Keith David Lawson - Poriskyite Tax Evader
Posted: Tue Mar 13, 2012 11:55 pm
Actually a married couple. Case below. Same natural person argument as Porisky et al but they also throw in the capitalized names argument (KIETH LAWSON? Not me, I'm kiEtH lAWsOn, good luck finding your guy) and a new one on me, that the names of places such as "City of Burnaby" are meaningless as geographic locations for court proceedings so the defendants can't be said to have committed their offenses anywhere. Judge brings Porisky into the decision. At the end a veiled threat that if the defendants don't get their way the population of Canada will arise in outrage to redress this injustice. He also wanted the court to formally recognize him and his wife, as natural persons, as he defines the term, for the purpose of the court proceedings.
Some editing done for brevity.
R v Lawson et al
[Criminal Code 508(1)]
HEADNOTE:
Applications for certiorari (i) to quash informations sworn by a CRA investigator with respect to charges of income tax evasion, failure to collect and remit GST, and, for the applicant KDL, counselling to commit fraud, and (ii) to quash summonses issued against the applicants by a Justice of the Peace, which were based on the impugned informations. Motion by the Crown to dismiss the applicants’ motions with respect to the validity of the informations and summonses. At issue was whether the informations and summonses should be struck on the basis that (i) they failed to properly identify either of the applicants, (ii) they failed to state the geographic locations where the alleged offences occurred, and (iii) the Justice of the Peace failed to adequately hear and consider the allegations of the CRA officer. The applicants also moved for other orders that did not go to the substance or validity of the summonses. Held: Motion by the Crown granted. Applications dismissed.
Oral Judgment
Citation: 2012 BCSC 356
BETWEEN:
Regina
and
Keith David Lawson, May Dang-Lawson
COURT/JUDGE/DATE:
British Columbia Supreme Court, Myers J., February 22, 2012. (Docket: 25976)
COUNSEL:
Keith D. Lawson, for himself and May Dang-Lawson.
Mark A. Erina and Nicola M. Pfeifer, for the Crown.
Oral Reasons for Judgment
MYERS J.:—
[1] The applicants, husband and wife, filed applications for certiorari to quash informations sworn by a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) investigator with respect to charges of income tax evasion, failure to collect and remit GST, and, for Mr. Lawson, counselling to commit fraud. They also apply to quash the February 3, 2012 summonses issued against them by a Justice of the Peace, which were based on the impugned informations. Further, the application requests a number of other orders that do not go to the substance or validity of the summonses, and which I will describe later.
[2] At a pre-application hearing, Cullen A.C.J. directed that an application by the Crown to strike the motions as being moot or having no foundation in law should be heard on February 18. The purpose of that was to potentially save a multi-day hearing for which the Lawsons wanted to subpoena the Justice of the Peace and the CRA officer who swore the information (and possibly others). I make no ruling here as to whether that would be an appropriate procedure. It is the Crown's motion that is before me now.
[snip]
[5] Mr. Lawson represented himself and his wife.
[6] At the close of the hearing, I gave Mr. Lawson the opportunity to send in further written submissions, which I have received and considered. There is one point made that I will deal with at the outset. The supplemental argument states that I might be biased because I refused to recognise the Lawsons as "natural persons" at the outset of the hearing. The argument alluded to my role in hearing the case of R. v. Porisky & Gould, 2012 BCSC 67, to which I refer below.
[7] Bias was not something raised by Mr. Lawson during the hearing. If it had been I would have rejected it – and do so now – because no reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that a judge was biased because he had decided a prior case involving similar issues. That is something that occurs on a regular basis. Furthermore, another judge would normally be bound to follow any applicable legal conclusions from my decision in Porisky under the principle of stare decisis.
I. The informations and summonses
[8] Mr. Lawson advances both substantive and formal objections to the informations and summonses.
A. The formal objections
[9] The first formal objection I will deal with is: "a failure to properly identify either of the Applicants by his or her proper name in any of the counts or offences alleged therein." This is so, Mr. Lawson argued, because his and his wife's last name are capitalised in the informations and summonses. He cites a literary style guide in support of his argument. There is, of course, no legal requirement as to the capitalisation of names in informations, summonses or other court documents. The accused are clearly and properly identified. Style guides are not legal authority, nor are they written as such.
