I've finally got some time to fit Denise Eddy into my Poriskyite write-ups. On February 4th, 2016 Denise pled guilty to income tax evasion, GST evasion, and counseling fraud. The last posting I'd done on her before this was February 22nd, 2015. That missing year was not an inactive one. Denise spent it trying hard, very hard, to get out of the charges by having them dismissed for various reasons, mainly Charter based. Her main tactic seems to have been an attempt to swamp the court with documents, the vast majority entirely irrelevant. These were dealt with in two pre-trial hearings, essentially mini-trials to clear away issues before the actual trial which was scheduled this month. In October 2015 Denise tried to dump an avalanche of inadmissable or irrelevant documents on the court in the guise of it all being part of an affidavit. Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke responded to this and he was not amused;
R v Eddy, 2015 ABQB 744http://canlii.ca/t/gn8kq
 Ms. Eddy on October 19, 2015 filed a Notice seeking various Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [the “Charter”] remedies. This was accompanied by a document that purported to be an “Affidavit”. That document was some 1,277 paragraphs and 866 pages, with 112 exhibits (an additional 959 pages), for a total of 1,835 pages.
 On November 3, 2015 I conducted an oral hearing on scheduling of certain voir dire applications in the criminal case management of this case. At that time I denied acceptance of the “Affidavit”, which I merely accepted as, and changed the designation of the document to, “Argument”. The basis for the denial was that the document was replete with irrelevant material, opinions, arguments, hearsay and other matters inconsistent with a proper affidavit at law. I explained these defects in detail to Ms. Eddy at the November 3, 2015 hearing, identified specific examples from the October 19, 2015 “Affidavit”, and provided her with an excerpt from Stevenson & Côté, Alberta Civil Procedure Handbook 2016 (Edmonton: Juriliber Limited, 2015) that illustrated the legally correct content of an affidavit.
. . . . . . . .
 Though I rejected the October 17, 2015 document as an affidavit, I permitted the Accused to file a proper legal affidavit on facts specifically relevant to the issues at hand on the voir dires, but only on my leave, so as to ensure any new purported affidavit was valid in law. I warned Ms. Eddy to not re-argue matters relating to the trial of Russell Anthony Porisky. I also stressed that Ms. Eddy should not return to disclosure issues that had been previously addressed in an earlier decision of this Court by Acton J, reported as R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 164 (CanLII), 583 AR 217.
Denise didn't take the hint and responded with a much smaller (only 451 pages!) but still inadmissable document. So Rooke told her to get lost;
 On November 16, 2015, the Accused provided another document entitled an “Affidavit” which is 1,937 paragraphs over 451 pages, for which she sought leave, referencing the same exhibits and exhibit numbers (para
as in the “Argument”.
 This was accompanied by a table of the discrete Charter issues that Ms. Eddy had identified. There are 120 issues in total.
 I sought input from the Crown, who in a letter dated November 18, 2015 (both to be marked for identification at the next oral hearing), argued that leave to file the November 16, 2015 “Affidavit” should be denied.
 I agree. For the reasons that now appear below (so not as to delay the matter further), and for any supplementary reasons I may decide to provide later, leave to file the November 16, 2015 “Affidavit” is denied. Those reasons, primarily referencing only the first few pages, but continuing throughout the document, and some examples, include that the Accused:
But she was given one last chance to try and get it right;
 Ms. Eddy has previously has been cautioned by this Court that her written materials raise the question of whether she advances her arguments in good faith (R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 164 (CanLII) at para 196, 583 AR 217; R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 234 (CanLII) at para 40, 583 AR 254; R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 391 (CanLII) at paras 37-38, 583 AR 268), and that she cannot re-litigate or collaterally attack court decisions (R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 234 at paras 34-39, 583 AR 254; R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 391 at paras 40, 59, 583 AR 268).
 The Accused will have one further chance to file proper affidavit evidence by December 4, 2015, provided that I grant leave, failing which her opportunity to provide relevant evidence may be lost.
