Now it can be told!
I like a punchy opening. However, like tabloid headlines, the contents are much more mundane. This posting covers a two day Supreme Court of British Columbia hearing held on March 22nd and 23rd, 2016 relating to a voir dire on an application by the Crown. It was a joint hearing for three accused Poriskyites;
Debbie Anderson;
viewtopic.php?f=50&t=10747
Michael Spencer Millar;
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Keith Lawson;
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The Crown wanted a ruling that the records seized from Russell Porisky's house which related to the three defendants could be submitted in evidence at their trials as business records and have the documents excluded from the best evidence rules. As I understand it this would eliminate the necessity of proving them all. The three accused opposed allowing the evidence as business records. At least this was the purported reason for the defendant's objection. The session quickly turned into yet another venue for Millar and Lawson's demented obsessions with capitalization, private documents, private persons acting in their private capacity, and jurisprudence. One of the most manic sessions I've yet attended.
So why have I waited over six months to report it? As explained later in this posting I was the subject of a personal publication ban on the proceedings! What this meant was that I could not publish anything about the hearing until all three trials, if they were jury trials, were concluded. The theory is that jurors or potential jurors might read my postings and might, as a result, might become biased against the defendants. This continues right through trial because I often hear information not available to the jurors because they have been excluded while the parties and judge discuss issues. The ban did not include trials by judge alone because judges are supposedly immune to being influenced by my babbling.
The problem with this was Debbie Anderson. Lawson's jury trial is done and Millar re-elected to be tried by a judge. But Debbie's trial has yet to be held and, until very recently, she was full-speed ahead on having a jury trial. Apparently she's been giving that some second thought after juries found Porisky, Gould, and Lawson guilty on all counts in almost indecent haste. So last Friday she re-elected for a trial by judge effectively ending the publication ban. I've had this posting written up for months in anticipation of this so here it is.
Tuesday March 22, 2016
Another day in court another personalized publication ban. I was back in my old Nanaimo Three and Charles Norman Holmes territory at the New Westminster courthouse. It had been almost two years since I was here last, attending the Alexander Ream trial and handicapped by five broken ribs.
A busy courtroom at the start. Three defendants, one lawyer representing Anderson (I won't bother to introduce him he won't be in the cast of characters very long), two court clerks, two Crown counsel (same pair that handled the Porisky/Gould trial), a sheriff and the judge. Nobody in the public seating except me and another Crown lawyer watching the proceedings. That would change in a few minutes when Debbie Anderson changed status from a party to the proceedings to a spectator and spent the rest of the day sitting just down the row from me.
Lawson and Millar introduced themselves to the judge as being there in their private capacity as private persons making Special Appearances. Debbie didn't introduce herself. Lawson immediately noted that he was trying to get everything stopped because the court did not have jurisdiction over him. We got a lot of that later. Millar popped up and stated he was also challenging the court's jurisdiction. We got LOTS of that later from him.
A word about the judge before we begin. Not the same judge as the March 16th hearing. A blunt no-nonsense guy who had no compunction against stomping on Millar and Lawson when required. It was required a lot today.
Debbie's lawyer spoke immediately after the introductions saying that Debbie was not contesting the Crown's application to allow the documents to be entered into evidence in her trial. He said that his retainer had "extinguished" immediately after he made that concession on Debbie's behalf and he no longer represented her. So he asked the court to release him from representing her and when judge approved he was gone. Debbie, no longer a party, came and sat down in the public seating and remained there for the rest of the day. A long day.
Lawson said that he had issues to discuss. He's unclear on something. He'd filed his arguments on jurisdictional issues last Friday. Judge immediately squashed him on that one. He said that the court very clearly had jurisdiction over Lawson. He cited R. v Anderson, Debbie's own case, where he'd said;
E. Jurisdiction of the Court to hear this case
[34] Ms. Anderson also seeks a declaration that the British Columbia Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to try Counts 1 and 2 until after the Tax Court of Canada determines the exact amount of tax she has allegedly evaded. She cites s. 12(1) of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2, as authority for this proposition. That section provides that the Tax Court “has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals to the Court on matters arising under the … Income Tax Act”.
[35] Ms. Anderson’s understanding is not correct. This jurisdictional issue was canvassed and dismissed by Bauman C.J.B.C. in R. v. McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928 (CanLII):
[11] I agree with the essence of the Crown’s submission at para. 22 of its argument:
[22] … The Redpath decision does not anywhere indicate that tax evasion charges should proceed in the Tax Court. Nowhere does the decision say that the provincial-level courts are without jurisdiction to try a criminal tax evasion case. Rather, the decision stands for the proposition that civil taxation questions should not be adjudicated in the criminal process.
[12] A similar view was taken by Justice Myers in R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 (CanLII), where the taxpayers similarly brought application to quash tax evasion charges. They, too, raised the taxability/jurisdiction argument. Justice Myers rejected that submission as premature (at para. 20):
[20] I do not agree that the Crown is obliged to seek a remedy in tax court rather than launch a prosecution for tax evasion. There have been several cases in which the Crown has obtained convictions for tax evasion and failure to remit GST. While Mr. Lawson cited cases in which the courts have acquitted on charges of tax evasion and remarked in their decisions that the Crown should have pursued the matter in tax court as a collection matter; that is, a decision that is made at a trial or preliminary inquiry. It is not for this Court to pre-determine that issue by way of a motion for a prerogative remedy.