[10] A second formal objection is: "... failure to state the geographic location where each of the alleged offences occurred." In Mr. Lawson's supplemental argument he states:
In the Information, neither of the terms "City of Burnaby," and "Province of British Columbia" expresses a geographic location; i.e. a place, where the alleged offences were committed. The Canadian Style guide's rules for the style of geographical terms, in section 4.21(c), shows that those words are not a location, but are used in a corporate sense.
At the hearing, Mr. Lawson added that he was not a shareholder of Burnaby.
[11] I do not agree with this argument. In their context, the words clearly denote geographic locations.
[snip]
[18] Mr. Lawson has filed an affidavit deposing to a conversation he had with the Justice of the Peace. He says it indicates that the Justice acted as a rubber stamp and that he was not aware of the constituent elements of the charge of counselling fraud. I do not agree that the Justice indicated that he rubber-stamped the application for the summons. His statement to the effect that he was not aware of the constituent elements of the counselling fraud charge was made several days before the summons for that charge issued. The effect of the presumption of regularity is that it is to be assumed that he made himself aware of those elements before issuing the summons.
[19] Given that the CRA officer appeared in front of the Justice of the Peace as an informant pursuant to s. 508(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, I do not agree that the informations were defective because they improperly stated conclusions of fact and law. Mr. Lawson has not adduced evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity that the Justice of the Peace adequately heard and considered the allegations of the CRA officer in performing his duties under s. 508(1)(b).
[20] I do not agree that the Crown is obliged to seek a remedy in tax court rather than launch a prosecution for tax evasion. There have been several cases in which the Crown has obtained convictions for tax evasion and failure to remit GST. While Mr. Lawson cited cases in which the courts have acquitted on charges of tax evasion and remarked in their decisions that the Crown should have pursued the matter in tax court as a collection matter; that is, a decision that is made at a trial or preliminary inquiry. It is not for this Court to pre-determine that issue by way of a motion for a prerogative remedy.
[21] That is sufficient to dismiss the Lawsons' motion on its substantive grounds, but there is more. There were, in fact, ample grounds for the issuing of the informations and summonses and for the Crown to proceed as it did in this case. Prior to the information being sworn, Mr. Lawson had met with the CRA. On October 4, 2011, Mr. Lawson - of his own accord - provided the CRA with an affidavit he had sworn. In it, Mr. Lawson says that he acted as a "Paradigm Educator" for Mr. Russell Porisky. The clear implication is that he earned money (to use neutral terms) for doing that. The other clear implication is that Mr. Lawson was of the view he did not have to report that money as income because he was a "natural person". The natural person theory is referred to in Mr. Lawson's supplemental written argument.
[22] Mr. Porisky, his alter-ego the "Paradigm Education Group", and the "natural person" taxation argument were the subject of the Porisky judgment I issued on January 18, 2012. In that judgment I concluded that the teachings of Mr. Porisky and Paradigm had no legal validity. I convicted Mr. Porisky of income tax evasion, failure to remit GST and counselling fraud. The second Information in this matter was sworn by the CRA officer on February 1, 2012, and the summonses were issued on February 2 and February 3. Based on Mr. Lawson's affidavit and the Porisky judgment, the information and the summons were fully justified at the time they were issued.
[23] I note that while Mr. Lawson objected when the Crown referred to his involvement with Paradigm at the hearing, it is difficult to conceive why, since his own affidavit in this proceeding put the matter before me.
[24] I grant the Crown's motion and dismiss the applicants' motions with respect to the validity of the informations and summonses.
II. Other relief sought
[25] The first order sought is a declaration:
... that the court which will hear this application is the same Honorable Court having the name and style "Supreme Court of British Columbia" (the "Court"), as continued by s.2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (R.S.B.C., 1996);
[26] In his supplemental argument Mr. Lawson argues that if the declaration is not granted there is:
.... the potential that the public will begin to perceive that if no lawful superior court exists in which people can have a reasonable expectation of the equal protection of law, as provided for by the Canadian Bill of Rights, then they will no longer seek to have their disputes and grievances settled in the courts, but will be more likely to take matters into their own hands to obtain justice by more swift and certain means against perceived adversaries and oppressors.
Earlier in his argument he refers to "YouTube" videos showing people swarming the courts of England "to demand justice and chasing judges from the bench." There is a reference to the "public, who are paying close attention to this and related proceedings in growing numbers."
[27] I will give Mr. Lawson the benefit of the doubt and assume that this was not meant as a veiled threat. Even so, the argument is not helpful, constructive or appropriate.
