Poriskyite Annual Tax Evasion Dinner and Dance!
Where I wrote;
Purchase tickets from your local Paradigm Educator
or contact Debbie @ 604-316-0969
"Debbie" is Debbie Arlene Anderson, a 56 year old Porisky follower, not previously mentioned in Quatloos, who is currently facing her own criminal charges for tax evasion and counseling others to commit fraud. The counseling charge relates to her claimed career as a Paradigm educator teaching the Porisky tax evasion scheme. I've been following her for a while. As the dinner dance arrangements show she was, and maybe still is, a true believer. She's been following Freeman/Sovereign type activities for a long time. One I've managed to locate is this flyer, where she is also the contact, for a 2001 David-Wynn: Miller: workshop.
https://www.mail-archive.com/public-lis ... 01508.html
While her trial is sure to be highly enjoyable it is unlikely I'll attend. Porisky started his tax evasion career with seminars in Chilliwack, a town about 60 miles east of Vancouver and Debbie hails from Abbotsford, about 40 miles east of Vancouver. So her trial will be held at either Abbotsford or Chilliwack, both inaccessible to me since I rely on public transportation. I bounce around between the Vancouver, Richmond, and New Westminster courthouses but those are my practical limits. So Debbie's court antics will have to, lamentably, go unrecorded. At such time as a decision comes out I'll be back to discussing her.
Well her trial date is now in sight and it's time to give her her day in the sun. These are the charges;
Ms. Anderson is charged with the following offences on the indictment:
Debbie Arlene ANDERSON, of the City of Chilliwack, Province of British Columbia, between December 31, 2004 and May 22, 2008 did make, or participate in, assent to or acquiesce in the making of, false or deceptive statements in her T1 Individual Tax Return for the 2005 and 2006 taxation years, filed as required by the Income Tax Act, by not declaring taxable income in the amount of $113,276.03 for the said taxation years, and did thereby commit an offence contrary to paragraph 239(1)(a) of the said Act.
Debbie Arlene ANDERSON, of the City of Chilliwack, Province of British Columbia, between December 31, 2004 and June 16, 2008, did wilfully evade or attempt to evade compliance with the Income Tax Act or payment of taxes imposed by the said Act, by failing to report her taxable income in the amount of $165,731.44 for the 2005, 2006 and 2007 taxation years, and did thereby evade the payment of taxes in the amount of $22,689.90, committing an offence contrary to 239(1)(d) of the said Act.
Debbie Arlene ANDERSON, of the City of Chilliwack, Province of British Columbia, between December 31, 2004 and April 1, 2008, did wilfully evade or attempt to evade compliance with the Excise Tax Act or payment or remittance of the Goods and Services Tax, by failing to collect or remit Goods and Services Tax of $12,336.81 on goods and services sold, and did thereby commit an offence contrary to paragraph 327(1)(c) of the said Act.
Debbie Arlene ANDERSON, at or near the City of Chilliwack, Province of British Columbia and elsewhere, between December 31, 2001 and August 26, 2010 did counsel various persons to commit the indictable offence of fraud in excess of five thousand dollars, contrary to section 380 of the Criminal Code, and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section 464(a) of the Criminal Code.
The decision I'm reviewing now is not her actual trial decision. Her trial is scheduled for November 16 to December 11, 2015. This current decision related to what I call preliminary skirmishing, getting a batch of issues out of the way before trial. It was released in October last year but just showed up on Canlii a few weeks ago. This type of thing is entirely typical in Canadina criminal cases. Weeks of wrangling about possible loopholes made possible by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
I'm currently attending a Porisky tax evasion trial in Vancouver which is now in it's third week. The first two weeks were completely take up with Charter arguments similar to what I'm reviewing below. Anyhow you can find Debbie's decision here;
R. v. Anderson, 2014 BCSC 2002
We can start the ball rolling with this;
 Ms. Anderson has exercised her right to trial by judge and jury. Practically speaking, this case is particularly ill-suited to a jury trial, especially for a self-represented litigant who has lately acquired a concussion. For this reason, I had raised this as a subject to be considered, with a view to a future hearing to hear submissions on whether there were proper grounds to set aside the jury trial. However, the Court of Appeal recently overturned R. v. Porisky, 2012 BCSC 67 (CanLII), rev’d 2014 BCCA 146 (CanLII), a case in most respects identical to the case at bar, on the ground that Mr. Porisky had wrongfully been denied a jury trial.