So she took her last shot at stopping the trial and had her voir dire, essentially a mini-trial before the big event. On January 22, 2016 this decision was released relating the results. A complete failure;
R v Eddy, 2016 ABQB 42http://canlii.ca/t/gn8kr
Yet again another massive data-dump.
 On December 4, 2015, the Court received an application for a leave to file a third purported affidavit from Ms. Eddy. This one was 236 pages and 1,430 paragraphs, and despite my detailed instructions shared the same defects that were present in the October 17 and November 16 documents. In light of the need to move this procedure forward, and provide the Crown an opportunity to respond before the scheduled hearing, I ordered this document would not be accepted as an affidavit generally but that Ms. Eddy may refer to this document on a paragraph by paragraph basis as a potential source of evidence, and that I would then evaluate the content referenced to see if it constituted proper evidence, and admit it or exclude it, where appropriate.
 During the voir dire hearing that followed, I reviewed paragraphs in the December 4, 2015 document as those were referenced by Ms. Eddy, and, in the process, struck out/excised many paragraphs as containing material that is improper for an affidavit. However, I allowed such material, again, to be treated as written argument. Nevertheless that review process did not capture all the defects in the December 4, 2015 document, and some improper purported affidavit material remains that should be, at most, argument.
Her argument about using material against her which was obtained from the Porisky search and seizure has already been beaten to death. Many of the Poriskyites have had a go of it and all have failed;
 Ms. Eddy advances a number of s 8 Charter breach allegations that relate to information that was obtained by the CRA in the process of the CRA investigating Russell Porisky, his wife Elaine Gould, and the PEG multi-level tax evasion organization. Information relating to Ms. Eddy was discovered during investigation of Porisky and PEG. This information then became the basis for a CRA criminal investigation of Ms. Eddy as also allegedly having engaged in illegal PEG-related activities. The initial investigation of Porisky and PEG was conducted by CRA investigators operating from the Burnaby CRA offices. Later, that information was transferred to the Edmonton-area CRA investigator Wade Hartley.
 Ms. Eddy complained that her s 8 Charter rights were breached in a number of ways that will be set out in more detail below in these reasons. However, for the purposes of this element of the voir dire decision, these complaints may be summarized as follows:
1. Ms. Eddy had a privacy interest in the materials and information that were obtained by the CRA when they searched the Porisky and Gould residence and obtained information relating to Porisky and PEG.
2. The searches of the Porisky and Gould residence were either illegal, or the CRA lost lawful detention of evidence that was obtained from those searches.
3. The transfer and/or copying of documents that were in the possession of the Burnaby CRA offices to Edmonton CRA investigator Hartley was in itself a warrantless search, and that search breached Ms. Eddy’s s. 8 Charter rights.
4. Subsequent to the transfer of evidence and information concerning the Porisky/PEG searches to Edmonton CRA investigator Hartley, the Crown lost lawful detention of that information, and that too was a breach of Ms. Eddy’s s 8 Charter rights.
5. The Porisky/PEG-derived evidence should therefore be excluded from the Crown’s case at trial, which has ‘downstream’ implications on the legality of other searches, including one of Ms. Eddy’s residence.
 Ms. Eddy argued, apparently factually correct, that investigation of her alleged misconduct began with the Porisky/PEG investigations and dates to at least 2003, if not earlier. She asserted that she was inextricably intertwined with those matters. The CRA investigator assigned to her case worked with the Burnaby investigators. She complained that her ability to scrutinize this period of the CRA investigation against her has been hampered by the Crown’s refusal to disclose materials from the Porisky/PEG investigation itself.
And Denise's argument was rejected just like all the others;
 I agree with the Crown. Eddy has no privacy interest in any documents, materials, or information that was derived from investigations of Porisky, Gould, PEG, or any other participant in the PEG scheme. That means this Court rejects all alleged s 8 Charter breaches that flow, directly or indirectly, from the manner in which Porisky/PEG-derived evidence:
1. was initially obtained,
2. was transferred between government actors,
3. was subsequently retained, and
4. used in the investigation of Ms. Eddy.
 In conclusion I find that Ms. Eddy has no legal standing to argue a breach of s 8 Charter rights in relation to the Porisky/PEG-derived evidence, and that any of that evidence or its ‘downstream’ products or derivatives should not be excluded from evidence or as a basis for subsequent searches, arrests, or other Crown activities.
