Harvester wrote:Prof wrote:The basic argument CTC makes, which is beyond silly, is that the portion of the statute that says "includes" government employees limits the scope of the statement to government employees.
No, that's incorrect. Have you read CTC? It argues that the term "employee" itself is custom defined to a very limited subset of workers.
Specifically, CtC argues that the term "employee" is custom defined to a very limited subset of workers, namely government workers.
Which is what Prof said.
From
an excerpt from CtC published on Hendrickson's own website:
Peter Hendrickson wrote:It is clear that the common characteristic of those in the enumerated list of "employees" in this special definition [in 26 USC 3401(c)] is that of being someone paid by the federal government (or an entity created and/or controlled by the federal government) for services rendered.
Seriously, we've been through this before. Are you claiming that Hendrickson doesn't mean what he says?
Harvester wrote:Why custom define such a commonly used word as employee?
Congress didn't "custom define" the word "employee," but wanted to make sure that government employees and corporate officers are subject to withholding.
Harvester wrote:If all common-term employees make income there's no need to custom define it.
Which is why Congress didn't "custom define" the word "employee," but just expanded the meaning to make sure that government employees and corporate officers are subject to withholding.
Harvester wrote:Quite simply, they do it to limit the statute to that which Congress can legally tax (it's own stuff/workers).
An interpretation of the Constitution for which you have no authority whatsoever, and which is contradicted by numerous Supreme Court opinions, such as Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 580-581 (1937):
Supreme Court wrote:“But natural rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of lesser importance. An excise is not limited to vocations or activities that may be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of common right.”
As well as countless Circuit Court opinions, such as:
“Turning first to their basic contention, indeed the one on which all the others rest, that the relation of domestic employment does not come within Art. 1, Section 8, and is therefore immune from the imposition of federal taxes and burdens, we find ourselves in no doubt that appellants are neither historically nor etymologically correct in their claim in substance that excises are limited to taxes laid on the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupation and upon corporate privileges only. It is true that taxes of the kind referred to are excise taxes but it is also true, as was held in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, that the excises which Congress has power to impose are not limited to vocations or activities which may be prohibited altogether or to those which are the outcome of a franchise, but extend to vocations or activities pursued as of common right. The term ‘excise’ is and was before and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution a term of very wide meaning.”
Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
“[Hamzik] contends only that he does not have a tax liability and subsequent deficiency because all federal income taxes are ‘indirect taxes’ and the Commissioner has not produced the statutes defining the ‘revenue taxable activity’ that would make Hamzik subject to or liable for any tax under Title 26. The tax court properly rejected Hamzik’s arguments as frivolous.”
Hamzik v. Commissioner, 25 Fed. Appx. 911, KTC 2001-589 (9th Cir. 2001), (affirming the decision of the Tax Court and imposing sanctions of $250 for bringing a frivolous appeal).
“Furthermore, Olson’s attempt to escape tax by deducting his wages as ‘cost of labor’ and by claiming that he had obtained no privilege from a governmental agency illustrate the frivolous nature of his position. This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that wages are not income as frivolous, [citations omitted] and has also rejected the idea that a person is liable for tax only if he benefits from a governmental privilege.”
Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985).
“All individuals, freeborn and nonfreeborn, natural and unnatural alike, must pay federal income tax on their wages, regardless of whether they have requested, obtained or exercised any privilege from the federal government."
United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. den. 112 S.Ct. 940 (1992).
“Similarly, Latham’s instruction which indicated that under 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) the category of ‘employee’ does not include privately employed wage earners is a preposterous reading of the statute. It is obvious that within the context of both statutes the word ‘includes’ is a term of enlargement not of limitation, and the reference to certain entities or categories is not intended to exclude all others.”
United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985).
“To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no ‘wages’ in 1983 because he was not an ‘employee’ within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of ‘employee’ includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.”
Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1986).
“Petitioner’s assertion that he is not a person required to pay tax as he is not an officer, employee or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or of a corporation, is wholly meritless.”
United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1981).
“[P]laintiff’s claim that only public officials can be taxed is completely frivolous and without merit.”
McAffee v. United States, 84 AFTR2d ¶99-5536(N.D.Ga. 1999) (sanctions imposed in the amount of $500 for filing a frivolous claim).