 Ms. Anderson represented herself at a five-day preliminary inquiry before Romilly J., who sat as a Provincial Court judge. She also represented herself at the commencement of these disclosure hearings; although for the last two days, Mr. J. Maddock, an articled student, was granted leave to represent her for her reply to the Crown’s position on disclosure. Ms. Anderson and Mr. Maddock’s submissions have occupied about 80% of the hearing time.
A couple of points of interest from these two paragraphs. Firstly, after the British Columbia Court of Appeals, in an abysmally wrong-headed decision, quashed Porisky's conviction because the trial judge didn't brand on Porisky's ass that he had the right to a jury trial, judges are being very cautious about anything that might imply that Poriskyites shouldn't be judged by a jury of their peers. Choosing a jury trial does not help Porisyites; juries hate them. I, in turn, hate jury trials because there is no written decision, just a guilty or innocent verdict. I love written decisions. I'm currently attending another Poriskyite trial here in Vancouver where the defendant has, wisely, chosen a trial by judge only.
The second point of interest is Mr. J Mattock, articled student. I'm getting to know J Mattock very well because he is also representing the defendant in the trial I'm attending. He has a history;
J. Maddock" is "Jeremy Maddock", son of a BC justice of the peace. That name goes interesting places. His father is apparently a recently appointed Justice of the Peace in BC. Jeremy is articling with a guy named Peter Blokmanis. I'd never heard of him but found out that he's the former partner of Douglas Christie. I've discussed Christie here;
Where I said;
Well he is now appealing this decision. They guy just can't quit trying to convince courts he is right. One difference this time. In previous cases he was represented by Doug Christie. For those of you who don't know about Christie he was the lawyer of last resort because he would represent anyone over anything. Holocaust deniers, hate speach prosecutions, human rights criminals, Doug was the go-to guy. Not a particularly good lawyer and lost almost all of his cases but he tried. Wserra comments frequently that everyone deserves a defense (agreed) and Christie was it for a lot of the fringe elements. His clients generally lost badly because they would rather go down in flames than cut a deal and they were an unsavory bunch to put in front of a jury. Anyhow Doug died last month and, while he received a lot of negative press, he served a necessary purpose.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Hate speach and human-rights enthusiasts used to go nuts over his defense of these types but they were entitled to legal representation and Christie was willing to take on the job, unlike many lawyers who feared sullying their reputations. Not many of his clients had much money and he didn't get rich by representing them. The Law Society of British Columbia noted, when they found him guilty of professional misconduct, that he was only making about $50,000 a year (not a lot in Vancouver-Victoria) and so cut him a deal on penalties.
Maddock also had a closed connection to Christie;
Maddock is posting on an OPCA-friendly Canadian forum, rallying support for a person facing hate speech criminal charges. And here's how Jeremy is credited:
Jeremy Maddock was Doug Christie’s former legal assistant. He is currently studying law in Victoria, B.C. This article was first published in the Friends of Freedom Newsletter. Mr. Maddock can be reached at: Jeremy Maddock@hotmail.com
More posts involving Maddock from this site;
It appears that Jeremy might be trying to inherit Christie's mantle. Sure looks like it...
Jeremy operates three law oriented blogs that have his name on them:
[url]Trademark Cases http://www.trademarkcases.ca, largely inactive.[/url]
active, surveys jurisprudence considering civil forfeiture across Canada. It's clear Jeremy sees the process as one that is abused/overused.
active, only briefly reviewed.
But he has a fourth where he is not so forward about being an author
This was linked from his other blogs. It's quite fragmentary, but look who he's tracking: Porisky, Klundert. Here are some conclusions:
R. v. Porisky is a case of first instance on the issue of counselling fraud, in circumstances where the “fraud” in question consisted merely of a financial strategy which questions the applicability of the Income Tax Act.
Uh, that's not what Porisky was doing and the findings of fact on that point are very clear. Other comments by Maddock minimize the illegal character of challenging tax legislation.