[13] In my view, that disposes of this aspect of the applicants’ argument.
[36] Moreover, a criminal court may determine the amount of tax allegedly evaded for the purpose of sentencing: see R. v. Alexander Street Lofts Development Corp., 2007 ONCA 309 (CanLII), leave to appeal ref’d [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 378, at paras. 28-31. Thus, if Ms. Anderson is convicted, and were the court to assess a fine, the court would have to determine the total amount of taxes evaded.
[37] There is no merit in Ms. Anderson’s position on this point.
http://canlii.ca/t/gkkbp
So he was not going to listen to any jurisdictional arguments. As the hearing later showed that didn't stop Millar and Lawson from making them ad nauseam.
So then Lawson decided to tell the court about me! "There's a gentleman in the public gallery who is detailing these hearings in his blog so I want the court to include him in the publication ban." Apparently I'm moving up in his estimate because last week he only described me as an "individual". Crown did not have any objection because this hearing was already covered by the previous bans since evidence was being entered. So they were fine with Lawson's request and I was banned yet again, this time for all three defendants. As with the ban last week the court used it's "inherent jurisdiction". So a word about inherent jurisdiction. The Supreme court of British Columbia is the highest level of trial court in the province of British Columbia. So any legal issues not covered by the lower courts are automatically covered by the Supreme Court's inherent jurisdiction. A pretty sweet deal for the Supreme Court judges. This wasn't the end of the day's discussion about the issue of the publication ban. The judge would keep returning to me during the course of the day.
I'll give my understanding of the law respecting publication bans since it seems to be suddenly and unexpectedly affecting me very intimately. Firstly as I understand it the ban only applies to jury trials. The intent is to stop jurors or potential jurors from being unfairly prejudiced against the defendants by something they have read in the media. So the ban only applies to jury trials on the assumption that judges are beyond being influenced by the gutter press. The "standard" ban covered by the legislation allows judges to impose a ban that covers two circumstances;
1 - Reporting on the actual trial in progress.
2 - Reporting on pre-trial hearings where evidence is submitted to the court.
So the hearing last week was not subject to the existing publication ban until the judge extended it because it was pre-trial, not trial, and no evidence was entered.
Today's extended ban was totally pointless because all three defendants already have standard bans which preclude me from posting anything about the current hearing because of prohibition 2. The bans are individually automatically lifted when the respective juries go into deliberations but I can't post anything about these joint hearings until all three trials are concluded since posting about one of them is posting about all of them. I already knew this before today's hearing but the judge decided to spell it out for me anyhow when he expanded the ban today. On top of that there was an orange sign on the registrar's table facing the public seating saying "BAN IN EFFECT"
So we finally got started with the Crown's submissions. The Crown's application was to have the judge approve the use of the documents seized during the search of Porisky's house. Specifically Two folders taken from a filing cabinet, one with Lawson's name on it the other with Millar's. They wanted them excluded from the hearsay rules and allowed as business documents.
Here is my understanding of the hearsay and business document issues. Generally document have to be proven because they are hearsay. This involves getting the maker of the document to testify that he produced it. Obviously this is impossible if large quantities of business records are involved. To start with there is the sheer volume. And, generally, it's not possible to identify who produced specific records or even if actual people did it rather than computers. It is also assumed that business records are correct, that's the whole point of having them. So a hearsay exception is made for them. These are the American rules on it, I assume Canadian rules are similar.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_ ... _exception
So the Crown argued that the seized records were business records and therefore not hearsay. Counsel ran through the general types of documents seized. The first category of documents were contracts between Paradigm and Millar/Lawson and between Millar/Lawson and their students. The second category were invoices, generally for Paradigm products and fees.
The Crown also wanted to avoid having to use the best evidence rule which required that the original document seized be used at trial. Judge cut in to note that counsel was not including Debbie Anderson in their arguments. Counsel said that it wasn't necessary since she was not contesting the application. Back on track the originals were not available because they were still in the custody of the Supreme Court of British Columbia pending the end of the Porisky/Gould trial. While the trial itself was concluded and verdicts reached the case wasn't over until their sentencing on May 24th and the Crown didn't want to prejudice a jury (I assume Lawson's jury since his trial is scheduled prior to Porisky sentencing) by having to tell them why original evidence not available.
Crown said that these documents were produced in the usual and ordinary course of Paradigm's business. Paradigm was a business in a broad sense. The judge agreed that Paradigm was a business since it produced and sent invoices.
We had to stand down at this point because of technical problems. Crown couldn't get samples of documents being considered up on the computer screens. Turned out to be a faulty cable and back at it at 11:00. Crown went through some of Lawson's educator documents seized at Porisky residence which detailed the terms of agreement between Lawson, Millar, and Paradigm. She quoted one line that said that they must act with the highest standards of ethics. Lawson cut in to say that he didn't know what Paradigm is. Judge told him he could cover that at trial. Right now they were just here to discuss "broad brush" availability of evidence. Crown agreed and said that it would be up to the jury to determine relevance of the documents.
