financing statement record is not an authorized
filing . . . and thus is not effective with respect to that individual . . . .
Title 19-A M.R.S. § 2358(8) (2008) provides that:
A person who honors an order to withhold and deliver is discharged from any liability or
obligation to the responsible parent for that property. The department warrants that it
will defend and hold harmless any such persons for honoring the order.
4
[¶6] We have no difficulty in concluding that Tardif’s UCC filing against
the bank officials was both unauthorized and no less frivolous than is this appeal.
First, and most obviously, Tardif could not simply self-declare into existence a
valid default judgment without any resort to the judicial process. Second, by
statute the Legislature has declared that the bank officials are discharged from any
liability to Tardif for money turned over to the Department in compliance with its
order. 19-A M.R.S. § 2358(8). In the same letter that resulted in his being named
as an additional “judgment debtor,” the bank’s attorney advised Tardif of the
bank’s statutory obligation to comply with the order. Finally, Tardif was not
authorized to file a UCC financing statement unless he had authority to do so
pursuant to 11 M.R.S. §§ 9-1509 or 9-1708, and he has established no such
authority. 5 M.R.S. § 90-E(1)(A).4
[¶7] Tardif’s self-represented status affords him no protection from our
conclusion that he could not have expected to prevail on such a meritless appeal, or
from our finding that his appeal is therefore frivolous. See Edwards v. Campbell,
2008 ME 173, ¶ 11, 960 A.2d 324, 327 (stating that “self-represented litigants are
held to the same standards as represented parties” (quotation marks omitted)).
4 Title 5 M.R.S. § 90-E(1)(A) (2008) provides that:
“Authorized,” when used with reference to a financing statement record, means that the
financing statement record was filed by a person authorized to do so as provided in
Title 11, sections 9-1509 and 9-1708.
5
Accordingly, pursuant to M.R. App. P. 13(f), we award $500 in costs to the Office
of the Attorney General, which represented the Department in this appeal.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. William Tardif is
ordered to pay $500 in costs to the State of
Maine Office of the Attorney General.
William Tardif, pro se:
William Tardif
703 Adams Street
Rapid City, South Dakota 57701
Attorneys for the Maine Department
of Health and Human Services:
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General
Debby Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen.
Office of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006

[Pottapaug1938]

Does anyone want to bet that this case will convince UCC-delusionals like the :Browns that the UCC, after all, has nothing to do with anything that they say?

[Bill E. Branscum]

Does anyone want to bet that this case will convince UCC-delusionals like the :Browns that the UCC, after all, has nothing to do with anything that they say?

Uhhhhh . . . no.

[Doktor Avalanche]

Does anyone want to bet that this case will convince UCC-delusionals like the :Browns that the UCC, after all, has nothing to do with anything that they say?

I used to believe that people, deep down, were a reasonable bunch until I discovered Quatloos.

[Arthur Rubin]

Does anyone want to bet that this case will convince UCC-delusionals like the :Browns that the UCC, after all, has nothing to do with anything that they say?

I used to believe that people, deep down, were a reasonable bunch until I discovered Quatloos.

I discovered news:misc.taxes and news:misc.legal long before Al Gore invented the Internet (oops) I mean, long before I, at least, had Internet access.

With my Atari 800 and 300 baud modem. (But that's for the "steam-powered computer" thread in Potpourri.)