Springer and Stilley guilty on all counts

[wserra]

Springer is seeking cert on the denial of his writ of mandumbass. Here is the docket.

As Doc C said, words fail me.

[LPC]

Springer is seeking cert on the denial of his writ of mandumbass. Here is the docket.

As we've seen previously in this thread, Springer can't appeal his conviction because he hasn't been sentenced yet, so he filed a petition for writ of mandumbass in the 10th Circuit, which was denied, the court explaining that "'The extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal.' Weston v. Mann (In re Weston), 18 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir. 1994)."

I haven't read Springer's petition to the Supreme Court but, based on the docket and the history I've described, it looks as though Springer has *not* petitioned for cert from the 10th Circuit, but is instead (once again) seeking a writ of mandumbass, this time from the Supreme Court, asking them to order either the District Court or Circuit Court to do something (or stop doing something).

Which shows that Springer is unwilling to understand what the 10th Circuit told him.

Which shows that this "writ of mandamus" obsession is not just a misunderstanding of the law, but is symptomatic of a mental disease or personality disorder, like using multiple exclamation marks or accusing the judge of treason. It's both egotistical in the extreme (my case is extraordinarily special) and a disassociation from reality.

[LPC]

it looks as though Springer has *not* petitioned for cert from the 10th Circuit, but is instead (once again) seeking a writ of mandumbass, this time from the Supreme Court,

Historical note: It was a petition for a writ of mandamus that was at issue in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) and the Supreme Court held that it would be unconstitutional for it to issue a writ outside of the jurisdiction allowed it by the Constitution.

Unless Springer is claiming to be the ambassador from Frickintardistan, I don't think that "original jurisdiction" applies.

In theory, the Supreme Court could issue a writ of mandamus ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction, but in actual practice I don't think it ever has, or ever will. In the rare case in which it might need to order a lower court (or some other party) to do something (or not do something) in order to preserve the case for an appeal, the Supreme Court can act through a stay (such as a stay of execution) or an injunction.

[wserra]

I haven't read Springer's petition to the Supreme Court but, based on the docket and the history I've described, it looks as though Springer has *not* petitioned for cert from the 10th Circuit, but is instead (once again) seeking a writ of mandumbass, this time from the Supreme Court

As usual, upon looking closer, Dan appears correct. I only write "appears" because part of the process is trying to analyze what Springer is doing, something always tortuous.

I am on Springer's mailing list, from whence I got the news flash. Please understand, when I get the usual email from Springer, I don't read page after page of blather. I skim it to see if there's something interesting (read: "monumentally dumb") to post here. So I saw that Springer had petitioned SCOTUS, and assumed that it was a cert petition, not an original mandumbass. IOW, I assumed that it was only something monumentally stupid, not something record-breakingly, mind-numbingly, worthy-of-being-exiled-permanently-to-Frickentardistanly stupid.

In my defense, here is the entire email. Read it at your peril.

Lindsey Springer here and offering you an update to certain events in my defense endeavors.

First, I wish to say thank you for your continued support as I must tell you I could not continue without your help. When the Court rules about the impact the elimination of the internal revenue district and district director have in my defense you can honestly say that without your help I could not have defended myself in that regard. It takes a team effort and again, thank you.

On January 25, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States docketed my Petition for Writ of Mandamus:

http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/09-8701.htm This Petition was actually recieved on January 11, 2010 by the Court but they lost it and then found it on January 21, 2010.

In this Petition for Writ of Mandamus I raised 3 primary issues with 4 subparts to the first issue:

I. Has Chief Circuit Judge in Misc. # 23 and the Panel in 09-5165, so far departed from Title 28, United States Code, Section 292(b), including the sanctioning of such departure by a lower district court, calling for an exercise of this Court�s supervisory power pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 10(a) to render such exercise clear abuse of such limited power extended by Section 292(b)?

A. Does Title 28, United States Code, Section 292(b) authorize a Chief Judge of a circuit, to designate United States� Judicial District Court Judges commissioned in one "Oklahoma" judicial district, to 1 year terms in the other two "Oklahoma" judicial districts on a renewable yearly basis for no reason?

B. What is the limitation on the meaning of the term "temporarily" and phrase "public interest" in Title 28, United States Code, Section 292(b)?

