Not necessarily. Remember the first opinion in the Murphy case?grixit wrote:Pretty sure judges who make it to the appellate level are plenty wise.
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features ... enDocument
Not necessarily. Remember the first opinion in the Murphy case?grixit wrote:Pretty sure judges who make it to the appellate level are plenty wise.
Two points of interest:... (3) the Form 1040, as a request for the “collection of information” covered by the Public Protection Provision of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, for the years 2000 through 2007, does not and did not comply with the mandates set forth by Congress upon the Internal Revenue Service at Title 44, Section 3506, 3507, 3512, and under 5 CFR 1320.5, 1320.6, 1320.8 and 1320.9., and accordingly, Form 1040 violated the Paperwork Reduction Act(s) and Springer should never have been subjected to any penalty....
Similarly, page 24 of the petition states that:(F) The Forms 1040 for years 2000 through 2005 have each never displayed compliance with the PRA of 1980 or 1995, including the information required to be displayed pursuant to Title 44, Section 3506(c)(1)(B), 3507, 3512(a)(1) and (2). See Exhibit 2,3,4,5,6,7
(G) The Form 1040 does not contain any of the information OMB mandates through regulations at 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) and 1320.9. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issues Form 1040 after filing a Form 83-I with the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). See Exhibit 8,9,10 and 11.
So what is "the obligation" that Springer/Barringer believe has been violated? I'm not sure, but I am sure that the 10th Circuit is not going to spend a lot of time trying to decipher these claims.In order for the Form 1040 to be “in accordance with this subchaper” or “in accordance with the act” the Form must comply with Title 44, Section 3506(c)(1)(B), 3507 and 3512, along with OMB regulations promulgated at 5 CFR 1320.5, 1320.6, 1320.8(b)(3) and 1320.9. The Form 1040 for years 1990 through 2007 do not and did not comply with either of these mandates (for 1980 through 1994, the mandates were slightly different but the effect was the same).
To the extent an argument is made that the obligations under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 can be made in some accompanying booklet, Springer further claims (1) form 1040 accompanies no such booklet and in fact is disclaimed therein, (2) that none of the obligations required by the Paperwork Reduction Act or OMB regulations are satisfied in any such booklet, (3) that OMB regulations refer to the place the information is to be displayed as “it”, and it cannot be anything other than the collection device, ....
The "some reason" being a complete lack of merit or coherence.Springer has raised issue with the IRS’ PRA violations in the United States’ Western Judicial District of Oklahoma, in April, 2005, case no. 05-466 (Judge Friot), appealed to this Court, case no. 05-6387, and again in September, 2005, case no. 05-1075 (Judge Friot), appealed to this Court, case no. 06-6268, and Petitioned in the United States’ Northern Judicial District of Oklahoma in February, 2006, case no. 06-110 (Judge Eagan), and appealed to this Court, case no. 06-5123. Each time a panel of this Court has found some reason to avoid the merits of Springer’s PRA public protection claims.
Yes but it did not take long for them to wise up. They generally are teachable. I wonder if they got the complete scheme of taxation, or was they just taught on the need to know basis.Cpt Banjo wrote:Not necessarily. Remember the first opinion in the Murphy case?grixit wrote:Pretty sure judges who make it to the appellate level are plenty wise.
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features ... enDocument
I certainly hope so. When I saw this nonsense posted on Sui, I thought it was a joke.Judge Roy Bean wrote:I smell sanctions.
That's what happens when you rely on a 100 old legal dictionary and some long out of date, legal text instead of actually knowing the law.Pottapaug1938 wrote:"Person and vicinage". I love the way that these idiots construct their pleadings as if there had been no reform of civil procedure and pleadings.
LPC wrote: 2. Reading this new petition from Barringer, I tried to find exactly *why* Springer/Barringer think that Form 1040 doesn't comply with the PRA, and couldn't find any coherent explanation. They keep stating over and over again that it doesn't, and citing the statute and regulations, but never point to exactly what's wrong.
