Surely we can contribute to this....

Judge Roy Bean
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Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by Judge Roy Bean »

The Honorable Judge Roy Bean
The world is a car and you're a crash-test dummy.
The Devil Makes Three
Judge Roy Bean
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Judge for the District of Quatloosia
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Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by Judge Roy Bean »

Since they've closed the page to additional notes, why not continue here?

What is your best/worst find in terms of goofy case filings?
The Honorable Judge Roy Bean
The world is a car and you're a crash-test dummy.
The Devil Makes Three
RyanMcC

Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by RyanMcC »

United States District Court,
E.D. Wisconsin.

John Wesley KAZMAIER, Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and the United States Justice Dept. and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Government, Defendants.

No. 2-C-1342.
April 11, 1983.

John Wesley Kazmaier, pro se.
Joseph P. Stadtmueller, U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

MYRON L. GORDON, Senior District Judge.John Wesley Kazmaier, the plaintiff in this action, seeks leave of the court to proceed in forma pauperis. The complaint states that federal jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1983; because there is no such statute, it appears that Mr. Kazmaier may have intended to refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Department of Justice, and the United States government.The complaint sets forth in great detail the alleged wrongdoings of the defendants. Generally stated, Mr. Kazmaier claims that the CIA has subjected him to brainwashing and torture attacks since 1965 through the use of satellite beams, portable dental laser equipment, and other such means. The other defendants are alleged to have failed to investigate these incidents. As a result of these attacks, he contends that his high school career was ruined, he was prevented from receiving his college degree, his right ankle was broken, and he suffered tremendous agony. He seeks $7,308,089,250,000.00 in damages, employment as the director and assistant director of the FBI, protection from assassins, authorization to carry concealed weapons, and other forms of relief. In several letters to the court, Mr. Kazmaier has "ordered" me to provide him with ridiculously large sums of money as loans or advances against his future court award. He has also "ordered" me to send him immediately a list of items, including:

"1. A 25 layer Kevlar bullet-proof vest with protection of both front and rear of body.
2. A 357 magnum caliber revolver in a right hand shoulder holster, preferably with a four inch barrel.
3. A selective-fire Beretta 9mm type 92 pistol in a left-hand shoulder holster.
4. An Uzi Submachine gun caliber 9mm with 5 large magazines, in a soft side case with a zipper top.
5. An M-16 rifle with 5 large magazines, caliber .223.
6. A .380 or .32 ACP caliber Gatling gun with one or more medium or large ammo-pak magazines. This gun is a multiple-barrel high speed gun capable of a high rate of fire, and it has an accurate range of 50 yards.
7. A United States Marshals Service Badge and I.D. set.
8. A bullet-proof car, such as a bullet-proof Lincoln Continental four door model from Ford Motor Company."*265

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the nature of the relief sought, and the contents of Mr. Kazmaier's letters, I find that this proposed lawsuit falls easily into the "frivolous" category. I will not grant the plaintiff permission to pursue this action without payment of fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Furthermore, the plaintiff has filed a nearly identical complaint in case no. 82-C-1384, now pending before Honorable John W. Reynolds, and he has paid the filing fee in that case. I see no reason to encourage duplication of judicial efforts, especially in a case as this one.Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be and hereby is denied.

D.C.Wis., 1983.
Kazmaier v. C.I.A.
562 F.Supp. 263
RyanMcC

Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by RyanMcC »

Here is a good one, Michael Vick is sued for $63 billion, "backed up by gold and silver" by a man named Johnathan Lee Riches© (currently in prison).

Handwritten Complaint:
http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/ric ... n_file.pdf

Exerpts:

"On April 28th Michael Vick sold my dogs on Ebay auction, and used proceeds to purchase missles from Iran Government."
"On Febuary 10, 2007, Michael Vick plead allegiance to Al-Qaeda."
"Michael Vick subjected me to microwave testing."
"Michael Vick has to stop physically hurting my feelings and dashing my hopes."
Since January 8, 2006, he has filed over one thousand lawsuits in federal district courts across the country..