 In closing on this argument, I note this exact scenario has already been evaluated in relation to another person involved with Porisky and the PEG. In R v Anderson, 2014 BCSC 2002 (CanLII) at paras 78-97, Brown J evaluated whether PEG “educator” Debbie Arlene Anderson had a privacy interest in materials and information that were obtained by the apparently same searches that targeted Porisky, Gould, and the PEG. Justice Brown’s analysis and conclusions parallels mine. Prior to that, Wilson J of this Court in R v Siggelkow, 2014 ABQB 101, also rejected s 8 Charter-related arguments advanced by an additional PEG “educator”, Edwin Siggelkow, that also targeted Porisky/PEG-derived materials, but on other bases.
Then on to the trivial;
 Ms. Eddy alleged s 8 Charter breaches that emerge from a number of related arguments, all of which flow from the operation of Criminal Code, ss 489.1-490. These sections provide judicial supervision of materials seized during searches, after those searches have been conducted. Section 489.1 creates a regime where government actors who seize property pursuant to Criminal Code, ss 487.11 or 489 then report to the courts on the status of seizures. For example, s 489.1 requires that where anything is seized by a peace officer that “as soon as is practicable” that the peace officer “shall”:
1. return the thing seized and report to a justice that the peace officer has done so (Criminal Code, s 489.1(a)), or
2. bring or report about the thing seized to a justice (Criminal Code, s 489.1(b)).
Ms. Eddy argued that a failure to report “as soon as is practicable” has the effect of rendering the possession of seized property illegal, and therefore a breach of s 8 of the Charter.
It seems that Denise didn't want just the original seized documents returned she wanted the Crown to destroy all of their copies of them thereby leaving no evidence on which to base a prosecution. Not doing this was a breach of her Charter rights. Judge Rooke wasn't buying it;
 The effect of these provisions is that, even if Ms. Eddy’s document-based evidence was returned via the s 490 procedures, the Crown is both entitled to make and keep copies, and those copies are deemed as having the same effect as originals. This makes plain Parliament’s intention when it comes to the return of seized documents - s 490 is not intended to deny access by the Crown to the information seized, but rather to provide a mechanism so that materials (in this case documents) that are no longer directly necessary (as originals) may be returned to their owners.
 I conclude the same is true for both ‘hardcopy’ and ‘electronic’ data. This conclusion collapses Ms. Eddy’s arguments that a s 8 Charter breach may result from the Crown’s continued holding of seized information beyond what is permitted under Criminal Code, ss 489.1-490. At most Ms. Eddy could obtain return of the original electronic and physical documents. She could never demand return or destruction of copies. If lawfully seized, those are permanently in Charter-compliant custody of the Crown.
 This is a second independent basis on which I reject Ms. Eddy’s 489.1-490 arguments. Once informational evidence (electronic or hardcopy) was obtained with a valid search warrant Ms. Eddy has no Charter right to interfere with the Crown’s possession or use of copies of that evidence. Even if she had been entitled to return of the original informational evidence, taken from her residence, Ms. Eddy could not have stymied the Crown’s ability to use copies of the seized information as a basis for searches, further investigation, or in its impending criminal trial.
Even if she had a point about the documents not being returned "as soon as practicable" the court wsn't going to find in her favour without her presenting evidence to back up her argument.
 Since Ms. Eddy has the onus to establish whether or not a s 489.1 report was made “as soon as practicable”, and since she has not provided evidence of the CRA investigators workloads, schedules, or information on the complexity of what was seized, I conclude she did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that any s 489.1 report was not made “as soon as practicable”. While I do not find that she has a s 8 Charter right in any case, the fact that she has not established a factual foundation for her argument is another reason I reject her proposed Charter breach claim.
 I therefore globally reject Ms. Eddy’s various Charter breach arguments wherever those rely on the Crown’s alleged failure to meet Criminal Code, s 489.1-490 procedures so that the Crown lost legal control of seized property and information.