C. Does Misc. # 23 qualify as a lawful and legal Article III designation pursuant to Title 28, Section 292(b) of Stephen P. Friot to 09-cr-043?

D. Should all orders entered by Stephen P. Friot in 09-cr-043 outside Stephen P. Friot�s Western Judicial District Court commission be rendered coram non judice and invalid?

II. When the Secretary abolishes "internal revenue districts," by calender year 2000 encompassing the State of Oklahoma, what original, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction does a District Court Judge have over alleged "internal revenue law" offenses pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231?

III. Is a United States Judicial District under Title 28, United States Code, Section 116(a) a valid substitute for an "internal revenue district" required for administration and enforcement of the "internal revenue laws" pursuant to Title 26, United States Code, Section 7621 in the State of Oklahoma?

If you wish to see a copy of the actual Petition email me and I will forward a copy of it to you. The Appendices I cannot forward (only in paper) but they are listed in the Table of Contents.

Today, I Petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari regarding the Paperwork Reduction Act decision by the Tenth Circuit on August 31, 2009. Since I petitioned for a Petition for Rehearing I had 90 days from October 27, 2009 which is today. I made it but barely.

In that Petition, I challenged the published decision which held that failure to pay penalty under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6651(a)(3) was not a penalty subject to the protection of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and 1995's public protection provision. That provision is Title 44, United States Code, Section 3512 [penalty defined at 3502(14)(1995)] The Panel in that case held that interest was not a penalty also.

There are two basic issues I have raised to the Supreme Court in that case with 2 subparts to one of the two main issues. First:

4. Does the definition of "penalty" pursuant to Title 44, United States Code, Section 3502(14)(1995) include amounts sought under Title 26, United States Code, Sections 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(3), 6654(a) and 6601(a)?

A. All penalties labeled as such should be included within meaning of penalty at Title 44, United States Code, Section 3502 and 3512.

B. Interest under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6601 should be held as a penalty in compensating for damages under both Title 44, United States Code, Section 3502 "penalty" and 3512's public protection.

5. Does Title 26, United States Code, Section 6330(c)(2)(B) withstand the "public protection" provided by Congress pursuant to Title 44, United States Code, Section 3512, involving the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue�s claims of additional penalties and interest pursuant to �� 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(3), 6654(a) and 6601(a) inexorably linked to the request for information Form 1040?



I also raised 3 jurisdictional challenges for good measure because they were inexorably linked to the Tenth Circuit�s published decision. Those were:

1. What is the consequence to the "jurisdiction" of the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of the Internal Revenue�s claims of statutory additions, penalty or interest, exercised outside the District of Columbia, when the office of district director and each internal revenue district established by law, pursuant to Title 26, United States Code, Section 7621, have been either eliminated completely, abolished in the year 2000, or never existed as a matter of law, in violation of Title 4, United States Code, Section 72?

2. Whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has delegation of authority, outside the District of Columbia, to issue or cause to be issued, a notice of levy in the absence of internal revenue districts, district director offices, and proper delegation, among the several States?

3. Whether Fred Rice is a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury with redelegated authority from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act anywhere within the State of Oklahoma since at least the year 2000?



As you can see I have been rather busy. I intend to get relief from the Court. I realize it is difficult to understand for some. Again, this Petition is available for anyone who requests it. Just email me.

I have also filed a series of Motions and Replies in the criminal case brought against me in March of 2009. Those motions include:

(1) Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing to bring charges against me by the United States of America.


In this Motion and Memorandum, I show how without internal revenue district and district director encompassing or surrounding the State of Oklahoma, there is no authority of the Secretary present and that such authority has not been present since 2000 when the Secretary abolished internal revenue districts and district directors.

This leads to a LACK OF ARTICLE III STANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA to be a party in the case they brought against me.

I next claim that such lack of standing leads also to a LACK OF ARTICLE III CASE OR CONTROVERSY at issue between me and the United States of America.

And finally, in this Motion, I claim dismissal appropriate because there is no United States Attorney in the "judicial district" since at least June 28, 2009 and that Title 28, United States Code, Section 547 places exclusive authority to prosecute "offenses against the laws of the United States" in the hands of the United States Attorney "appointed" under Title 28, United States Code, Section 541 by the President of the United States of America.