Here's one candidate (the Patridge case, previously discussed in this forum):notorial dissent wrote:Nikki, (notice, I got it right this time)
I thought I remembered reading a court ruling that not only trashed the PRA nonsense in pretty resounding terms, but then went on to explain exactly why it was nonsense and that the numbers on the forms were not only valid, but correct. I'm pretty sure they also pointed out that the Congressionally mandated legal requirement to file trumped anything that the PRA might possibly have had to say above and beyond the rest of why the argument was a loser to begin with. As I recall the judge pretty well sliced and diced their argument and wasn't delicate about it. Can't remember where I read it now to save myself.
-from United States v. Patridge, 507 F.3d 1092, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 50,806 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1721 (2008) (bolding added).The last of the issues we address is Patridge's contention that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§3501-21, forecloses his conviction. This contention is as weak as the other 18 [i.e., the other 18 issues raised by Patridge], but it has been raised in several recent appeals --despite the fact that it was considered and rejected in Salberg v. United States, 969 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992) --so we take this occasion to hold that the 1995 amendments to the Act do not alter Salberg 's conclusion.
Section 3507 provides that an agency needs the approval of the Office of Management and Budget to collect information, and §3512(a)(1) adds that "no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to this subchapter" unless OMB's approval is evinced by a "valid control number" on the agency's demand for information. Per §3507(g), OMB "may not approve a collection of information for a period in excess of 3 years." Patridge observes that the IRS's Form 1040 has displayed the same control number since 1981 and argues that it must therefore represent an approval lasting for more than 3 years. Moreover, he asserts that the IRS did not obtain a new approval between the 1995 amendments and the adoption of forms for tax years 1996 and 1997, so these forms must be (in counsel's words) "outlaw and bootleg." Finally, Patridge contends that all IRS forms are invalid because they do not tell taxpayers that the lack of a valid control number means that they need not supply any information.
How any of this could block a conviction for tax evasion is a mystery. Patridge evaded taxes by shuffling his income among trusts in an attempt to conceal it from the IRS. That crime does not depend on the contents of any form. Evading one's taxes is illegal independent of the information one does or does not supply. Consider another example: the Clean Air Act requires businesses to curtail certain emissions using the best available technology, and to report on those emissions to the EPA. An error in the EPA's forms might spare the business any penalties for bad information but would not license it to emit pollution without limit. The Paperwork Reduction Act does not change any substantive obligation.
Anyway, as we held in Salberg, the obligation to file a tax return stems from 26 U.S.C. §7203, not from any agency's demand. The Paperwork Reduction Act does not repeal §7203. Repeal by implication depends on inconsistency that makes it impossible to comply with the newer law while still honoring the old one, see Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 141-44 (2001), and there is no such inconsistency between §7203 and the Paperwork Reduction Act. One reason for this is that §7203 requires a "return" but does not define that word or require anyone to use Form 1040, or any "official" form at all. All that is required is a complete and candid report of income.
Finally, we have no doubt that the IRS has complied with the Paperwork Reduction Act. Form 1040 bears a control number from OMB, as do the other forms the IRS commonly distributes to taxpayers. That this number has been constant since 1981 does not imply that OMB has shirked its duty. Section 3507 requires periodic review, not a periodic change in control numbers. Patridge offers us no reason to think that the necessary review has not been conducted. The control number on Form 1040 appears on OMB's web site as a current, valid number; if this is wrong, it takes more than a lawyer's say-so to establish the proposition. That OMB didn't re-review Form 1040 between the 1995 and 1996 tax year is irrelevant; nothing in the 1995 amendments says that all existing approvals become invalid or that all forms must be resubmitted.
[ . . . . ]
Jerold W. Barringer represented Patridge at trial, in the Tax Court, and during the three appeals to this court. He has performed below the standard of a pro se litigant; we have serious doubt about his fitness to practice law.
Correct.fortinbras wrote:Despite the claim made in Springer's pleading, courts have held that the Form 1040 for various years (including recent years) comply with the PRA, carry valid OMB numbers, etc.