So what else is he up to?
Identifies controversy over Trinity Western University's law school as "untrammeled bigotry against a small religious minority"
I actually agree with him on that one.
Here he is as a "paralegal" breaching privacy interests for forfeiture staff identities:
And a sack full of this and that:
pointing him to MagneticMessages.ca, a website design outfit but which also advertises Maddock's legal research background.
which provides little data, except that in his friends links we find: Brian Alexander (Freeman), Jodie Emery (owner of Cannabis Culture). I suspect others are counterculture personalities too.
Another bio page, he's editor for "TeleClick.ca"
TeleClick still exists, but is apparently abandoned
also associated with this
Appearing on an internet radio program commenting on civil forfeiture
Commenting a hate website was merely humorous
In favor of paralegals
Maddock is assisting the operator of the Radical Press (front page)
Charter, s 1 sucks because it infringes on freedom of speech, including hate speech and pornography
Jeremy is the only lawyer or lawyer-to-be that I'm aware of who is operating on this frontier. Clearly very much an ideologue, and willing to act on it.
Then the next two paragraphs introduce a new, and very significant player, the Unlicensed Man himself; David Kevin Lindsay!
 Over the objections of Crown counsel, but with leave of the Court, Ms. Anderson has also had considerable assistance from her friend David Lindsay. Mr. Lindsay prepared three volumes of materials upon which Ms. Anderson based her submissions. Mr. Lindsay and Ms. Anderson evidently subscribe to the same legal theories, notably as it pertains to the Canadian system of taxation. Its practitioners take steps they say allow them to characterise their individual identity before the law as a “natural person”, or as a “private person”, or, as Ms. Anderson’s materials refer to her, as a “private woman commonly known as Debbie”. Their views have led the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”) and other government bodies to characterise them as “tax-protestors”. Subscribers to this theory - commonly known as the natural person legal theory - seek to organize their financial affairs to evade government taxation. Multiple cases in British Columbia and other jurisdictions have roundly rejected the natural person legal theory: see Porisky; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 (CanLII); R. v. Bruno, 2002 BCCA 348 (CanLII); R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 (CanLII); R. v. McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928 (CanLII); Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII); R. v. Siggelkow, 2014 ABQB 101. In Porisky, Myers J. found that the materials published by the group that Ms. Anderson was associated with, the Paradigm Education Group, effectively counsel tax evasion. While Porisky was overturned by the Court of Appeal, it was solely on the issue of whether the accused was wrongfully denied a jury trial. None of the other conclusions reached in the trial decision were disturbed.
 Although the leave given for Mr. Lindsay to assist Ms. Anderson excluded the expounding of “natural person” theories rejected in other cases, considerable portions of the materials he presented were nonetheless devoted to that subject. Ms. Anderson relied on 86 cases in argument, which far exceeds what is reasonably necessary to address the issues. I have read the materials most conducive to her position on the issues she has raised, but there is no advantage in recounting all the (often repetitive) arguments that she made, particularly those portions that do not advance any recognizable legal concepts.
We've covered Lindsday here;
And I met him at a seminar described here;
Anyhow with the cast of characters in place, on to the case.
II. Overview of defence applications
 Ms. Anderson argues she can establish breaches of ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 8 of the Charter on a voir dire.
 She argues that she can establish the Crown breached ss. 2(b) and 2(d) by prosecuting Ms. Anderson selectively; namely not for what she did, but for who she associated with. Moreover, she submits the Court should “read down” s. 464(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Code] because it imposes an unreasonable limitation on an accused’s freedom of expression in circumstances where the accused merely expresses an honest, good faith political opinion. Regarding s. 8 of the Charter, Ms. Anderson argues she has standing to challenge the validity of a warranted search of Russell Porisky’s residence (the “Porisky Search”), and submits that evidence seized during the search implicating her should be excluded.
 Ms. Anderson further submits she needs to receive additional disclosure to support the Charter arguments she intends to make; primarily breaches of ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 8 of the Charter, but also s. 7.
 In this regard, Ms. Anderson argues she has established a prima facie showing of actionable misconduct by the Crown that provides a sufficient basis on which the Court may order further disclosure.