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Lee_Riches
Last edited by RyanMcC on Mon Jan 05, 2009 9:40 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Judge Roy Bean
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Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by Judge Roy Bean »

You have to wonder when the filing is hand-written - and this is a classic, filed in the SD of Texas – 4:07-mc-00291:

Federal Court the United States Supreme Court
5/15/07
Jurisdiction Rules to David Brian Mann Full amount of 1 Billion 529 Million 180 thousand plus 3 times damage from 2002 til Date. As added #1 List A.
1 List A.
(1) To Be paid in Full
(2) ID card
(3) DL
(4) Credit should be 760-800 points
(5) My Record Cleared in Full
(6) A Contract in Full IF I want worked off of any more.
(7) Military ID Card
(8) A Full amount pd and over a 3 year pay.
(9) Saddilite or DirectV inter Net Camera Intel and so on.
I want paid in Full
(10) I David Brian Mann wants my own Life my personal Life
(11) I own my Body & Mind. No other
(12) I have the right to profit from my Decision.
(13) I would like to talk to the Judge or Judges in person.
(14) I don’t want my voice picked up. Shut the saddilite Down DirectV or Deal over I have not been paid a the problems from it.
(15) I need my truck + pd I need a place to stay
(16) My own cking + atm Card.
(signed - David Brian Mann)
Forgot to add - the defendants:

FedEx, the State of Texas, Flying J, ConocoPhillips, Ford Motor Company, the State Indiana, CVS Corporation, Direct TV, Homeland Security, Harris County, Houston, Texas, Nasa, NFL, Shell Oil, Baker Botts, Tire Wheel Conv, Mann's Tire Svc, Polit Truck Stop, Reliant Energy, CenterPoint, Lawrence Marshall, David Florence, Treasure Department, Justice Department, the Transportation Department, Commission of Patents and Trademarks, Halliburton, KBR, Montgomery County, Walgreens, Lows, ATT, Home Depot, Congress Washington DC and United States Supreme Court.
The Honorable Judge Roy Bean
The world is a car and you're a crash-test dummy.
The Devil Makes Three
notorial dissent
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Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by notorial dissent »

I would say that more than typewriter privileges need to be pulled from Mr Riches, and why he hasn’t declared a vexations litigant and prohibited from filing I can’t see. I’m not sure this one meets the requirements for not having a full time keeper, and the one in TX is right up there as well. I am inclined to think the tolerance for this sort of thing is over broad.
The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.
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Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by Lambkin »

notorial dissent wrote:I would say that more than typewriter privileges need to be pulled from Mr Riches, and why he hasn’t declared a vexations litigant and prohibited from filing I can’t see.
He probably has been declared a vexatious litigant but those lists of vexatious litigants are not centrally maintained. Different courts have different rules for declaring someone a vexatious litigant and they keep their own separate lists of offenders. So it's not that hard to find a new court to receive your filings in a new jurisdiction. I have also seen filings to a county court which declined jurisdiction and forwarded it to a federal district court where the litigant was already declared vexatious, and the filings were still accepted since they didn't come directly from the dipstick in question.

All in all, it is not entirely effective when the serial litigant is very persistent (and most are).
RyanMcC

Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by RyanMcC »

Judge Roy Bean wrote: Forgot to add - the defendants:

FedEx, the State of Texas, Flying J, ConocoPhillips, Ford Motor Company, the State Indiana, CVS Corporation, Direct TV, Homeland Security, Harris County, Houston, Texas, Nasa, NFL, Shell Oil, Baker Botts, Tire Wheel Conv, Mann's Tire Svc, Polit Truck Stop, Reliant Energy, CenterPoint, Lawrence Marshall, David Florence, Treasure Department, Justice Department, the Transportation Department, Commission of Patents and Trademarks, Halliburton, KBR, Montgomery County, Walgreens, Lows, ATT, Home Depot, Congress Washington DC and United States Supreme Court.
The previously mentioned Johnathan Lee Riches© filed a lawsuit which contained 57 pages of defendants (is that a record?):

http://www.citypaper.net/articles/2006- ... awsuit.pdf

Among those listed: George Bush, Magna Carta, Tony Danza, Skittles Candy, Elizabeth Smart, PAYNOTAXES.COM (page 55), Rastafarian Natives, King James Bible, Ming Dynasty, Liberty Bell, unknown authors of the Uniform Commercial Code.

I don't know what the lawsuit was about, but I doubt he did either.
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Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by Randall »

President Clinton and Ross Perot have made fortunes in the death-hunting industry, and are responsible for the murder of at least 10 million black women in concentration camps, their bodies sold for meat
Somebody had to feed Idi Amin.
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Re: Surely we can contribute to this....

Post by The Observer »

MARTHA L. JACOBS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES TREASURY IRS, AND
POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Defendants.

Release Date: OCTOBER 02, 2008


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Martha L. Jacobs, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action for damages alleging that the defendants have conspired to maliciously and wrongfully collect money from the plaintiff for taxes which the plaintiff claims should not be owed./1/ Plaintiff files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. section 1915. The complaint names as defendants two United States agencies or departments. The plaintiff alleges that she represents herself and all others similarly situated. The complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Pro Se and In Forma Pauperis Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint herein pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 1915. This review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).

The complaint sub judice has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous or malicious." section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Hence, under section 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71 (5th Cir. 1995). The court may dismiss a claim as "factually frivolous" under section 1915(e) if the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. In making this determination, the court is not bound to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, but rather need only weigh the plaintiff's factual allegations in his favor. Id.

This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 9 (1980) (per curiam). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff alleges that she was employed by the United States Postal Service ("USPS") and that in February 1993 she retired because of a disability due to a physical illness. She claims that she is "permanent total disabled" and receives workers' compensation benefits and payments. She further alleges that a judge ordered the USPS to pay her $ 130,000.00 for "non-pecuniary damages" which she did receive in 1999. Then, in 2001 she "received payment of one hundred seventy thousand dollars for Loss of Earnings Capacity" from the USPS. The plaintiff appears to allege that initially the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") determined that she owed taxes on both payments that she had received, but that eventually after much effort on her part/2/ the IRS "adjusted the taxes assessed" such that she did not owe taxes based upon the $ 130,000.00 payment she had received in 1999.

The plaintiff alleges that the IRS continues to seek taxes based upon the $ 170,000.00 she received in 2001, but the plaintiff disputes her tax liability. She claims that she owes no taxes because the $ 170,000.00 amount was payment for her "Loss of Earnings Capacity."/3/ The plaintiff alleges that the IRS has garnished and continues to garnish monies from her workers' compensation checks, her tax refunds, and her OPM disability checks, and that the IRS has "put a lien against my property and refused to release it." The plaintiff claims that "the IRS' relentless pursuit to assess and collect taxes has caused default, collection actions, and repossessions by my creditors." The plaintiff seeks "12 billion dollars for damages for it destruction of my life & children (mother) which includes the restoration of my business, erecting & staffing of a "YOU" facility to counteract any such unwanted actions etc. and payment to all other in similarly situations, retroactive." The plaintiff alleges that the Postal Service incorrectly completed the 1099 Tax Form documents relating to her two payments for $ 130,000.00 and $ 170,000.00.

The plaintiff alleges that the "USPS Mrs. Hayden accounting service has said: it followed the IRS' instructions," and that the USPS insisted that both payments were placed correctly on the 1099 MISC Tax Forms.