Also correct.fortinbras wrote:One court went to the extent of pointing out that, while federal law requires the submission of a tax return, the statute does not require the use of the Form 1040 - so IF the 1040 were to fail to comply with the PRA it doesn't make a difference, the taxpayer is still required to submit a return even if it has to be one of his own devising.
Probably one of the "Springer v. Somebody" or "Somebody v. Springer" decisions.notorial dissent wrote:I thought I remembered reading a court ruling that not only trashed the PRA nonsense in pretty resounding terms, but then went on to explain exactly why it was nonsense and that the numbers on the forms were not only valid, but correct.
Famspear wrote: Here's one candidate (the Patridge case, previously discussed in this forum):
Easterbrook, J:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF
v. Case No. 09-CR-043 SPF
LINDSEY KENT SPRINGER,
OSCAR AMOS STILLEY DEFENDANT
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE
Comes now OSCAR AMOS STILLEY1 by limited special appearance, and not a general appearance, and for his brief in support of motion states:
It appears to be customary and legally required that a defendant lacking resources for appeal be provided a transcript. As the court explained in U.S. v. Gilbreath, 9 F.3d 85 (10th Cir. 1993)
Further, you would have the right to have a lawyer in order to do that. If you can't afford one, the Court will see to it that you have one appointed at the public expense for that purpose. Also, the Court will see to it that you are provided a transcript of the record that is appropriate for any appeal at the cost to the public.
The requirement is of constitutional dimensions. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970), the Court said:
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), marked a significant effort to alleviate discrimination against those who are unable to meet the costs of litigation in the administration of criminal justice. In holding that the failure to provide an indigent criminal defendant with a trial transcript at public expense in order to prosecute an appeal was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, this court declared that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id., at 19. In the years since the Griffin case the Court has had frequent occasion to reaffirm allegiance to the basic command that justice be applied equally to all persons.[fn16] Subsequent decisions of this Court have pointedly demonstrated that the passage of time has heightened rather than weakened the attempts to mitigate the disparate
treatment of indigents in the criminal process.[fn17] Applying the teaching of the Griffin case here, we conclude that an indigent criminal defendant may not be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by the statute regulating the substantive offense. (Emphases added)
Undersigned has chosen to proceed on appeal pro se. A direct appeal from a criminal conviction is a matter of right. As possessor of the right, a defendant has the right to conduct his own defense, provided that he does so in conformity to the rules. As Justice Frankfurter eloquently
put it for the Court in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942), to require the acceptance of counsel as a condition precedent to the exercise of a defendant’s discretion and choices "is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution." The Court was not convinced, nor should it have been, that the possibility of unwise choices is sufficient to override the free will of an individual.
This Court has appointed standby counsel, for its own benefit as well as the benefit of the Defendants. These learned counsel have opined, based upon various acts of the Court including but not limited to the additional conditions imposed upon the reading of the verdict, and other
circumstances, that post trial motions are likely to be denied, and that the Court is likely to order immediate incarceration upon sentencing.
Having received such information from attorneys held in esteem by this Court, undersigned cannot in good conscience and with due regard for his family and others depending upon him fail to bring these issues to the immediate attention of the Court. If incarceration upon sentencing is within the realm of possibilities, the right to be heard in a reasonable time and manner requires the ability to brief legal issues sooner rather than later.
In order to assure that at least the liability issues are briefed on some semblance of parity with a litigant having the services of counsel, it is necessary to have the transcript promptly ordered and supplied to the Defendants.
Defendant has served time in jail. He was not allowed any metal, not even staples or paper clips. Only very short pencils were allowed for a writing instrument. Defendant had no access whatsoever to any legal materials except those brought in, which could not have hard covers.
Some items that friends were supposed to bring never got there, for whatever reason. Only lawyers had routine access. Visits from other persons was extremely limited, and their ability to bring materials was also extremely limited or non-existent.