A voir dire is a trial within a trial. I just suffered two weeks of them that Jeremy inflicted on me in the case I'm currently watching. Essentially a voir dire settles a point of law necessary to be determined before the trial can go forward. Often the issue is fundamental and will determine the outcome of the trial. An example is the admissibility of evidence. A voir dire might be called by the defense to attempt to exclude evidence gathered by the Crown. If this is successful the case might be over because the excluded evidence was necessary to prove the charges.
However before we get to the vior dire issues the judge had to dispose of a few preliminary issues brought by the triumverate of Anderson/Maddock/lindsay;
A. Property rights and s. 7 of the Charter
 Ms. Anderson asserts that the Canadian Constitution guarantees her a right to use, enjoy, and dispose of her property. This is incorrect. Section 7 of the Charter provides that: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. Previous cases that have addressed this question have made it clear that the right to own, use, enjoy, or dispose of property is not guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.
B. Section 2 and the liberty to structure one’s life as one pleases
 Ms. Anderson claims that the Constitution guarantees her the right to structure her life as she desires and to make fundamental life choices. I agree with Crown counsel that this claim does not frame any constitutional issues, particularly given the elements of the offence in this case. Further, her argument simply recasts arguments roundly rejected by numerous court decisions, as mentioned earlier. As submitted by the Crown, a person cannot lawfully choose or determine whether monies they have received constitute taxable income. Of course, a person may legally structure their financial affairs in various ways to minimize taxes payable; tax evasion is, however, another matter. Ultimately, the provisions of the applicable tax legislation and court decisions determine the taxes a person has to pay and whether a person has complied with their legal obligation.C. Is Ms. Anderson subject to the Income Tax Act, the Excise Tax Act and the CRA’s authority exercisable under the Canada Revenue Agency Act?
 Ms. Anderson submits, in effect, that she is not subject to either the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) [ITA], or the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 [ETA] and cannot be compelled to, among other things, “pursue or receive profits or gains or intend to pursue or receive profits or gains”. She also submits that she is not subject to the CRA’s authority under the Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17 to administer the ITA and the ETA. Ms. Anderson’s submissions in this regard do not raise any valid constitutional issues with any prospect of success. The ITA and ETA are validly enacted federal legislation and are not, as Ms. Anderson contends, unconstitutional and of no effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act 1982, a violation of the common law, or a violation of the Coronation Oath: see Reference re Goods and Services Tax, 1992 CanLII 69 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 445; R. v. Kennedy, 2012 FC 1050 (CanLII); Kennedy v. Canada (Customs & Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC),  4 C.T.C. 186 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203 (CanLII). Ms. Anderson has not provided any reasonable basis upon which the Court may declare any portions of ss. 2(1), 3, or 152 of the ITA to be of no force and effect.
Next up was the I'm too stupid to understand the Income Tax Act argument. Gosh darn it is just too vague and incomprehensible for the average Joe like me to follow so who can blame me if I screwed up? I tried!
D. Vagueness of the ITA and constitutionality
 Ms. Anderson contends the ITA is too vague, ambiguous, and far too complex to form a basis for sanctioning criminal conduct. Moreover, she argues that the ITA is contrary to the common law right (and duty) to know the law. She also questions the meanings of terms like “intent to profit”, “source of income”, “income”, “personal endeavour”, and “businesslike manner or behaviour”. She states at para. 88 of the “grounds for the relief sought” section of her Notice of Application of Constitutional Challenge:
Under these conditions, where thousands of people have differing thoughts, beliefs, and opinions of same, it cannot be held to be constitutional, a fortiori where the results are penal.
 The ITA is certainly lengthy and highly detailed, but only a few select sections and definitions are relevant to this case, and those portions of the ITA pertaining to the charge are not unreasonably vague.
 The structure of the business Ms. Anderson allegedly ran was not complicated. Her activities, regardless of how the jury characterizes their true nature for purposes of the indictment, did apparently produce monies for her. If engaged in a legitimate business, Ms. Anderson would be entitled to deduct expenses incurred to earn that income. For personal income tax purposes, she would be expected to include her net taxable business income and other sources of income, deduct universal personal deductions, and adjust income for line items such as RRSP deductions and charitable donations. It is likely that thousands of taxpayers who own small businesses undertake this process annually without turning a page of the ITA. Some prepare their own returns; others may choose to retain professionals or others to prepare and file their returns for them. Others use computer software to guide them through the process. Regardless of how taxpayers prepare and file their returns, millions of Canadians do so each year.