The Crown was trying to connect documents seized at the Porisky residence with document seized at the Lawson and Millar residences. There were no bank documents seized at Lawson's home however the Canada Revenue Agency got them from the bank and they matched up to amounts in documents from Porisky search. Now 11:30 and break.
After break on to Millar documents. There are a number of Millar students who will testify at his trial on their contracts and dealings with him. I assume that they will verify their identities in the documents and attach them to Millar. Then a detailed walk through the seized Porisky documents trying to connect them to Millar. A lot of them were signed or came from "Spencer" which happens to be Millar's middle name. Crown suggested that these were documents prepared by Millar and sent to Porisky. I believe there were also bank records seized at Millar's home which matched up to at least some of the Porisky invoices. The Crown submitted that the accused were the authors of the documents and that the folders seized from the house were business documents.
Then lunch break. I headed off to Burnaby Hobbies, a 20 minute Skytrain ride and walk away so I skipped lunch. As I was walking to the Skytrain Station I noticed the three Crown counsel just going into a Japanese restaurant just by the station. Millar, Anderson and Lawson were walking behind me and they ended up in the same restaurant.
After lunch judge asked if we were on record. When it was confirmed that we were he said that, before we started again, he wanted to add a comment regarding the publication ban. He'd been giving it thought over lunch and decided, as best I understood it, to stipulate that there might be circumstances where it might not be necessary to wait until the last of the three trials was heard before lifting the ban. He said he wanted to allow for some flexibility. I had no idea what he meant but a lawyer I asked told me that he simply added a proviso to allow the order to be varied by further order of the court. Then back to business but there was still more about the ban later in the day.
Crown now into legal arguments. We set up the context (where records stored) and content (what records) so court should have no problem finding that the documents were business records. Crown submits that these were entirely normal types of business records. The issue for this vior dire is the admissibility of these records as business records. The reliability and weight to be given to the documents will be for the jury to decide. In respect to the joint written response by Millar and Lawson opposing the application the court has no jurisdiction to review the first part (I think this was the argument that the Supreme Court of British Columbia doesn't exist). That is for the trial judge. True enough, we have a two day hearing scheduled next week to thrash that one out. The defendants are making privacy claims that these are not business documents. They are implicitly suggesting some form of ownership of the documents suggesting some form of privilege. It is the Crown's position that there is no privilege. Lawson and Millar have not made any Charter arguments and have not argued that copies are unreliable. They have not argued that the documents are hearsay or irrelevant. It is the Crown's submission that the documents should be ruled admissible in the trials and accepted as business documents. Then Crown done.
The Crowns submission had been boring but that is the very nature of properly done legal submissions. It had been routine but logical and to the point. It flowed in a linear manner and made sense. Once the defendants started speaking all sense, relevance, logic and linear thinking fled the courtroom and didn't return. As crazed a session as I've attended with the possible exception of this one;
viewtopic.php?f=48&t=9388&start=260#p165879
Both Lawson and Millar had made written submissions, apparently very lengthy ones. I'm assuming that the arguments they raised orally matched those in their submissions. Lawson went up first. He said that he was unrepresented and he didn't want to make mistakes. So he asked the judge if arguing admissibility of evidence was going to affect his jurisdiction argument. Judge said no, there was no question that this court has jurisdiction for this hearing and the Crown has the right to make the application she has made. What you say here addresses only the issues in this court. Then Lawson brought up the Porisky search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained through the warrant. The judge cut him off. The validity of the Porisky search warrant is not relevant here. It has already been found valid and you can't argue it. The legality of the warrant is not a relevant issue here. If there was no finding in Porisky's case on the validity of the search warrant then it is already legally decided. All that is relevant in this court is whether the documents with your name on them are relevant in this court. It is not more complicated than that. The jury will decide on the totality of the evidence. These documents will be part of that totality. This voir dire is not to determine the weight to be given to the documents but whether they are relevant.
But Lawson couldn't leave the Porisky search warrant alone. He kept going back to it unconvinced that he couldn't get it thrown out by the court and the evidence obtained by it excluded. "Since Porisky's trial is concluded if we find a defect in the warrant would that be material here?" Judge "The legality of the search warrant is not relevant here even if it is faulty on it's face. It was relevant at Porisky's trial and not brought up. Even if you found minor errors in the warrant it would not be relevant anyhow because courts don't reverse on minor mistakes or defects."
Lawson seemed stunned by this and asked for a few moments to regroup so Millar took over. Judge encouraged Millar and Lawson to read out their submissions into the record. So Millar read what were essentially a few bullet points of it to kick-start his verbal rant. This report only captures part of Millar's statements because, once he was on a roll and got excited, it wasn't possible to do a complete transcript. At least not possible for me. Millar had bigger goals that the admissibility of a few documents. He wanted the whole trial tossed out because of fraudulent conduct by the Crown! The majority of his comments were complaints about how he wasn't being given fundamental justice and how mistreated he was by the Crown and the court. His fundamental justice argument seemed to be that the case had not been thrown out after he'd demanded it be thrown out. Unless he was allowed to unilaterally dismiss all the charges against him his rights had been irreparably violated. We got a lot of that, generally in an angry semi-rant in this session so I'll leave it out of the rest of this report.