So she said that the Canada Revenue Agency employee who gave her an envelope was a liar and this gave her a free pass out of the charges.
 Ms. Eddy argued that the products of the 2010 search of her residence ceased to be lawfully detained on January 24, 2011. This is allegedly a consequence of an unfair hearing before Provincial Court Judge Kirby, where the Crown applied for continued detention of property that had been seized from Ms. Eddy’s basement suite residence via Criminal Code, ss 489.1-490. The defect that Ms. Eddy identified is that an affidavit of Wade Hartley in support of that application allegedly included a lie by Hartley. The affidavit describes service of notice and supporting materials for the January 24, 2011 hearing
 Ms. Eddy argued that the affidavit and written notes Hartley prepared to document service of the January 24, 2011 hearing notice could not have been delivered in the manner described. Hartley deposed he stood at the threshold of the building Ms. Eddy occupied and observed a third party deliver the envelope that contained the notice and supporting documents by sliding it under the door to Ms. Eddy’s basement suit. Ms. Eddy personally testified on the arrangement of the entrance to the building’s basement suites and argued, with the assistance of photographs, that this is impossible. She argued that Hartley would, at a minimum, have had to enter the structure and occupy a landing beside the back door to have seen the delivery occur.
 It appears that Ms. Eddy argument is that this misstatement should mean the January 24, 2011 hearing was invalid, and that the Crown lost lawful detention of the residence search products at that point.
Judge Rooke didn't place quite the same anount of importance on the issue that Denise did;
63] The first basis on which I reject Ms. Eddy’s argument is that the inaccuracy, if indeed there is one, is trivial. Presuming for a moment that Hartley did physically enter the step area to observe the envelope delivery, that distinction is, at most, minor, and any intrusion into the shared space of a multitenant residence is inconsequential.
 I therefore conclude that Ms. Eddy has no basis to challenge the warrant on which property seized from her residence was detained. The defect identified by Ms. Eddy (if it existed) cannot subvert the Kirby PCJ order. This a second independent basis on which I reject Ms. Eddy’s argument.
 I therefore conclude that Ms. Eddy has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that her Charter rights were breached, directly or indirectly, through the ongoing detention of property seized from her residence. I note that my analysis of the legal implications of the Crown retaining seized information may have other applications to the alleged Charter breaches identified by Ms. Eddy. My conclusions as law apply equally to those other alleged breach scenarios.
Then to the real bottom-barrel nit-picking arguments;
 At the time of the search warrant on her residence Ms. Eddy lived at a basement suite at 8524 84 Ave. in Edmonton. The ITO identifies that as the address for the search, and the search was conducted on that location. However, Ms. Eddy claimed that what purports to be the Land Titles record for that building indicates the address as 8522 84 Ave., and argued that means the 8524 address is incorrect, and it should be ‘struck out’ of the ITO, as a consequence, presumably leaving the ITO without any target address.
 I conclude the fact that there are, or may be, variant addresses for Ms. Eddy’s residence is irrelevant to the question of whether the Crown obtained authorization to access that location - and it did - and it had evidence that linked Ms. Eddy to the 8824 variant of that address - which it did. Ms. Eddy has not proven any defect in the ITO that requires any further investigation.
This goes on and on. Anyone interested can read it themselves. I'll skip to paragraph 123 where Russ Porisky enters the story again;
 Ms. Eddy, in her written argument, complains that the Crown engaged in abusive litigation when it identified her as an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] litigant in a number of preliminary hearings. The “OPCA” term was coined by myself in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 543 AR 215, to identify a collection of pseudolegal arguments that are sold on a commercial basis by “OPCA gurus” on the basis that these strategies will purportedly defeat genuine legal obligations, enforce demands on government and private actors, and ‘money for nothing’ scams to provide funds from secret, concealed sources. Ms. Eddy, in the oral hearing, relied on her written argument on this point. As I understand it, Ms. Eddy argued that her being associated with vexatious OPCA litigants breaches her s 11(d) Charter presumption of innocence, and is discriminatory, contrary to s 15 Charter.