 As noted earlier, Ms. Anderson does not lack for intelligence and she has failed to give any particulars of how, or which particular language of the ITA, prevented her from declaring her sources of income accurately and truthfully. Moreover, the language of the ITA is at least clear enough that adherents of Paradigm purport to know ways to alter their status as tax payers, and sequester their financial affairs, keeping them beyond the CRA’s reach.
 Ms. Anderson has not drawn attention to any provision of the ITA relevant to the elements of the offences she is charged with that are too vague to permit her from making full answer and defence. Ms. Anderson has been given a list of relevant terms and definitions and where to find them in the ITA. She may require further guidance and explanations on terms and definitions in the ITA. If so, she can ask Crown counsel where she can find the applicable information. Further, there will be pre-trial conferences where these issues can be addressed further if necessary.
 I find no merit in Ms. Anderson’s legal position on this point.
This next argument was obviously doomed from the start. Debbie was arguing that the Provincial Court of British Columbia did not have the jurisdiction to hear her case since the Income Tax Act of Canada gives the Tax Court of Canada the exclusive jurisdiction to hear income tax appeals. However that only applies to civil appeals of Canada Revenue Agency reassessments. Unfortunately for Debbie this is not an appeal from a civil assessment it is a criminal charge and that is within the jurisdiction of the British Columbia court. This issue has been beaten to death, most recently in Sigglekow;
Where I said;
First an argument that the Provincial Court of Alberta had no jurisdiction to hear the case because it was just a civil income tax matter which lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. The judge dismissed this point with harsh efficiency. He said that the accused claimed that his activities were "non-commercial" in nature and that this resulted in him having no taxable income and therefore there were no grounds for being criminally charged with tax evasion. The judge noted that this was the same argument found in cases set out in the Crown's material, some involving Paradigm adherents. All these prior arguments were dismissed and, in the judge's opinion, properly so. At best Siggelkow's argument that he was not taxable might serve as a basis for his defense but had nothing to do with the court's jurisdiction.
E. Jurisdiction of the Court to hear this case
 Ms. Anderson also seeks a declaration that the British Columbia Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to try Counts 1 and 2 until after the Tax Court of Canada determines the exact amount of tax she has allegedly evaded. She cites s. 12(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2, as authority for this proposition. That section provides that the Tax Court “has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals to the Court on matters arising under the … Income Tax Act”.
 Ms. Anderson’s understanding is not correct. This jurisdictional issue was canvassed and dismissed by Bauman C.J.B.C. in R. v. McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928 (CanLII):
 There is no merit in Ms. Anderson’s position on this point.
F. Demand for further particulars
 Ms. Anderson also requests further particulars of the indictment. However, the Crown has already provided Ms. Anderson with detailed particulars of the charges brought under the ITA, as well as information about their essential elements and the nature of the evidence the Crown will be presenting to prove them. At the last hearing, the Crown advised the Court it would similarly assist Ms. Anderson with respect to the counselling charges under s. 464 of the Code. The Crown has also provided Ms. Anderson with a copy of its written submissions for committal, as filed at the preliminary inquiry on February 27, 2014. Ms. Anderson cross-examined six CRA witnesses at the preliminary inquiry. She is not lacking in intelligence and organizational ability and I am satisfied she has a good grasp of the case she has to meet and understands the nature and extent of the Crown’s case quite well. In addition, she will have further instruction from the bench in due course.
Then on to Project Fable! We've discussed Project Fable here;
Essentially there were so many suspected Poriskyite income tax evaders that the Canada Revenue Agency set up a specific project to coordinate information across Canada rather than have each case pursued in isolation. According to Debbie that violated her Section 2 Charter rights. Section 2 states;
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.
Apparently Debbie believes that the Charter protects her and the other Poriskyites from interference from the CRA when they went about their lawful business of tax protesting by evading income tax. However that argument did not get any traction;
2. Targeting of tax protestors and violation of s. 2 of the Charter
 Ms. Anderson has staked much of her application on what she characterises as the CRA’s targeting of tax protestors through a program identified as Project Fable.