Before Millar started the judge said "I want to caution you, I can't make it clearer, I don't want any submissions on jurisdiction wasting the court's time. There is clearly no question that the court has jurisdiction to hear this application". Good luck with that judge!
Millar replied "I have difficulty with that because it is straightforward to read the law and see that it hasn't been complied with. The application does not give the Crown standing to have jurisdiction to make it. A plain reading shows that it black and white that the Crown has no jurisdiction". Millar was like that all the way through the rest of the afternoon. Making the most preposterous statements with an absolute certainty that he fully understood the law and was instructing the judge.
The judge's response was "That is a general statement with no evidence." But Millar was already getting agitated. "They (Crown) are not in compliance with the law. And what about the territorial issue?" "What territorial issue?" Something about the County Boundaries Act and jurisdiction. Judge said "You don't understand Mr. Millar that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all of British Columbia". Millar wasn't having any of that nonsense.
Millar - The Crown hasn't established that proceedings are taking place in British Columbia. Criminal proceedings don't allow just upper case.
Judge - That's totally immaterial
Millar - That's just one example.
Judge - The rest better be better.
Millar - The legislation makes plain procedures and the prosecution is not using the prescribed styling.
Judge - If I tell you that I don't want to hear any more I want you to respect that and stop because you are wasting court time.
I was actually disappointed. I thought Millar might have something novel but he's living in the past, way, way in the past, flogging old already discredited arguments. This was what he was arguing, Some of the documents prepared by the Crown had styled the court as THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA but section 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act says;
2(1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".
And that was his whole point. The case against him had to be thrown out because the Crown had committed the criminal offense of using only upper case in some of their filings when the statute, in his dream world, required the use of both upper and lower cases for everything. Once, when freemen were young and vigorous and bursting with new ideas this was a crowd pleaser, a clear winner. Until it took a shit-kicking in court. Repeatedly. It's about as relevant today as this would be if it suddenly showed up on your television set.
I suppose that we need to show some charity here. Millar is getting on but is still living in a past when all things were still possible. Like so many of us he doesn't recognize that time has passed him by. His glory days were back in the old detaxer period of the late 1990s, early 2000's. Essentially all of the arguments he presented in court today came from that time period and are classic but failed old-school OPCA strategies. But Millar can't see it, he's too committed to his past investment in all of this to realize that it's dead and gone. The circus has folded it's tents and moved on but Millar is still standing in the fairground waiting hopefully for the clowns and elephants.
Over a year ago I posted the results of a trial hearing argued on this exact same basis on the use of upper and lower cases when using the name of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. It was a completely trivial local case I attended; Master Gee and his issues with paying his annual Burnaby business license fee;
viewtopic.php?f=48&t=10342
Master Gee used exactly the same argument as Millar except he expanded it to cover the CITY OF BURNABY too. I wrote;
Gildemeester immediately presented himself to the court as a private person acting in a private capacity and started arguing that the court didn't actually exist because its name on all the documents was in capital letters but in section 2.1 of the Supreme court of British Columbia Act it was in upper and lower case. He said he couldn't "relax" in court because the City of Burnaby was also styled in all capital letters in the various documents whereas it was in upper and lower case on the city website. Same with his and his wife's names. Everywhere he looked it was a fictitious alternate world of all capital letters. He wanted the court to issue an order that the documents all had to be changed to mixed case and that the court confirm that it was actually the Supreme Court of British Columbia acting as a Section 2.1 court. If it didn't his rights were not being respected. He said the fact that none of the documentation correctly identified the parties was a HUGE issue. He again demanded a court order. Judge wasn't buying it and refused saying that the capitalization issue was irrelevant. Well then, Gildemeester said, the case is over because it can't proceed if the parties and court are styled incorrectly. Judge said "We are proceeding". "You're going ahead?" Mark asked incredulously. The judge said he'd already ruled against him so the issue was finished. Mark rebutted by saying that this caused him to question the legitimacy of the proceedings. He kept going over and over the issue (at least it was an issue to him) about how neither Burnaby nor the court existed because of all those capital letters.
So Mark then demanded that the judge confirm that this was actually the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Judge responded "You know what court you are in". The judge said he hadn't memorized the Supreme Court of British Columbia Act so he had no idea what section 2.1 said but this was the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Mark accused the judge of sidestepping the issue. Mark said the judge was not willing to make him feel "safe" by confirming for the record that this was the real Supreme Court in adherence to 2.1 of the Supreme Court of British Columbia Act because this was obviously a court unknown to law "I don't want to participate in this court, I want to participate in a lawful court". Judge said "If you don't want to proceed that's fine but this application is proceeding regardless of your participation"
The judge stated in his decision;
[11] Mr. Gildemeester also objects that the petition refers to this court as THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA and that the proper name and style of the court is The Supreme Court of British Columbia. He makes the same objection about the City of Burnaby, based on their letters patent. He accuses the City of Burnaby of fraud. He also asserts that the City of Burnaby is on unceded First Nations lands. He has provided evidence that a person Mr. Gildemeester says is an Elder of the Squamish Nation has given him permission to use the land in this fashion.