Well judge Rooke quite literally wrote the book about OPCA litigant in Meads v Meads
and he actually coined the phrase Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument in that decision;
Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571http://canlii.ca/t/fsvjq
So he wasn't agreeing that just the use of the OPCA designation was, in itself, sufficient to constitute a Charter breach;
 First, I wish to confirm that Ms. Eddy, in this voir dire, and in my review of this action, has at no time exhibited any indication of being an OPCA litigant - that is to say, she has not argued OPCA pseudolaw and her materials scrupulously have avoided those vexatious and abusive strategies. I find, as fact, that she is correct in saying she is not an OPCA litigant. That said, she is not an entire stranger to the OPCA phenomenon. She has been apparently involved with notorious Detaxer guru Russell Porisky and his PEG organization: Meads v Meads, at paras 87-98. Porisky and PEG propagated a universally rejected OPCA anti-tax scheme that “natural persons” are not required to pay income tax: R v Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 (CanLII) at para 19, 93 OR (3d) 81, leave refused  SCCA No 522; R v Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 (CanLII) at para 27, 302 BCAC 76, leave refused  SCCA No 265; Kennedy v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC),  4 CTC 186, 2000 DTC 6524 (Ont Sup Ct J). The Crown alleges Ms. Eddy participated in the PEG scheme as one of the “educator” subordinate gurus. Whether that or not is true is a question for trial, and not this voir dire.
 What is relevant to the question of whether the Crown engaged in some form of misconduct when it characterized Ms. Eddy as an OPCA litigant is whether this warning was in some manner malicious or intended to harm Ms. Eddy. I conclude it was not. Ms. Eddy, as I have noted, is not entirely unrelated to the OPCA phenomenon. Nor are all of her PEG fellow travellers innocent courtroom participants. For example, PEG Detaxer Gerald Blerot engaged in in-court misconduct which required that he had to be physically restrained by the RCMP: R v Blerot, 2014 SKQB 2 (CanLII) at paras 12, 14, 2014 DTC 5029, affirmed 2015 SKCA 69 (CanLII). In brief, the Crown had a reasonable basis to have a concern Ms. Eddy may engage in OPCA-related misconduct. To her credit, she has not, and the Crown has not persisted in continuing to flag her in this manner without basis.
 More broadly I believe, on a policy basis, that no sanction or criticism should be advanced against a party who notifies a court that litigation has a potential OPCA character where that is a reasonable possibility. OPCA litigation is by definition frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process: Meads v Meads. As I noted in ANB v Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97 (CanLII), 557 AR 364, the fact an individual is an OPCA litigant is not relevant to the validity of their action or arguments (para 19). Those are tested on their merits - and if they are OPCA-based, they fail. However, OPCA affiliation is also associated with a range of litigation and criminal misconduct: para 20. Some OPCA litigants who have appeared in this Court are potentially very dangerous persons, such as the Montana Freeman Dale Jacobi who is described in Perreal v Knibb, 2014 ABQB 15 (CanLII), 581 AR 275.
And, well before Porisky's jury found him guilty, Judge Rooke commented on the futility of his natural person defense;
 I therefore conclude that Ms. Eddy’s complaint of being improperly classified as an OPCA litigant is accurate, but it does not indicate an abuse of process by the Crown. I conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that it was reasonable for the Crown to indicate a potential OPCA character to Ms. Eddy’s conduct given her association with Porisky and PEG. This notification to the courts proved unnecessary, but Ms. Eddy has not suffered any prejudice to her Charter rights as a consequence.
 I note in passing that, at the closing of Ms. Eddy’s voir dire, the Crown suggested it would make an application to prohibit Ms. Eddy from advancing the “natural person” Detaxer argument promoted by Porisky and the PEG. Ms. Eddy indicated she had no intention of making any argument of that kind, which is again to her credit, since to do so would obviously be futile given Canadian jurisprudence on that subject.
Then Denise claimed that the whole matter should be dropped because of undue delay in getting to trial, justice delayed is justice denied. And Judge Rooke agreed with her about the delay!
 The analysis of Ms. Eddy’s alleged s 11(b) Charter breach involved several interrelated subjects: the length of delay, the cause of the delay, and the prejudice to Ms. Eddy that relates from the delay.