[28] There is no doubt that this is the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and no issue has been raised with respect to this Court's constitution or jurisdiction, of which the Lawsons chose to avail themselves. The motion is unnecessary and frivolous, and is dismissed.
[29] The second order sought is:
an order confirming that this Court recognizes each of the Applicants in propria persona, and each having the status of a private person, also known as a natural person, at common law for the purposes of these proceedings.
According to Mr. Lawson, this request was made of the Associate Chief Justice at the pre-application hearing and denied. I reach the same conclusion. This has no legal merit. The Lawsons are named individuals. There is no basis for the recognition of any special status, nor does one exist for them. There are no separate laws, rules, rights, remedies or procedures applicable to "natural persons" versus other individuals, or, for the sake of completeness, individual persons. In line with this, I order that the reference to "private person" following the applicants' names in the style of cause be struck.
[30] The third order sought is a declaration:
... that this Court is competent court [sic] to hear and determine these matters at common law for the purposes of these proceedings.
This is unnecessary now that I have heard and determined this matter. Further, it was unnecessary to request this since no one had challenged jurisdiction and it is the Lawsons themselves who launched these proceedings in this Court.
[31] The fourth order sought is:
an order declaring that the Applicants, who are unrepresented by counsel, are entitled to the assistance of this Court in making this application, and that this Court will provide direction and assistance to Applicants in accordance with the common law duty of a judge to assist an unrepresented individual in a criminal case;
In this regard, Mr. Lawson referred to Steemson v. The Queen, 2002 BCSC 307.
[32] This matter is now moot since I have concluded the hearing, during which I did attempt to provide the appropriate assistance. Further, it is not the appropriate subject for an order. However, since this point pervaded Mr. Lawson's arguments, it is important for the Lawsons to understand that there is only so far a judge can go in assisting a party. A judge is not an avatar of defence counsel. As stated by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kim, 2004 BCCA 57:
[65] A trial judge has a duty, whether an accused is or is not represented, to ensure a fair trial. This might be said to be an extension or a restatement in modern terms of the principle expressed in R. v. Gibson (1887), 18 Q.B.D. 537 at 543 (U.K.).
[66] But it is not and cannot be any part of the duty of a trial judge to give advice to an accused on trial tactics. Thus, for example, it is the judge's duty to advise an unrepresented accused that it is his choice whether to give evidence or not to give evidence. But as to what course is the best course for an accused in any particular case, is not a question on which the trial judge can give advice.
[67] When a poor man - there is no evidence here that the appellant could not afford counsel or was denied legal aid - had no choice but to represent himself, judges did sometimes cross the line into giving advice in order to help the prisoner and thereby prevent wrongful convictions. But there was not then and is not now any such obligation.
...
[69] Having failed to avail himself of the opportunity to retain counsel, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that the learned trial judge ought to have become his legal advisor.
See also R. v. Bonnick, 2004 ABCA 133 at para. 12; at paras. 64-69; R. v. Mirabi, [2008] O.J. No. 867 at para. 43.
[33] The fifth and sixth orders are related and can be dealt with together. They are:
• an order directing that each registry location of the Supreme Court of British Columbia shall ensure that it has a proper court seal, in accordance with s. 7(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), having the proper name and style of the court, as set out in s. 2(1) of that Act;
• an order recognizing that the application filed by Applicants in this Court does not bear the proper seal of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, as set out in ss. 7(1) and 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), and a further order declaring that the lack of the proper seal of the Court, or the use of an improper seal, shall by order of this Court be deemed to be an irregularity that shall have no adverse effect on the substance, jurisdiction, or otherwise in respect of this application, because the Applicants were informed by the court registry that the proper court seal was not in the possession of the registry of this Court, although the Applicants did insist that the proper court seal be used to file this application;
[34] There is no relation between this issue and the validity of the Information or summonses. If the Lawsons have any standing to raise this issue, this is not the proper procedure in which to do it. These applications are therefore dismissed.
[35] All of the other applications in the notice of application have been disposed of as part of or as a consequence of my ruling on the validity of the informations and the summonses, and I will not list them separately.
[36] In summary, all of the Lawsons' applications are dismissed.