[12] These defences are without merit. Mr. Gildemeester operates a business in the City of Burnaby. He is required to have a business licence. He is no different from other persons operating businesses in the City.
But past, failed cases mean nothing to Michael. He didn't argue them in court. This is a new day when dead arguments are miraculously resurrected!
He pulled out some unidentified document and said that the styling on it was in both upper and lower case. Then he started in on how he was here by Special Appearance. Judge told him to stop because special appearances were not recognized by this court. So Millar shifted to discussing the "defective fraudulent material" submitted by the Crown. "All documents related to me are a nullity because of defects". They'd failed to state the name of a court known to law. They'd also failed to stipulate his legal status. "The prosecution has had time to correct this and they've refused and caused irreparable prejudice against me". He used the phrase "irreparable prejudice against me" numerous times but I'm not going to repeat them all. He did a lot of ranting about his fundamental right to justice being denied due to the actions of the Crown and court and kept demanding that he receive the justice due to him which, apparently, was whatever justice he thought was due him. He said that the court had no jurisdiction because of these defects. If they were known to the public known they would shock the conscience of the community and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. He used the phrase "shock the conscience of the community and bring the administration of justice into disrepute" a number of times. It crossed my mind that the reason that the public doesn't know about the injustices being relentlessly inflicted on him was due to the publication bans which were imposed at the defendant's requests. Otherwise I'd be happy to shock the conscience of the community on his behalf by reporting how he is being martyred. Although Lawson had asked for today's publication ban I'm assuming that he did so on Millar's instructions. So Millar is actually acting against his best interests by having the ban.
The babbling by Millar about not knowing who or where he is because the Crown refuses to tell him. This goes back to comments he made in his December 9, 2015 hearing.
He said documents are invalidated in substance and form because of the case issue and are a nullity. He wanted a an order from the court of defining the "legal nature" of the plaintiff and defendant are because he doesn't know. Is the Crown acting against him as a private person? As the Michael Millar Trust? As the flesh and blood natural man? If the court doesn't do this the proceedings are a fraud.
Is this proceeding in common law, law of equity, admiralty law? The Crown won't say and I don't know so I can't get a fair trial. Court has been mislead by Crown's paperwork and I'm not getting fundamental justice.
Judge - What order are you asking me to make? I want an order saying whether this action is taking place against a private person or the officer and trustee of a trust. I want to know if it is common law, or admiralty law. There is no reason for a trial all the documents are a nullity all of the documents are a fraud.
Some rambling about how the Crown is trying to sneak some documents into court that don't match the documents served to him. Not explained but I assume a styling issue. I need guidance from the court. Is this proceeding as a trust matter or common law? What about the Michael Millar trust? The Crown is claiming that these are proceedings against the private flesh and blood man but they are really dealings against the Michael Millar trust. So it is a matter of equity. Unless the court spells this out I can't get a fair hearing.
Judge asked Crown counsel if she could write a letter answering Millar's questions. Sure but he won't be satisfied. The Crown does not recognize him as a trust, private person. None of this is recognized in Canadian law. He'll just argue against font styling again. There are no defects in the indictment. Judge told her to write the letter to Millar and he can argue it and she will make a ruling. Lawyer said she could but it wouldn't make any difference.
So I assume that if the Crown had sent him the requested letter it hadn't satisfied his demands that they tell him who he is.
Then on to his private person routine. "All of the records should be excluded because they are private documents of private persons acting in their private status and are outside of the jurisdiction of the court." He said he wanted all of the documents covered by the application excluded because they are private rather than commercial and public. "This issue has been willfully evaded and avoided by the CRA. It is clear that the documents seized are private because they say so on their face and are therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the court." What he is referring to is a notation that Porisky put on each individual document that it was a private document. That, apparently, is a magical talisman that bars them from being used by the Canada Revenue Agency, the Department of Justice, and the courts.
At this point he was going way to fast for me to keep up and it was the same stuff anyhow. On and on about the legal magic of putting the word "private" on documents. He was just ranting about the legal status of persons and his inability to find out from the Crown or the court who he is. The judge just sat there and let it wash over him for a while then he said that it was of no relevance. "Do you have any problem with the words "Supreme Court of British Columbia"? How are you prejudiced by "The Supreme Court" instead of "Supreme Court?"".
This comment related to yet another argument that Millar had thrown into the mix. As I've noted the Supreme Court Act says;
2 (1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".
Note the quotation marks around
Supreme Court of British Columbia. This meant, in Millar's dream world, that if a document had the word "the" in front of the words "Supreme Court" that it referred to yet another separate Supreme Court. To this point Millar has identified the existence of three entirely different Supreme Courts;
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- The Supreme Court of British Columbia
- SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
And maybe even;
- THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
And nobody will tell him which one he is in. So his plaintive response in answer to the judge's above question about how he was prejudiced was "I don't know what court I'm in." All the judge said to help him with his identity crisis was "Go on to the next point. I've told you that you are not going to get any traction from this point."
So he moved on to the seal of the Supreme Court and some issue about the words on it. I didn't catch the issue. He said that the words on the seal don't match the Supreme Court Act so I assume it's just another argument about upper and lower cases. Judge - Go on to next point.