 First, I conclude that the time it has taken to get to this matter to trial, approximately 43 months, is prima facie evidence of inappropriate delay. Both the Crown and Ms. Eddy agree on this. As noted, waiver is also not a factor.
Except that it was her own damn fault that it took so long.
 Review of the court transcripts makes it very plain there is no question about who was trying to advance the action - that was the Crown. In R v Godin, one lawyer attempted to move the action to trial (unsuccessfully) because the lawyer met “radio silence”. That is not the situation here. The Crown, figuratively speaking, encountered a concrete wall, covered with barbed wire. Ms. Eddy refused to cooperate at every step, complained about disclosure, filed yet more disclosure requests, refused to elect the forum and format of her trial, advancing spurious Charter complaints, and engaging in collateral attacks on prior decisions.
 I will provide one example to illustrate Ms. Eddy’s behaviour. A point of contention was that the Crown refused to permit Ms. Eddy to make copies of private tax information that related to third parties, but from the beginning the Crown offered to permit Ms. Eddy to view these items. Ms. Eddy refused to cooperate with this procedure, and instead demanded hardcopies of these items. She also complained that she should not have to travel to Edmonton to view this disclosure. At the December 4, 2012 hearing the Crown explained that it had attempted to satisfy Ms. Eddy’s concerns by having CRA employees travel to Red Deer, where Ms. Eddy lives, and then she could view the documents. Ms. Eddy, however, refused to enter a room that contained these documents unless she was accompanied by an unidentified male person. Ms. Eddy would not identify this individual, and so he was not permitted to enter the room that contained the third party materials. Ms. Eddy then aborted the process entirely.
 I note that Ms. Eddy’s misconduct during this period was so bad that both Justices Acton and Marceau concluded she was not making her applications in good faith, but instead was attempting to actively derail the criminal proceeding. Marceau J in R v Eddy, 2014 ABQB 391 (CanLII),  DTC 5098 took the highly unusual step of ordering costs against Ms. Eddy in response to her April 17, 2014 application, which was made very shortly before the first scheduled preliminary inquiry. Justice Marceau concluded Ms. Eddy had engaged in conduct that, in a civil context, would have made her a vexatious litigant (paras 49-50), made unsubstantiated allegations of Crown misconduct (para 51), lied to the court (para 52-55), and specifically that her persistent demands for disclosure were ungrounded and an abuse of process (paras 58-61).
 Assembled, it is quite obvious who caused any non-inherent or institutional delay that occurred between the August 8, 2012 hearing and the first scheduled preliminary inquiry on May 26, 2014. During this period Ms. Eddy blocked the advance of her trial where she could, and advanced, and ultimately litigated, a series of complaints that had no legitimate foundation. The Courts and Crown attempted to move the action forward. Ms. Eddy resisted without a valid basis. When one steps back and examines the flow of litigation as a whole, it is Ms. Eddy who, therefore, was the cause of all delay during this period.
 I therefore allocate the period between August 8, 2012 and May 26, 2014 as:
1. inherent delay: 10 months;
2. delay caused by limitations due to institutional resources: 1 month; and
3. the remaining delay was caused by Ms. Eddy: 325 days.
 I stress I see no basis to conclude the Crown’s conduct in any way contributed to any of these delays.
 Returning to the approach indicated in R v Godin, there is no question who is the ultimate cause of the May 26, 2014 to January 19, 2015 delay period. That is Ms. Eddy - again she is the one who set ‘the dominos in motion’. I note the next preliminary inquiry was set for a little over seven months after the first post-illness hearing, which I conclude is a reasonable time that does not attract any institutional delay.
 The chief question is whether the Crown should be allocated any part of this delay period because it could not reschedule to an earlier date. The June 11, 2014 transcript reveals the Crown had tried to make arrangements for an earlier date by adopting a ‘full paper’ preliminary hearing and on the hope that Ms. Eddy would admit her identity. Ms. Eddy emphatically refused that alternative: “... I absolutely don’t agree to a full paper preliminary.”: June 11, 2014 transcript, p 5, line 25.