[37] At the hearing, Mr. Lawson referred to the requirement for him and Mrs. Lawson to be fingerprinted pursuant to the Identification of Criminals Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-1. If I did not quash the summonses, he requested an order delaying the fingerprinting pending the hearing of a Charter challenge he said he would be launching. In my view that is akin to a stay of proceedings or an injunction. I do not have a sufficient basis to make such an order, particularly since the Charter application has not been filed.
[38] I wish to make it clear that I am not seized of any further applications on this matter.
"E.M. MYERS, J."
Some editing done for brevity.
R v Lawson et al
[Criminal Code 508(1)]
HEADNOTE:
Applications for certiorari (i) to quash informations sworn by a CRA investigator with respect to charges of income tax evasion, failure to collect and remit GST, and, for the applicant KDL, counselling to commit fraud, and (ii) to quash summonses issued against the applicants by a Justice of the Peace, which were based on the impugned informations. Motion by the Crown to dismiss the applicants’ motions with respect to the validity of the informations and summonses. At issue was whether the informations and summonses should be struck on the basis that (i) they failed to properly identify either of the applicants, (ii) they failed to state the geographic locations where the alleged offences occurred, and (iii) the Justice of the Peace failed to adequately hear and consider the allegations of the CRA officer. The applicants also moved for other orders that did not go to the substance or validity of the summonses. Held: Motion by the Crown granted. Applications dismissed.
Oral Judgment
Citation: 2012 BCSC 356
BETWEEN:
Regina
and
Keith David Lawson, May Dang-Lawson
COURT/JUDGE/DATE:
British Columbia Supreme Court, Myers J., February 22, 2012. (Docket: 25976)
COUNSEL:
Keith D. Lawson, for himself and May Dang-Lawson.
Mark A. Erina and Nicola M. Pfeifer, for the Crown.
Oral Reasons for Judgment
MYERS J.:—
[1] The applicants, husband and wife, filed applications for certiorari to quash informations sworn by a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) investigator with respect to charges of income tax evasion, failure to collect and remit GST, and, for Mr. Lawson, counselling to commit fraud. They also apply to quash the February 3, 2012 summonses issued against them by a Justice of the Peace, which were based on the impugned informations. Further, the application requests a number of other orders that do not go to the substance or validity of the summonses, and which I will describe later.
[2] At a pre-application hearing, Cullen A.C.J. directed that an application by the Crown to strike the motions as being moot or having no foundation in law should be heard on February 18. The purpose of that was to potentially save a multi-day hearing for which the Lawsons wanted to subpoena the Justice of the Peace and the CRA officer who swore the information (and possibly others). I make no ruling here as to whether that would be an appropriate procedure. It is the Crown's motion that is before me now.
[snip]
[5] Mr. Lawson represented himself and his wife.
[6] At the close of the hearing, I gave Mr. Lawson the opportunity to send in further written submissions, which I have received and considered. There is one point made that I will deal with at the outset. The supplemental argument states that I might be biased because I refused to recognise the Lawsons as "natural persons" at the outset of the hearing. The argument alluded to my role in hearing the case of R. v. Porisky & Gould, 2012 BCSC 67, to which I refer below.
[7] Bias was not something raised by Mr. Lawson during the hearing. If it had been I would have rejected it – and do so now – because no reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that a judge was biased because he had decided a prior case involving similar issues. That is something that occurs on a regular basis. Furthermore, another judge would normally be bound to follow any applicable legal conclusions from my decision in Porisky under the principle of stare decisis.
I. The informations and summonses
[8] Mr. Lawson advances both substantive and formal objections to the informations and summonses.
A. The formal objections
[9] The first formal objection I will deal with is: "a failure to properly identify either of the Applicants by his or her proper name in any of the counts or offences alleged therein." This is so, Mr. Lawson argued, because his and his wife's last name are capitalised in the informations and summonses. He cites a literary style guide in support of his argument. There is, of course, no legal requirement as to the capitalisation of names in informations, summonses or other court documents. The accused are clearly and properly identified. Style guides are not legal authority, nor are they written as such.
[10] A second formal objection is: "... failure to state the geographic location where each of the alleged offences occurred." In Mr. Lawson's supplemental argument he states:
In the Information, neither of the terms "City of Burnaby," and "Province of British Columbia" expresses a geographic location; i.e. a place, where the alleged offences were committed. The Canadian Style guide's rules for the style of geographical terms, in section 4.21(c), shows that those words are not a location, but are used in a corporate sense.
At the hearing, Mr. Lawson added that he was not a shareholder of Burnaby.