So he argued the failure to define the lawful place to establish the judicial district. His words not mine. Something about the county of Vancouver vs. the Vancouver Judicial District. He said that the Supreme Court Act screwed this up so there are no judicial districts and no Supreme Court. So he has shifted from claiming that there are multiple Supreme Courts of British Columbia to none at all. "I want to be assured that we are actually in a judicial district defined by law. So where are we? The Crown refused to answer that question so they are holding this hearing in a different court". Judge - Next point.
But Millar was too excited about the current point to move on. "I'm seeking the administration of justice and this isn't met if we don't know where we are". Then something about how the court has no jurisdiction over the seas. Happily this did not lead to a rant about maritime or admiralty laws. "The prosecution wants to prosecute me in a fictitious jurisdiction". Move on.
I've never heard the word "county" applied to Vancouver or the province of British Columbia so I looked the issue up in Wikipedia;
The BCSC sits in eight judicial districts called "counties". This is the only usage of "county" in British Columbia, which is a reference only to such court districts and has no similarity to the meaning in other provinces or in the United States or the United Kingdom. Prior to 1990, there existed in British Columbia a County Court, an intermediate court between the Provincial Court and the BCSC. In 1990, the County Court of B.C. merged with the BCSC and its judges became justices of the BCSC. The judicial districts of the Supreme Court have the same boundaries of the counties of the former County Court.
The judicial districts are: Cariboo; Kootenay; Nanaimo; Prince Rupert; Vancouver; Victoria; Westminster; and Yale. The Counties of Vancouver and Westminster are collectively one judicial district under the name of the "Vancouver Westminster Judicial District".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_C ... h_Columbia
So I assume that Millar believes he has found some error in the boundary definitions based on counties vs. judicial districts. Lawson has a two day jurisdictional hearing slated for next week on what appears to be exactly this point so I may get some further insight there.
Then something about the Crown having avoided using prescribed forms which moved them from a lawful court to an illegal court. Back to upper and lower cases and claimed minor errors in the documents which voided them. Apparently the Crown's documents don't adhere to the rules that Millar has pulled out of his ass about the usage of various cases in various documents. Judge - Move on to next point.
But he wasn't finished with his obsession about cases quite yet. Something about how names and style on criminal release and parole documents didn't style his name correctly leaving his status unknown because the name used for him is not known to law. There is a lack of legal clarity regarding the legal nature of Michael Spencer Millar. Sometimes it is in upper case and sometimes in mixed case. Each refers to a different person. Which Michael Spencer Millar is the Crown charging?
Then a long, barely coherent harangue about the incompetent, corrupt Crown counsel. Keep in mind I'm only relating a fraction of what he said. He was on an afternoon-long rant and there was no way to keep up and, really, there was no purpose in trying anyhow.
Back yet again to upper and lower case. Unless the forms submitted by the Crown followed the exact correct styling the paperwork did not invoke a lawful court. "All I want to do is confirm that I am in a lawful court in a lawful district."
Then Lawson popped up, apparently recovered from his prior defeat. "I'd like to put on the record about the court's comment that there are no such things as special appearances. That is not what Justice Cullin said so, for the record, there are special appearances." Judge responded "I don't know what Justice Cullin said but it doesn't apply here". So Lawson changed gears and said that the documents to be ruled on, including those taken under the Porisky search warrant, do not meet the requirements of the Criminal Code. He said "You've been curt with Mr. Millar so I won't read everything into the record". Judge said that he'd read Lawson's submissions and there was a lot of repetition with Millar. Back to the Crown's documents having substantial defects. So documents are void and ultra vires. Are we in a proper law process? Then back, yet again, to jurisdiction. Crown has used illegal names and styles for the Supreme Court. The judge said that if judges paid attention to these things no self-represented litigant would get a hearing in court. Lawson said that the Crown won't admit that we are in a lawful jurisdiction. Judge - "It is clear that you are in the lawful jurisdiction for this case. Mr. Millar's arguments actually undermine his position. The forms are not mandatory as long as they cover essential matters." Lawson - "If this is an innocent error of the Crown they should clear it up. They haven't done so it is fraud." Judge - "There is nothing wrong with the form of the indictment."
Lawson said that he'd read in some book that if you capitalized the word "city" it indicated a corporate status. So the city of Vancouver is the actually physical city but the City of Vancouver is a corporation. So, are cities places or corporations? "Are we talking about places when we talk about the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or are we in corporations?" Judge said "I can't see how you are confused about this."
So back to the old and familiar "The mandatory forms have not been complied with". Judge - "They are not mandatory, they are prescribed. They are to give guidance and it is wrong to say that they are required." Then Lawson went off on a ramble about how he is being prejudiced because he doesn't know where he is or how he can defend himself. The judge said "The Court considers the substance of forms not the precise form. You've gone to a lot of trouble but nothing that I've heard applies to the court having jurisdiction." Lawson wanted judge to confirm that we were in a lawful court. Judge said "You are in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and always have been so stop asking me about Section 2 of the Act and don't ask me again if you are in the Supreme Court."