DISCUSSION

I. Claims Against the IRS.

The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is with the plaintiff. Suit for money damages against the United States cannot be maintained unless it has waived its sovereign immunity. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). When the United States waives sovereign immunity and consents to suit, the terms of the waiver precisely define the extent of the waiver and the court's jurisdiction. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). Title 28 U.S.C. section 1346(a)(1) generally provides jurisdiction for suits against the United States for claims involving the assessment of taxes. However, other statutes limit jurisdiction until certain prerequisites are met./4/ For example, 26 U.S.C. section 7422(b) provides, "such suit or proceeding may be maintained whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress."/5/ Accordingly, one prerequisite to suit in district court is full payment of the disputed taxes. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960) (requiring full payment of the assessment before an income tax refund suit can be maintained); Grant v. United States, 289 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2003). In this case, the plaintiff did not allege that she has paid the full amount of the disputed taxes prior to filing this lawsuit. In fact, because the plaintiff alleges that her checks are currently being garnished and she has refused to pay taxes on the $ 170,000.00 payment, the court concludes that these allegations are tantamount to claiming that she has not paid the full disputed amount. Therefore, this action should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiff has failed to establish that she completed one prerequisite to filing suit against the United States for damages relating to a disputed tax liability.

This case should also be dismissed because it appears that one purpose of the lawsuit may be to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax. In fact, the plaintiff alleges that "the IRS' relentless pursuit to assess and collect taxes" has ruined her life. The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. section 7421(a) provides that, unless certain statutory exceptions are applicable, "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person[.]" The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that, if there is no express provision for an exception in the Anti-Injunction Act itself, a lower federal court may not create an exception. See Clark v. Baker (In re Heritage Church and Missionary Fellowship), 851 F.2d 104, 105-106 (4th Cir. 1988) (the "PTL" bankruptcy case).

The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is "the protection of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference,' and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in suit for a refund.'" Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974)./6/ See also Rochefort v. Gibbs, 696 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-53 (W.D. Mich. 1988). The Supreme Court has judicially created a limited exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. See Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). In order to establish a claim for injunctive relief under the holding in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., the taxpayer must show: (1) under the most liberal view of the applicable laws and facts, it is clear that the government cannot prevail on the merits; and (2) absent an injunction, irreparable injuries will occur for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 370 U.S. at 6-7. Unless both of these prerequisites are met, "a suit for preventive injunctive relief must be dismissed." United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 10 (1974).

As to the second Enochs prerequisite, the plaintiff has adequate remedies at law. All United States Court of Appeals have held that the right of a taxpayer to petition the Tax Court and his or her right, in the alternative, to sue for a refund (in a federal district court) are adequate remedies at law. See, e.g., Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313-314 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying injunction, even though the Service failed to mail notice of deficiency to the taxpayer's last known address, because the taxpayer did not establish that it had no adequate remedy at law, or that irreparable injury would result from the denial of the injunction). The plaintiff can petition the Tax Court, or as mentioned above, the plaintiff can make full payment of the disputed amount and begin administrative, and, if necessary, judicial proceedings in a federal district court to recover a refund. Because the plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would show that any of the statutory or judicially created exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are applicable and to the extent the plaintiff's motive in bringing this lawsuit is to halt "the IRS' relentless pursuit to assess and collect taxes," then this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Additionally, this action should be dismissed because the plaintiff filed a prior action in this court on February 28, 2006, Jacobs v. IRS, C/A No. 4:06-599-TLW-TER, which was based on almost identical facts and appears to be duplicative. In the plaintiff's first action, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for lack of jurisdiction,/7/ and on July 27, 2007, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The plaintiff appears to be complaining about the same matter again in this subsequent lawsuit, and the court cannot discern any new facts or circumstances that would now give this court jurisdiction. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit commented, "[t]he District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient." Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970).