 It first has to be generally noted on this point that a person’s personal or political beliefs do not immunize them against prosecution for violation of ITA provisions: see R. v. McMordie, 2001 BCCA 412 (CanLII); R. v. Bruno, 2002 BCCA 348 (CanLII); and R. Millar, 2003 BCCA 164 (CanLII).
 In McMordie, the appellant had been charged with failing to comply with a ‘notice of requirement’ pursuant to s. 239 of the ITA. Having been acquitted at trial, he sought leave to appeal his conviction on summary appeal. In dismissing the appeal, Proudfoot J.A. stated:
 In support of his application for leave, the appellant asserted 1) the summary conviction appeal judge failed to consider his written submissions 2) the summary conviction appeal judge failed to consider his arguments about grammar used in legislation 3) that he has a counterclaim that makes the judgment of Stewart J. a miscarriage of justice and 4) that the Income Tax Department is not disclosing approximately 15,000 documents which they have collected on him, and such non-disclosure amounts to an abuse of process based on selective prosecution.
 I think it is important to state at this point that the appellant is a member of a group known as “De-taxers”. The group advocates the non-filing of tax returns and non-payment of tax.
 It appears that the appellant and his friends are under the impression that because he is contesting the payment of taxes based on his “political beliefs” rather than “self-interest” he is somehow or other entitled to immunity and cannot be prosecuted. This is a very interesting notion, but wholly devoid of merit.
. . . . . . . .
 Of course, for the sake of an arguable point, were the CRA to prosecute a person solely because they held a political belief disapproved of by a CRA officer and not because there were reasonable grounds to believe they had committed a criminal offence, such conduct could constitute, depending on the facts, violations of ss. 2 and 7 of the Charter. Recent examples of such cases have been widely publicized in the United States, where officials of the Internal Revenue Service were alleged to have discriminated against some conservative interest groups.
 It is clear, however, that the Charter cannot protect a person from prosecution who subscribes to and acts upon a philosophy eschewing the payment of taxes. Neither could the Charter immunize such a person who counsels other people to evade taxes and commit indictable offences under the ITA.
 Further, I have not been referred to an authority or legal principle that gainsays Bruno, McMordie, and Millar and finds it unconstitutional for a duly constituted investigative authority to exercise an administrative discretion to concentrate some of its available resources on persons or organizations whose activities effectively scorn duly proclaimed legislation the institution is authorized to administer. Even if Ms. Anderson could show the CRA targeted so-called tax protesters, I see no reasonable possibility that Ms. Anderson could succeed in obtaining a finding that her Charter rights had been thereby breached or in having an order staying proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.
. . . . . . .
 My conclusion is, for the reasons stated, that Ms. Anderson has shown no plausible justification for further disclosure or a voir dire on this issue. I find there is no reasonable basis upon which the Court can find that the CRA’s so-called targeting of Paradigm and others subscribing to and acting upon the natural person theory of law is a breach of s. 2 - or any other section - of the Charter.
Well Debbie has a lot of arrows in her quiver and next up is an iteration on the "The Income Tax is just too darn complicated" argument. This time she applied it to the Criminal Code of Canada.
3. Constitutionality of s. 464 of the Criminal Code
 Section 464 of the Code forbids everyone from counselling others to commit indictable or summary conviction offences. The general benefits and objectives of such a law for maintaining a safe society are obvious and need no explanation. . . . . . .
 Ms. Anderson contends Parliament never intended s. 464 of the Code to apply to complex legislation such as the ITA, which, she argues, one can interpret in different ways. She further submits that an interpretation of s. 464 that renders communications of one’s thoughts and opinions a criminal offence is unreasonable and unconstitutional, as it violates her rights under ss. 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter as there can be no crime for speech. She argues that interpreting s. 464 in this manner would chill communication and subject lawyers and accountants to criminal charges.
 As an alternative to a finding that s. 464 of the Code is unconstitutional, Ms. Anderson states she would seek a Charter remedy that would see s. 464 “read down as an unreasonable limit on freedom of expression in circumstances where the accused has made no false representations of fact but has merely expressed an honest political opinion in good faith.”