Lawson asked for a break for a moment so judge decided to take the opportunity to revisit the publication ban. He asked "Are the two gentlemen in the back members of the press and do they understand the publication ban?". The only other guy in the back was a Department of Justice lawyer who just happened to be sitting in the same row as me so I was the person being addressed. I stood up and said that I was not press, I wrote for a blog. I understood the effect of the ban and did not plan to publish anything during the course of the trials.
Back to Lawson and his private interests. Judge asked "If you put words "private interest" in a document are you saying that it must be considered private?" Yes, the wording means that it doesn't extend to the public. Lawson said that putting the words "without prejudice" on a document also makes them private and they can't be used by the public. Judge said no, it is a term used in negotiations so that offers can't be used against you later if negotiations fail. "You can't write "Without Prejudice" on documents and exclude them from criminal investigations."
So Lawson argued that Paradigm can't be considered a business because it wasn't registered somewhere or another as a legal person. Judge said it didn't matter what Paradigm was since Porisky had been charged personally so it makes no difference to your situation what Paradigm is.
It was now 4PM and everybody had had their say. So judge said he would give his oral decision at 10 tomorrow morning and we'd be done by lunch. He will provide written reasons for judgment later.
A note about presenting styles. While the two defendant's arguments were almost identical their way of presenting them was entirely different. Lawson was at least calm and composed. Millar was very agitated, indignant at being here and having his arguments opposed by the Crown and angry at the Crown for persecuting him even though he's proven to them that they have no case against him. The two Crown counsels responded to him by ignoring him and keeping focused on business.
Millar's basic position seems to be that if an "i" isn't dotted or if, somewhere in all the documents, a "t" isn't crossed correctly or a word is misspelled he has irrefutable proof of the total corruption of the Crown and the case against him must be dismissed. He's claiming an absolute standard of no errors at all. Well, errors as he defines them since styling the court name in capital letters was deliberate. He said that he'd originally thought it was just innocent incompetence on the part of Crown counsel that resulted in all of the improper documents that they'd filed but he now realizes that it is deliberate fraud on the court. So his case must be thrown out because justice demands that the Crown do everything exactly right by a set of standards that Millar has essentially pulled out of his ass.
I would also note that Lawson tried almost of the same arguments out in a Supreme Court of British Columbia hearing four years ago and failed there. They've been fleshed out since then but are essentially the same.
]A. The formal objections
[9] The first formal objection I will deal with is: “a failure to properly identify either of the Applicants by his or her proper name in any of the counts or offences alleged therein.” This is so, Mr. Lawson argued, because his and his wife’s last name are capitalized in the informations and summonses. He cites a literary style guide in support of his argument. There is, of course, no legal requirement as to the capitalization of names in informations, summonses or other court documents. The accused are clearly and properly identified. Style guides are not legal authority, nor are they written as such.
[10] A second formal objection is: “… failure to state the geographic location where each of the alleged offences occurred.” In Mr. Lawson’s supplemental argument he states:
In the Information, neither of the terms “City of Burnaby,” and “Province of British Columbia” expresses a geographic location; i.e. a place, where the alleged offences were committed. The Canadian Style guide's rules for the style of geographical terms, in section 4.21(c), shows that those words are not a location, but are used in a corporate sense.
At the hearing, Mr. Lawson added that he was not a shareholder of Burnaby.
[11] I do not agree with this argument. In their context, the words clearly denote geographic locations.
[12] Furthermore, the courts have taken a dim view of applications to quash informations, summonses and indictments on formal or technical grounds. As Tim Quigley states in Procedure in Canadian Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at p. 17-2:
[T]he Criminal Code has long sought to reduce the potential for technical defects to halt proceedings and, in recent years, the judiciary has increasingly stressed this aim. There is a marked preference for amending faulty informations and indictments, rather than to quash them, especially after the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Moore [(1998), 1988 CanLII 43 (SCC), 65 C.R. (3d) 1].
...
The position now is that only an indictment or information that discloses no offence known to law or is so badly drafted that it fails to provide notice of the offence charged will be quashed and then only if it cannot be amended.
II. Other relief sought
[25] The first order sought is a declaration:
… that the court which will hear this application is the same Honorable Court having the name and style "Supreme Court of British Columbia" (the "Court"), as continued by s.2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (R.S.B.C., 1996);
[26] In his supplemental argument Mr. Lawson argues that if the declaration is not granted there is:
…. the potential that the public will begin to perceive that if no lawful superior court exists in which people can have a reasonable expectation of the equal protection of law, as provided for by the Canadian Bill of Rights, then they will no longer seek to have their disputes and grievances settled in the courts, but will be more likely to take matters into their own hands to obtain justice by more swift and certain means against perceived adversaries and oppressors.
Earlier in his argument he refers to “YouTube” videos showing people swarming the courts of England “to demand justice and chasing judges from the bench.” There is a reference to the “public, who are paying close attention to this and related proceedings in growing numbers.”
[27] I will give Mr. Lawson the benefit of the doubt and assume that this was not meant as a veiled threat. Even so, the argument is not helpful, constructive or appropriate.
[28] There is no doubt that this is the Supreme Court of British Columbia, and no issue has been raised with respect to this Court’s constitution or jurisdiction, of which the Lawsons chose to avail themselves. The motion is unnecessary and frivolous, and is dismissed.