II. Claims Against the Postmaster General.

Even liberally construed, the court cannot glean from the complaint a cause of action stated against the defendant Postmaster General. If the plaintiff is claiming that an employee of the USPS was negligent in completing the plaintiff's 1099 Tax Forms, such a cause of action would lie under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). However, a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act lies only against the United States, and a federal district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over claims asserted against federal agencies or individual federal employees. See Myers and Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1256 (2nd Cir. 1975)./8/ Moreover, an administrative claim must first be filed with the appropriate federal agency before commencement of a civil action in a district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 C.F.R. section 14.2; the Standard Form 95; and 28 U.S.C. section 2401(b) (a tort claim "shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues")./9/ There is no indication that the plaintiff has filed an administrative claim with the United States Postal Service claiming that her 1099 Tax Forms were completed incorrectly. Under the FTCA, "the requirement of filing an administrative claim is jurisdictional and may not be waived." Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1986); Kokotis v. United States Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2000). Since the complaint does not show that the plaintiff has submitted an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency, if the plaintiff alleges a claim pursuant to the FTCA it should be dismissed for failure to exhaust federal administrative remedies.

III. Plantifff's Alleged Class Action.

To the extent that the plaintiff seeks to bring this lawsuit on behalf of others similarly situated, she lacks standing to do so. One pro se litigant cannot "represent" another pro se litigant. See Myers v. Loudon Co. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005). See also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 & n.* (4th Cir. 1975) (a pro se prisoner unassisted by counsel cannot be an advocate for others in a class action); Frank Krasner Enter., Ltd. v. Montgomery Co., Md., 401 F.3d 230, 234-236 & nn. 6-9 (4th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases on standing); Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-563 (4th Cir. 1977) (one pro se inmate does not have standing to sue on behalf of another inmate).

In Myers, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that, "[a]n individual unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court." Id. This is a right of high standing which "'reflects a respect for the choice of an individual citizen to plead his or her own cause.'" Myers, 418 F.3d at 400 (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)). However, the right to litigate for oneself does not create a similar right to litigate on behalf of others. Id. "The reasoning behind this rule is two-fold: it protects the rights of those before the court . . ., and jealously guards the judiciary's authority to govern those who practice in its courtrooms. . . ." Id. Accordingly in this case, this rule protects the rights of the "other persons similarly situated" because it is too risky to permit the plaintiff layman to litigate their claims due to the risk of the layman's limited competence to litigate. See Id.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

DATED: October 2, 2008
Florence, South Carolina.

Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
P. O. Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).

FOOTNOTES

/1/ Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

/2/ She alleges that she met with IRS representatives and an appeal officer to explain why she believes that all of her damages were related to a physical illness and thus she does not owe taxes.

/3/ It is not clear but perhaps the plaintiff argues that the $ 170,000.00 amount was a personal injury settlement that should be tax exempt.

/4/ These prerequisites are not necessary to seek review in the United States Tax Court. See 26 U.S.C. section 6330(e)(1); 26 U.S.C. section 7421(a); 26 U.S.C. section 6015(e).

/5/ Another prerequisite required by 26 U.S.C. section 7422(a) is that the plaintiff must have filed a proper claim for refund or credit with the Secretary. Beckwith Realty v. United States, 896 F.2d 860, 862 (4th Cir. 1990). For the sole purpose of this report and recommendation, the court assumes that the plaintiff alleged facts that would show that she filed an administrative claim related to the disputed tax assessment.

/6/ Portions of the Court's holding in Bob Jones University v. Simon were modified by South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 372-82 (1984).

/7/ In the plaintiff's prior action, the court did not rule on the merits of the plaintiff's claims regarding the disputed tax liability.

/8/ The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the sovereign immunity of the United States in certain situations. Litigants must strictly comply with the requirements of the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. section 2675; United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979).

/9/ When the United States has denied an administrative claim filed under the FTCA, the claimant has six months to bring suit in a federal district court. 28 U.S.C. section 2401(b).
"I could be dead wrong on this" - Irwin Schiff

"Do you realize I may even be delusional with respect to my income tax beliefs? " - Irwin Schiff