[11] I do not agree with this argument. In their context, the words clearly denote geographic locations.
[snip]
[18] Mr. Lawson has filed an affidavit deposing to a conversation he had with the Justice of the Peace. He says it indicates that the Justice acted as a rubber stamp and that he was not aware of the constituent elements of the charge of counselling fraud. I do not agree that the Justice indicated that he rubber-stamped the application for the summons. His statement to the effect that he was not aware of the constituent elements of the counselling fraud charge was made several days before the summons for that charge issued. The effect of the presumption of regularity is that it is to be assumed that he made himself aware of those elements before issuing the summons.
[19] Given that the CRA officer appeared in front of the Justice of the Peace as an informant pursuant to s. 508(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, I do not agree that the informations were defective because they improperly stated conclusions of fact and law. Mr. Lawson has not adduced evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity that the Justice of the Peace adequately heard and considered the allegations of the CRA officer in performing his duties under s. 508(1)(b).
[20] I do not agree that the Crown is obliged to seek a remedy in tax court rather than launch a prosecution for tax evasion. There have been several cases in which the Crown has obtained convictions for tax evasion and failure to remit GST. While Mr. Lawson cited cases in which the courts have acquitted on charges of tax evasion and remarked in their decisions that the Crown should have pursued the matter in tax court as a collection matter; that is, a decision that is made at a trial or preliminary inquiry. It is not for this Court to pre-determine that issue by way of a motion for a prerogative remedy.
[21] That is sufficient to dismiss the Lawsons' motion on its substantive grounds, but there is more. There were, in fact, ample grounds for the issuing of the informations and summonses and for the Crown to proceed as it did in this case. Prior to the information being sworn, Mr. Lawson had met with the CRA. On October 4, 2011, Mr. Lawson - of his own accord - provided the CRA with an affidavit he had sworn. In it, Mr. Lawson says that he acted as a "Paradigm Educator" for Mr. Russell Porisky. The clear implication is that he earned money (to use neutral terms) for doing that. The other clear implication is that Mr. Lawson was of the view he did not have to report that money as income because he was a "natural person". The natural person theory is referred to in Mr. Lawson's supplemental written argument.
[22] Mr. Porisky, his alter-ego the "Paradigm Education Group", and the "natural person" taxation argument were the subject of the Porisky judgment I issued on January 18, 2012. In that judgment I concluded that the teachings of Mr. Porisky and Paradigm had no legal validity. I convicted Mr. Porisky of income tax evasion, failure to remit GST and counselling fraud. The second Information in this matter was sworn by the CRA officer on February 1, 2012, and the summonses were issued on February 2 and February 3. Based on Mr. Lawson's affidavit and the Porisky judgment, the information and the summons were fully justified at the time they were issued.
[23] I note that while Mr. Lawson objected when the Crown referred to his involvement with Paradigm at the hearing, it is difficult to conceive why, since his own affidavit in this proceeding put the matter before me.
[24] I grant the Crown's motion and dismiss the applicants' motions with respect to the validity of the informations and summonses.
II. Other relief sought
[25] The first order sought is a declaration:
... that the court which will hear this application is the same Honorable Court having the name and style "Supreme Court of British Columbia" (the "Court"), as continued by s.2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (R.S.B.C., 1996);
[26] In his supplemental argument Mr. Lawson argues that if the declaration is not granted there is:
.... the potential that the public will begin to perceive that if no lawful superior court exists in which people can have a reasonable expectation of the equal protection of law, as provided for by the Canadian Bill of Rights, then they will no longer seek to have their disputes and grievances settled in the courts, but will be more likely to take matters into their own hands to obtain justice by more swift and certain means against perceived adversaries and oppressors.
Earlier in his argument he refers to "YouTube" videos showing people swarming the courts of England "to demand justice and chasing judges from the bench." There is a reference to the "public, who are paying close attention to this and related proceedings in growing numbers."
[27] I will give Mr. Lawson the benefit of the doubt and assume that this was not meant as a veiled threat. Even so, the argument is not helpful, constructive or appropriate.
[28] There is no doubt that this is the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and no issue has been raised with respect to this Court's constitution or jurisdiction, of which the Lawsons chose to avail themselves. The motion is unnecessary and frivolous, and is dismissed.