. . . . . . .
 In Porisky, Myers J. thoroughly examined and applied the law pertaining to counselling others to commit fraud in excess of $5,000. I will now turn to his conclusions that highlight the differences between Charter protected political views and the exercise of those political views in a manner that offends s. 464 of the Criminal Code:
 The Canadian Illusion sets out a legal view that I, and other courts, have concluded is incorrect. That does not in itself amount to counselling fraud. It further sets out a political view about the income tax system. That is something that anyone is at liberty to advocate, and is, of course, protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Mr. Porisky’s political views are not on trial. There must, as described by Fish J. in Hamilton, be an encouragement to commit the offence. As noted in Sharpe (a case which dealt with the constitutionality of the offence of possession of material that counsels sexual activity with persons under 18) at para. 56:
The mere description of the criminal act is not caught. Rather, the prohibition is against material that, viewed objectively, sends the message that sex with children can and should be pursued.
 To paraphrase the test in Sharpe, does The Canadian Illusion send the message that the Paradigm view should be followed, or does it merely state a valueless legal opinion or a legitimate political viewpoint? I think it is the former: it exhorts and goads people to free themselves from the shackles of “serfdom” and “slavery” supposedly imposed by the income tax system. It instructs people to do this by exercising the “forgotten option” of structuring their arrangements as so-called natural persons and thereby consider their income as nil. Those who do not do this have chosen the “Common Option for the Disadvantaged.” Paradigm and Mr. Porisky offer further education, mentoring and counselling to achieve this result. The Canadian Illusion does not urge people to act by lobbying for a change in the tax system; rather, it encourages them to illegally avoid the system altogether. The audience in “The Tax Game” DVD is urged to “quit working for the taxpayer” – namely, in their capacity as a natural person, to not pay taxes.
 I adopt Justice Myers’ reasoning. Section 464 of the Code does not prohibit Ms. Anderson from advocating her legal and political views about the Canadian tax system. Rather, it prohibits her from going beyond mere advocacy and encouraging others to commit tax evasion. Indeed, Ms. Anderson appears to grasp this distinction herself, as she is defending the charge by claiming she was expressing her opinions without telling anyone how to evade taxes. If the jury accepts her evidence that she never counselled tax evasion, then she would not be convicted of the offence. I find Ms. Anderson has shown no reasonable basis for a voir dire or further disclosure on this point.
Oh well, she tried.
Next up the old tried and true. An attempt to exclude information found on Russell Porisky's computer from being used in her trial. This is a critical issue since all of the Porisyites convicted of income tax evasion or who are currently in the process of being convicted were nailed through information found on Porisky's computer. He kept very comprehensive records. If the information could be excluded Debbie would quite possibly get off.
C. Alleged breach of s. 8 of the Charter
1. Does the accused have standing to challenge the Porisky Search?
 Section 8 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”
 To ground a claim under s. 8 of the Charter, Ms. Anderson has to demonstrate that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents seized during the Porisky Search. In R. v. Edwards, 1996 CanLII 255 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 128 at 145-146, Justice Cory summarized the general principles governing a s. 8 analysis as follows:
. . . . . .
 In determining whether an accused has established a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is important to consider the nature of the privacy interest invoked. In R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 (CanLII) [Tessling] at para. 20, Binnie J. distinguished between personal privacy, territorial privacy, and informational privacy. Binnie J. adopted a definition of informational privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”: see Tessling at para. 23.
. . . . . .
 From the forgoing, it is clear that not all information an individual wishes to keep confidential will necessarily enjoy s. 8 protection: see Tessling at para 26.
 As regards the territorial privacy interest, there is generally a lower expectation of privacy in a garage than in a dwelling place: see R. v. Tse, 2009 BCSC 1344 (CanLII) at para. 34.
