First a bit of technical Canadian tax background. Desiree, and her mother-in-law Roseann, were assessed under Section 160 of the Income Tax Act. This section is there to stop taxpayers from transferring their assets to third parties to avoid tax.
This is a common practice by unsophisticated taxpayers to stop the Canada Revenue Agency from seizing their assets. You owe the CRA a pile of money you don't want to pay. So you transfer your half of the house to your wife for, say, $10.00. Make it all legal with a sales agreement. Screw you CRA, I don't own nuthin' no more, try and collect nuthin'! Your half of the house was worth $200,000 so you think you've put that out of the CRA's reach. Not quite. Section 160 allows the CRA to assess your wife and collect your tax off of her to the extent of the fair market value of the property in excess of what she gave you for it. In this case $199,990.
This is a very draconian section, deliberately so. I recall one case where a woman made a large transfer into a friend's bank account. The friend took it out in cash and gave it back to the taxpayer and it disappeared. The CRA assessed the friend for all the taxes owing under section 160 and the assessment was upheld on appeal. The friend argued that it wasn't her money because she never really had it because she had to give it back. However the court concluded that, during the short period that the money was in the account, she legally held ownership and control of it thereby meeting the requirements of Section 160.
So what did our tax expert Rick transfer to his wife and mom?
 As mentioned, there are no facts in dispute. Roseann and Desiree Bekkerus are the wife and mother, respectively, of Rick Bekkerus. In 2005, Rick transferred his 2002 Harley-Davidson motorcycle (the “Harley”) to Desiree for no consideration. At that time he owed approximately $206,000 to the Minister for income taxes assessed. In 2011, Rick transferred his 2011 Lexus RX450H (the “Lexus”) to Roseann for no consideration. At that time he owed the Minister in excess of $3,000,000 for income taxes assessed. At the respective time of transfer, the Harley had an assumed fair market value of $19,000 and the Lexus had an assumed fair market value of $51,500. The Minister raised assessments equal to the fair market values of the Harley and the Lexus, respectively, against Desiree and Roseann, again respectively, as transferees under section 160 of the Act.
Note that the judge seemed confused who was the wife and who was the mother because he said, in a prior paragraph;
These two appeals involve the transfer of two items of property by a son and husband to his mother, Roseann, and to his spouse, Desiree, respectively.
So Roseann, wife or mother, owed the CRA $51,500 and Desiree owed $19,000. They filed a joint appeal against the injustice of being forced to pay somebody else's taxes. These were their argument why Section 160 did not apply to them;
 The Appellants’ agent raised the following succinct, and to this Court at least, novel legal argument as the basis for the appeal. The Tax Court of Canada is not a Court of inherent jurisdiction, but a statutory Court created by Parliament. The Court has statutory authority to decide the validity of assessments raised by the Minister against taxpayers. Taxpayers, throughout the Act, are never defined or described as persons who “gain their livelihood in the private sector”. The conclusion proffered is that on such basis, the Respondent has failed to prove, “beyond a reasonable doubt”, that Roseann or Desiree are taxpayers and therefore owe the assessed section 160 taxes.
 While strictly speaking, submissions contained within a notice of appeal do not constitute per se submissions in Court, in this matter, they do assist in providing some additional needed flesh to the skeletal argument above. The Court notes the following excerpts from the identical legal argument contained in the notice of appeal for both Appellants:
a. To have a liability under the Income Tax Act R.S.C. 1985, 5th Suppl, two essential elements must attach to a person.
b. Resident: One must be a resident within the meaning of the Act i.e. one must reside on the lands that her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada either owns, or has a right to dispose of OR falls within the meaning of section 250(1), (2), (3).
c. Taxable Income: To have taxable income, one must have a taxable profit or gain or be employed within the meaning of section 248, “employed”.
d. If the Income Tax Act R.S.C. 1985, 5th Suppl spoke uniformly to every man, woman and person (i.e. Corporations) there would be no need to identify civil servants and their positions as office or employment.
e. There is no mention of any private man or woman gaining a livelihood in the private sector.
f. The Appellants have no obligation or are compelled to any performance pursuant to the Income Tax Act R.S.C. 1985, 5th Suppl as evidenced in case law and legislation.
g. Canadian custom and convention has only made provisions for the abrogation of private sector human and civil rights in the presence of war. Because of the excessive abuse in the past, the Parliament of Canada repealed the War Measures Act and currently has no legislative instrument to unilaterally compel any performance of the private sector to the Income War Tax Act, 1917 as amended.
 The submissions additionally contend, within the above context, that the Appellants have never “resided” on federal lands or been governmental employees and have never performed a function for government or held office or employment for profit.
Sadly for our appellants the court concluded otherwise;
 For two different reasons, the appeals cannot succeed and are dismissed: firstly, section 160 does not require Desiree or Roseann to be a taxpayer and, secondly, the Constitution Act, 1867, 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 ascribes to Parliament clear, broad and enumerated powers of taxation of all Canadians and in conjunction with the Act itself, does not limit the assessment of such taxes to government employees, office holders or residents of federal lands.
The court torpedoed the "I'm not a taxpayer" argument with this;
 Contained within section 160 is the notion that the transferor, Rick Bekkerus, must owe the tax in the first instance. The Appellants do not challenge this. Just as the Appellants’ agent said he can detect no reference to a “person who gains their livelihood in the private sector” as a taxpayer, nowhere within subsection 160(1), which creates joint and several liability for the transferees, Roseann and Desiree, is there a reference, requirement or condition that a transferee be a taxpayer or, for that matter, a resident or earner of income from any source. Since the expressed legal and factual criteria for raising the subsection 160(1) assessments have not been challenged by the advanced argument, but have been admitted, the assessments stand on the basis of what the Federal Court of Appeal has called “the clear meaning of the words of subsection 160(1)” defining such criteria”: Livington v R, 2008 FCA 89 (CanLII) at paragraph 17.
Then the court, deciding to rub it in, stomped on the second argument even though it conceded that it was a moot point after the above paragraph;
 Subsection 91(3) of the Constitution Act , 1867 provides as follows:
Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.
 These are broad, far-reaching and manifest powers of taxation and include what historically are described as direct and indirect powers to tax.
 The Act, itself, is arguably the pre-eminent and paramount taxing legislation in Canada. In direct challenge to the assertion of the agent for the Appellants that neither Desiree nor Roseann are taxpayers stands the very definition of “taxpayer” within the interpretation and definition of subsection 248(1) of the Act. That definition states: “taxpayer includes any person whether or not liable to pay tax” (emphasis added). “Person” is not defined within the Act, is to be given its ordinary meaning and, in any event, it was not contended in argument that the Appellants were not persons.
 Therefore, even if subsection 160(1) referred to a “taxpayer” rather than a “transferee”, the argument that the Appellants are not taxpayers because they are not defined as such is untenable. Whatever reasons, exemptions or statutory omissions may exonerate the Appellants from other liability for tax, the constitutional powers afforded by Parliament and the clear and plainly obvious definition of “taxpayer” within the Act (which includes any person irrespective of liability to pay tax) renders the Appellants “taxpayers” under the Act.
 As stated, for these reasons, the appeals are dismissed.