[29] The second order sought is:
an order confirming that this Court recognizes each of the Applicants in propria persona, and each having the status of a private person, also known as a natural person, at common law for the purposes of these proceedings.
According to Mr. Lawson, this request was made of the Associate Chief Justice at the pre-application hearing and denied. I reach the same conclusion. This has no legal merit. The Lawsons are named individuals. There is no basis for the recognition of any special status, nor does one exist for them. There are no separate laws, rules, rights, remedies or procedures applicable to "natural persons" versus other individuals, or, for the sake of completeness, individual persons. In line with this, I order that the reference to "private person" following the applicants' names in the style of cause be struck.
[30] The third order sought is a declaration:
... that this Court is competent court [sic] to hear and determine these matters at common law for the purposes of these proceedings.
This is unnecessary now that I have heard and determined this matter. Further, it was unnecessary to request this since no one had challenged jurisdiction and it is the Lawsons themselves who launched these proceedings in this Court.
[31] The fourth order sought is:
an order declaring that the Applicants, who are unrepresented by counsel, are entitled to the assistance of this Court in making this application, and that this Court will provide direction and assistance to Applicants in accordance with the common law duty of a judge to assist an unrepresented individual in a criminal case;
In this regard, Mr. Lawson referred to Steemson v. The Queen, 2002 BCSC 307.
[32] This matter is now moot since I have concluded the hearing, during which I did attempt to provide the appropriate assistance. Further, it is not the appropriate subject for an order. However, since this point pervaded Mr. Lawson's arguments, it is important for the Lawsons to understand that there is only so far a judge can go in assisting a party. A judge is not an avatar of defence counsel. As stated by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kim, 2004 BCCA 57:
[65] A trial judge has a duty, whether an accused is or is not represented, to ensure a fair trial. This might be said to be an extension or a restatement in modern terms of the principle expressed in R. v. Gibson (1887), 18 Q.B.D. 537 at 543 (U.K.).
[66] But it is not and cannot be any part of the duty of a trial judge to give advice to an accused on trial tactics. Thus, for example, it is the judge's duty to advise an unrepresented accused that it is his choice whether to give evidence or not to give evidence. But as to what course is the best course for an accused in any particular case, is not a question on which the trial judge can give advice.
[67] When a poor man - there is no evidence here that the appellant could not afford counsel or was denied legal aid - had no choice but to represent himself, judges did sometimes cross the line into giving advice in order to help the prisoner and thereby prevent wrongful convictions. But there was not then and is not now any such obligation.
...
[69] Having failed to avail himself of the opportunity to retain counsel, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that the learned trial judge ought to have become his legal advisor.
See also R. v. Bonnick, 2004 ABCA 133 at para. 12; at paras. 64-69; R. v. Mirabi, [2008] O.J. No. 867 at para. 43.
[33] The fifth and sixth orders are related and can be dealt with together. They are:
• an order directing that each registry location of the Supreme Court of British Columbia shall ensure that it has a proper court seal, in accordance with s. 7(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), having the proper name and style of the court, as set out in s. 2(1) of that Act;
• an order recognizing that the application filed by Applicants in this Court does not bear the proper seal of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, as set out in ss. 7(1) and 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), and a further order declaring that the lack of the proper seal of the Court, or the use of an improper seal, shall by order of this Court be deemed to be an irregularity that shall have no adverse effect on the substance, jurisdiction, or otherwise in respect of this application, because the Applicants were informed by the court registry that the proper court seal was not in the possession of the registry of this Court, although the Applicants did insist that the proper court seal be used to file this application;
[34] There is no relation between this issue and the validity of the Information or summonses. If the Lawsons have any standing to raise this issue, this is not the proper procedure in which to do it. These applications are therefore dismissed.
[35] All of the other applications in the notice of application have been disposed of as part of or as a consequence of my ruling on the validity of the informations and the summonses, and I will not list them separately.
[36] In summary, all of the Lawsons' applications are dismissed.
[37] At the hearing, Mr. Lawson referred to the requirement for him and Mrs. Lawson to be fingerprinted pursuant to the Identification of Criminals Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-1. If I did not quash the summonses, he requested an order delaying the fingerprinting pending the hearing of a Charter challenge he said he would be launching. In my view that is akin to a stay of proceedings or an injunction. I do not have a sufficient basis to make such an order, particularly since the Charter application has not been filed.
[38] I wish to make it clear that I am not seized of any further applications on this matter.
"E.M. MYERS, J."