(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Article III Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Lack of Article III Jurisdiction of the Facts, and Article III venue.

I split this up into two separate Motions. The first covers Count One and the second covers Counts Two through Six.

In this Motion and Memorandum, I show how the district court must have Article III subject matter jurisdiction and that only exists if some words in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, provides the subject. The only two available are the case involves a law of the United States or the United States is a party. I argue in order for the United States to be a party they must identify their interest in the outcome of application or enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Without such an interest in the State of Oklahoma, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. It is more intense than that but the gist of my claim for dismissal on that score is just that.

Without the first issue resolved in favor of the other United States of America party there certainly is no Article III jurisdiction of the facts or venue.

In summary, my defense is that no power by law exists to allow exercise of the Secretary�s authority outside the District of Columbia pursuant to Title 4, United States Code, Section 72, at least without internal revenue districts and district directors, previously established by law and presently in existence.

Also, the Acting United States Attorney was not appointed by the President nor by any other lawful means and thus no authority to prosecute in this judicial district exists as a matter of law.

Furthermore, the Honorable Stephen P. Friot was without any lawful authority to preside over the case brought by the Department of Justice in the northern judicial district as his commission was in the western judicial district. I have also moved to recuse on other grounds for bias and prejudice.

Without district director office over the State of Oklahoma and where I live there would be no delegated authority for anyone legally to act on behalf of the Secretary regarding my monetary events since at least 2000.

Again, if you wish for any copies of these defense submissions email me and I can forward them to you.

I have not heard from Tax Court on my motion to restrain nor have I heard from the northern judicial district where I move to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from acting outside the District of Columbia. Interestingly, the Department of Justice simply argued without declaration that the "IRS" was authorized to act as the Secretary. Such argument caused me to raise the question who is the IRS as a delegate and I cannot find any such delegation issued by the Secretary. I did find district director.

Lastly, in the Tenth Circuit, in 09-5088 where the Bivens Defendants (case over theft of $ 2000 while unauthorized raid was taking place in 2005 in my home) are arguing they did steal money when it benefits them but when it hurts them they resort back to arguing they never stole the money. I filed a Motion for Sanctions and they responded. I will reply. When I file that reply I will let you know what I am saying.

The Defendants said that they cannot be sanctioned in that case because they are the United States and they have never been sanctioned before by any Court. I thought you would like that one. I did since the mere name Bivens means sued individually and not in an official capacity.

I realize there is much said and I hope you can see what I am saying and what I am doing. I continue to need your help. I cannot do what I am doing without you.

If you wish to support me there are two ways that can be accomplished. The first is through paypal and either [redacted]. The conventional way remains to Lindsey Springer at [redacted].

Again, let me know if there is any of these defense documents you wish to obtain.

[jg]

...I filed a Motion for Sanctions and they responded. I will reply. When I file that reply I will let you know what I am saying.

So, it seems that Springer is aware that his motions, taken alone, are not comprehensible.

[notorial dissent]

I would say, taken alone or together, they are totally incomprehensible.

It has always been my understanding that you can only raise issues on appeal that were brought up at the actual trial, that you don't feel were properly addressed, and so far I don’t remember any of this ever coming up. So, is not all of this going to get bounced for not being germane to the appeal, rather in the same vein of his writ of mandumbass being bounced since it wasn’t a proper filing? I realize that Lindsey is just trying to delay the inevitable, and not very well at that, and the judge is apparently not paying much attention to it either since the sentencing is still on.

I would say my question now is whether or not Lindsay is as totally incompetent as this would seem to indicate since he is now doing nothing but filing inappropriate documents and nonsense?

I know he is still trying to get the court to say that just because all of the appellate courts have stomped on his PRA nonsense that they really didn’t do that and that it is the magic key to get out of jail, and that is going to be or has already been kicked back as well, since they have long accepted the findings on that and aren’t about to change just because Lindsey doesn’t like it.

[Nikki]

...
I would say my question now is whether or not Lindsay is as totally incompetent as this would seem to indicate since he is now doing nothing but filing inappropriate documents and nonsense?
...