[29] The second order sought is:
an order confirming that this Court recognizes each of the Applicants in propria persona, and each having the status of a private person, also known as a natural person, at common law for the purposes of these proceedings.
According to Mr. Lawson, this request was made of the Associate Chief Justice at the pre-application hearing and denied. I reach the same conclusion. This has no legal merit. The Lawsons are named individuals. There is no basis for the recognition of any special status, nor does one exist for them. There are no separate laws, rules, rights, remedies or procedures applicable to “natural persons” versus other individuals, or, for the sake of completeness, individual persons. In line with this, I order that the reference to “private person” following the applicants’ names in the style of cause be struck.
[33] The fifth and sixth orders are related and can be dealt with together. They are:
• an order directing that each registry location of the Supreme Court of British Columbia shall ensure that it has a proper court seal, in accordance with s. 7(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), having the proper name and style of the court, as set out in s. 2(1) of that Act;
• an order recognizing that the application filed by Applicants in this Court does not bear the proper seal of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, as set out in ss. 7(1) and 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act, (RSBC, 1996), and a further order declaring that the lack of the proper seal of the Court, or the use of an improper seal, shall by order of this Court be deemed to be an irregularity that shall have no adverse effect on the substance, jurisdiction, or otherwise in respect of this application, because the Applicants were informed by the court registry that the proper court seal was not in the possession of the registry of this Court, although the Applicants did insist that the proper court seal be used to file this application;
[34] There is no relation between this issue and the validity of the Information or summonses. If the Lawsons have any standing to raise this issue, this is not the proper procedure in which to do it. These applications are therefore dismissed.
R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356
http://canlii.ca/t/fqhb6
Wednesday March 23, 2016
Back in court but first a chat with Keith Lawson. I was reading the court calendar posted in the courthouse lobby when Lawson came up behind me saying "Hello Michael, oh, you're not Michael." Quite right, I'm not currently charged with any criminal offenses and facing trial. Lawson asked me what my position was on his case. I told him that I spent 35 years as an income tax auditor which should fully explain my position. He claims not to have read any of my Quatloos postings or even know what Quatloos is. Do you own it? Is it subscription? He said that he only knows about Quatloos from friends who've told him that I post about him on it. The only person I've written about who has actually admitted that he read my postings about him was the Chief. All the rest tell me they don't have time, it's not worth the bother, my posts are all lies anyhow.
When I told Lawson that I write about freemen and tax evaders he professed not to know what freemen are and said that he had no idea if Paradigm was based on freeman beliefs. I told him that Porisky's natural person argument was pure freeman and that Millar at least was arguing old freeman concepts in court. I told him it didn't matter to his prosecution since the crown seemed to be just treating him as an everyday tax evader. He said he'd attended some of the Porisky trial but apparently not on the days I attended. He went the first week and I went the second. He was surprised that Porisky offered no defense at all (as was I) and said that he'd tried to contact Porisky but it seems that Porisky had severed any connection with his followers. A pleasant enough chat, I told him I appreciated being upgraded from an individual to a gentleman. Then off to court.
Debbie Anderson did not attend today. Only other spectator was an older guy in a suit who I've seen at a few other Poriskyite hearings and who knows Lawson and Millar. No idea who he is. (Note - This is what I wrote at the time of the hearing. I've later learned that he's Lawson's father) The judge was going to give his decision today. I didn't expect any suspense about the results, it was pretty clear by the end of yesterday that the application would be approved. We got the same private person in private capacity special appearance routine from Lawson and Millar when judge came in. Before we got going some paperwork issues to do with sorting out submissions. Then Lawson had a question. Was this hearing proceeding under the authority of Section 2(1) of the Supreme Court Act? As I posted yesterday this is 2(1);
2 (1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".
Judge said no, it was proceeding under the authority of the Income Tax Act and (I believe) the Criminal Code of Canada. Then Lawson asked something I didn't get. Judge just said "I want to get along with this matter, anything else?" Lawson said that he was not properly identified in the paperwork. Judge said that his name and address were on it and that was enough. Judge told him that the court was properly constituted and "it is so fundamental and so basic that there is no point in discussing this further". Judge got started. "This application is about the admissibility and use of written and computer documents." He noted that the documents had come from Porisky's house and that Porisky and Gould had both just been convicted of tax evasion and Porisky of counseling tax evasion. "This application is limited to determining the admissibility of two educator files to be admitted to trial of the accused."
He said that he noted for the record that Debbie Anderson, on advice of counsel, was not contesting the Crown's application. However his order would apply to all three defendants. This voir dire is specifically in respect to documents found in folders in Porisky's house during the CRA search and seizure. There were three folders, each with a defendant's name on them. Anderson's folder contained 305 pages in pdf format. Millar's folder contained 336 pages in pdf format. Lawson's folder contained 193 pages in pdf format. Then "Crown's application is granted. Crown is to draft the order for me to sign. Written reasons to follow."
So hearing was over but Lawson suddenly stood up to say something as judge was leaving. Sheriff got up and stood beside him but he didn't say anything as judge left. Turned out to just be a minor quibble he had about some documents. He, Crown counsel and the registrar corrected it and we were done, all in twenty minutes.