Telephone time was very limited. Research capability was essentially non-existent. Papers beyond a small amount were exceedingly difficult to organize and keep together, due to the prohibition on possession of metal or other items that facilitate organization of papers. Perhaps other incarceration facilities are better. On information and belief most aren’t. Few if any allow word processors and electronic files.
The playing field, where one party is incarcerated and the other is not, is so lopsided that there can scarcely be any appearance of equality before the law. No one can perform nearly as well under the restrictions of jail as they could perform with even the cheapest and oldest technology readily available on the outside.
In light of all these facts, and the law, Defendants should be accorded a transcript at public expense and at the customary rate, as soon as the schedule of the court reporter reasonably permits.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Oscar Stilley respectfully requests that the Court order the production of the transcript, excluding voir dire, at public expense; and such other relief as may be appropriate whether or not specifically prayed.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Oscar Stilley
Oscar Stilley, Attorney at Law
7103 Race Track Loop
Fort Smith, AR 72916
(479) 996-4109
(866) 673-0176 Fax
oscar@oscarstilley.com
If Stilley wrote that, then he is more of an idiot than I thought.Dezcad wrote:Comes now OSCAR AMOS STILLEY1 by limited special appearance, and not a general appearance,
What I failed to copy and paste was the Footnote 1 from above after his name, which footnote reads:LPC wrote:If Stilley wrote that, then he is more of an idiot than I thought.Dezcad wrote:Comes now OSCAR AMOS STILLEY1 by limited special appearance, and not a general appearance,
This appears in every motion filed by Stilley in the case. I wonder if he'll continue to challenge jurisdiction from his prison cell.1 It is presumed that the plaintiff is master of his own complaint. This
complaint is styled in the name of “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” as opposed to
the people thereof, or any grand jury. Plaintiff, whoever that may actually be,
named OSCAR AMOS STILLEY as a Defendant. Therefore, OSCAR AMOS
STILLEY has appeared specially and limited, challenging jurisdiction, to
defend against the charges to the extent required so to do by the law.
As I've written before, courts are quite reluctant to impose sanctions in criminal cases.On November 16, 2009, a jury found Lindsey K. Springer guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7203. The trial was conducted by District Judge Stephen Friot, sitting by designation. Mr. Springer seeks a writ of mandamus ordering Chief District Judge Claire V. Eagan and Judge Friot “to cease exercising Article III Judicial Power of the United States, including Jurisdiction and Venue, over Springer’s person and vicinage, in case number 09-cr-043, in the Grand Jury Indictment dated March 10, 2009, United States of America v. Lindsey Kent Springer,” because (1) Judge Friot is not a judge of the Northern District of Oklahoma; (2) since 2000, there has been no “Internal Revenue District” for Oklahoma, so that the Northern District of Oklahoma has no jurisdiction or venue to enforce the internal revenue code; and (3) the Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 for the years 2000-2007 violates the Paperwork Reduction Act. Pet. at 1.
“The Supreme Court has made it clear that mandamus is a ‘drastic’ remedy that is ‘to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.’” In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (per curiam)). Among other factors for mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “no other adequate remedy is available.” In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration and quotation omitted). Mr. Springer cannot satisfy this requirement, because at the proper time he may appeal his conviction and sentence. “The extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal.” Weston v. Mann (In re Weston), 18 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir. 1994).
The petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED.
It was also predictable that the 10th Circuit would not express any opinion as to the merits (if any) of the actual arguments. Having found that Springer had an adequate remedy through an appeal, the court ignored the rest of his claims, leaving them for the surely-inevitable appeal.10th Circuit wrote:Among other factors for mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “no other adequate remedy is available.” In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2004) (alteration and quotation omitted). Mr. Springer cannot satisfy this requirement, because at the proper time he may appeal his conviction and sentence.
'Round here he needs someone to vouch for him.LPC wrote:...Of course, Stilley was already suspended pending the disbarment proceedings, so I doubt that the second concurrent suspension will bother him very much, but it will be interesting to see what might happen if he should apply for pro hac vice status now.