 Ms. Anderson must prove on a balance of probabilities that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents seized in the Porisky Search. Mr. Maddock, in discussing the Paradigm-related documents originating from Ms. Anderson seized in the Porisky Search, argued that as a person who does business with a bank, an accountant, or a photography shop retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in documents provided to those entities in confidence, so Ms. Anderson also had a reasonable expectation of privacy related to those documents which she provided to Mr. Porisky in confidence. Mr. Maddock referred the Court to the following cases: R. v. Shayesteh (1996), 1996 CanLII 882 (ON CA), 111 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (O.N.C.A.); R. v. Rendon (1999), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 12 (Q.C.C.A.); Davis v. Canada (Attorney General) (1997), 49 C.R.R. (2d) 114 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Weil (2003), 111 C.R.R. (2d) 151 (Ont. S.C.J.).
(Note - Court reviewed all of these cases and found them irrelevant)
 Setting aside consideration of whether the validity of the Porisky Search is res judicata, I find Ms. Anderson could not succeed in challenging the validity of the search and that there is no reasonable basis for the Court to conclude that Ms. Anderson’s s. 8 Charter right has been infringed.
 Applying the framework set out in Edwards, I am not persuaded Ms. Anderson has the necessary standing to challenge the Porisky Search, as after taking account of all the circumstances of this case I have concluded that Ms. Anderson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items seized.
 The items seized during the Porisky Search implicating Ms. Anderson were various business records, such as contracts and invoices. The records were contained in an “employee” file in Mr. Porisky’s garage, which stored documents related to people associated with Paradigm who sold goods and services to Paradigm students. Of course, certain aspects of an employee file may garner Charter protection if the file contains biographical and other personal employee information. Moreover, employees working in an office likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to personal information stored on their desktop: see R. v. Little, 2009 CanLII 41212 (ON SC), 2009 CanLII 41212 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 126-129.
 However, this case does not present those circumstances. Once Ms. Anderson forwarded the documents to Mr. Porisky, she no longer had any ownership claim over those documents. Ms. Anderson also had no ownership, possession, or control of Mr. Porisky’s garage where the search was conducted. Nor did Ms. Anderson present evidence that she has the ability to regulate access to the property. Unlike in Weil, the information obtained during the Porisky Search did not provide intimate details of Ms. Anderson’s personal and home life. Indeed, the documents contained no biographical information or personal information about the accused’s activities that might signal the presence of a privacy interest sufficient to give standing to challenge a search under s. 8 of the Charter.
 All of these factors taken together lead to the conclusion that Ms. Anderson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized documents. While Ms. Anderson certainly would have preferred the documents to remain confidential, that is not sufficient for s. 8 of the Charter to avail her. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted at para. 26 in Tessling, “not all information an individual may wish to keep confidential necessarily enjoys s. 8 protection”.
 As I have concluded that Ms. Anderson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents seized in the Porisky Search, the Court need not move on to consider whether the Porisky Search was reasonable. However, had I determined that Ms. Anderson met the first prong of the analysis I would have found that the search was conducted reasonably, for the following reasons.
 First, I do not find that the officers who seized the accused’s file during the Porisky Search exceeded the ITO. The ITO authorized the police to seize information necessary to establish the total income that Mr. Porisky and Ms. Gould earned from their seminars. As Ms. Anderson is one of Paradigm’s educators, information showing how many people she taught and the fees she earned - all of which would have likely been in her file - was related to the investigation, and the ITO certainly permitted the investigators to seize that information.
 Second, I do not agree with Ms. Anderson’s contention that investigators used the Porisky Search as an opportunity to investigate her, as it would not be unduly speculative to conclude the investigators initially took that information to find out how much revenue Ms. Anderson earned as part of the investigation into Mr. Porisky and Ms. Gould.
 For these reasons, I would have found that the Porisky Search was conducted reasonably and in accordance with the officers’ judicial mandate.
 I conclude that Ms. Anderson has no standing to challenge the Porisky Search, and I would not order a voir dire on this matter.
Jeremy did not try this argument at the trial I am currently attending. I mentioned to him that he was taking a quite different approach in my trial than the one he's been taking in Anderson. His comment was that each trial has its own set of facts. Quite true, along with there being no point to pursuing arguments that have been decisively stomped into the ground.
So apart from a possible appeal of this decision (I'm not aware of one) this disposes of all the brush-clearing prior to trial. Since I won't be attending and there will be no written decision all you'll get about the trial itself is the verdict.