 Justice Cromwell, in R v Godin at para 23, is explicit that the fact a litigant offers an alternative date which cannot be accommodated by the other party does not shift or make neutral the cause of a delay. If Ms. Eddy’s chief concern had been a more timely preliminary inquiry then she had that alternative, but she refused that. The Crown Counsel and its witness were not at Ms. Eddy’s ‘beck and call’. I conclude the Crown took reasonable steps during this period to move the litigation forward. Objectively, this was merely more of what had occurred before. The Crown struggled to advance the action, while Ms. Eddy continued to do the opposite.
 I therefore conclude this entire period of delay should be attributed to Ms. Eddy.
202] I therefore conclude that, in total, the period between when charges were laid against Ms. Eddy’s and the time of her impending trial should be allocated as follows:
• inherent delay - 22.5 months
• institutional delay - 1 month
• delay caused by Ms. Eddy - 24.5 months
• delay caused by the Crown - none
 In brief, the majority of pre-trial delay, over two years, was caused by Ms. Eddy.
 The time this matter took to come to trial, that is not attributable to Ms. Eddy, is 23.5 months. The R v Morin guidelines indicate are 14-20 months. The inherent and institutional delay here does exceed that range, but that difference is not unexpected given this is not a simple trial with little evidence. Instead, the Crown and Ms. Eddy face a lengthy trial with a jury. Given the institutional stress on the Alberta courts, particularly the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, this is not an unreasonable time to trial. When considered in combination with the prejudice to Ms. Eddy that has resulted I conclude that unreasonable delay has not occurred, and therefore that Ms. Eddy’s s 11(b) Charter application must be denied.
Denise's submission was so huge that even Judge Rooke admitted he may have omitted a point here or there but, barring that, Denise was toast;
 Because Ms. Eddy filed a total of over 2,000 pages of actual or purported evidence and argument, in addition to about eight days of oral argument, it may be easy to miss a discrete issue not covered by the above analysis. I do not believe that is the case, but, if alleged, it can be brought to my attention for a supplementary decision and reasons.
 In light of my rejecting Ms. Eddy’s s 11(b) Charter application, I therefore order this matter to proceed to trial, as scheduled, commencing at 10 a.m. on Monday, February 22, 2016, with jury selection at 9 a.m. on Thursday, February 17, 2016, all at the Edmonton Law Courts.
Denise had given it her best shot, fought a monumental battle and gone down in total defeat. The road was finally clear to put her on trial. A trial she obviously concluded she couldn't win. So she caved and pled guilty.
However it wasn't a total defeat for her. These were the original charges;
 Denise Marie Eddy [“Ms. Eddy”] is charged on an information, sworn February 27, 2015, which lists eight tax-related criminal offences:
1. four counts of making false or deceptive statements in her T1 Individual Tax Returns, for the taxation years 2005-2008: Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 239(1)(a);
2. engaging in tax evasion for the period of December 31, 2004 to January 1, 2009 by understating her taxable income for the 2005-2008 taxation years: Income Tax Act, s 239(1)(d);
3. wilfully evading payment of taxes for the period of December 31, 2004 to January 1, 2009 by failing to collect or remit goods and services tax returns for taxation years 2006-2008: Excise Tax Act, RSC 1985, c E-15, s 327(1)(c);
4. between July 10, 2003 and October 13, 2010 counselled various persons to commit the indictable offence of fraud in excess of $5,000.00: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 380, 464(a); and
5. between July 10, 2003 and October 13, 2010 counselled various persons to commit the indictable offence of fraud in excess of $5,000.00, who then committed fraud, making Eddy a party to those offences: Criminal Code, s 22.
The Crown, I'm assuming as part of a plea bargain, cut the eight charges down to three. The multiple income tax and GST evasion charges were reduced to one on each count and the charge of being party to the fraud of others was dropped. I'm assuming that had she not made the plea and saved the court the cost and trouble of a jury trial her case would have gone forward on all eight charges and, given the history of all prior Poriskyite trials, she would have been found guilty on all of them. So by pleading guilty she seems to have saved herself from actual jail time by being given a conditional sentence.