Well, there's incompetent and there's incompetent.
1 - Properly qualified
2 - Adequate for the stipulated purpose
3 - Law Legally fit or qualified

If we focus on #3, Lindsay is technically competent in that he is capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and is able to conduct or materially participate in the proceedings and his defense.

Now, as to the effectiveness of his participation, it doesn't really matter. He is, to the extent that he interprets them, following the various laws and rules of procedure albeit futilely.

If we go back to definitions #1 and 2, he is clearly not competent, but that doesn't matter in a legal sense.

Just because he's determined he's a resident of Planet Springer and acts according to the laws as established there doesn't qualify him as incompetent -- Just pathetically comical.

[Dezcad]

For those of you who may wish to read Lindsey's Petition to the SCOTUS, the trial blogger has provided a link to it here.

Lindsey requests that the SCOTUS

issue an order in the nature of mandamus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to reverse its order of December 4, 2009, in 09-5165

Where does he come up with this nonsense?

[Pottapaug1938]

For those of you who may wish to read Lindsey's Petition to the SCOTUS, the trial blogger has provided a link to it here.

Lindsey requests that the SCOTUS

issue an order in the nature of mandamus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to reverse its order of December 4, 2009, in 09-5165

Where does he come up with this nonsense?

Where does ANY deranged TP/TDer (a redundancy?) come up with their garbage writings?

[Dezcad]

Most of Springer and Stilley's pending Motions have been denied in a detailed 26 page Order.

01/28/2010 293 OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Stephen P Friot, ruling on Motion(s)/document(s): #224,232,262,265,267,271,273,285 Denied (Re: 265 MOTION to Vacate/Set Aside Order dated December 9, 2009 MOTION Reinstate Docket # 257 and # 260 as properly filed under Local Criminal Rules 12.1 MOTION 10 days from date of order to refile docket # 257 and # 260 in accordance with Local Civil Rule 7.2 including extended page number therein, 267 MOTION to Reconsider, 232 JOINDER in Springer's motion for reconsideration, dismissal, or mistrial (in 224 ), 262 MOTION for New Trial, 224 MOTION to Reconsider, 273 MOTION to Strike Document(s), 271 MOTION Disqualify, Recuse, Removal and for Random Reassignment, 285 MOTION to Strike Document(s) 276 and 277 ) as to Lindsey Kent Springer, Oscar Amos Stilley (pll, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

[LPC]

Most of Springer and Stilley's pending Motions have been denied in a detailed 26 page Order.

Some highlights:

2. Jury Instruction Regarding Venue.

Mr. Springer next argues that the jury instruction regarding venue, instruction 33, was improper and entitles him to a new trial. This motion is founded on Mr. Springer’s often-repeated premise that Internal Revenue Districts have been abolished and that without Internal Revenue Districts within which to place the charged crimes, the jury should have been allowed to find there was no proper venue. The court has rejected this argument before and it rejects it again now. The venue instruction correctly advised the jury regarding the law of venue with respect to each of the crimes charged against the defendants. The venue instruction does not require a new trial.

3. Instructions or Statements to the Jury that Form 1040 Complied With the Paperwork Reduction Act

Mr. Springer argues that on numerous occasions the court incorrectly advised the jury that IRS Form 1040 did not violate the Paperwork Reduction Act. In this motion, Mr. Springer argues that the PRA was his “complete defense” and that the court improperly advised the jury that Form 1040 complied with the PRA. Assuming that the PRA has any application at all to the offenses charged in this case, the court rejects, as it has done before, Mr. Springer’s contention that the Paperwork Reduction Act provides him with a defense in this action. As held in United States v. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1991), quoted in Springer v. United States, 447 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2006), “the requirement to file a tax return is mandated by statute, not by regulation” and “such explicit statutory requirements are
not subject to the PRA.” The court’s statements to the jury regarding the PRA do not require a new trial.

4. Jury Improperly Drawn

Mr. Springer argues:

The jury in this case was not drawn according to the Sixth Amendment State and district mandate. This Court allowed the Jury [to] be drawn from several districts in the State of Oklahoma in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Jury should have been drawn from the district in the State that Springer lives within.

(Doc. no. 262, p. 6.) Mr. Springer cites no authorities that support his contention that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury was not drawn from the specific district in which he lives rather than from counties Mr. Springer has “never even been through or ever visited.” (Doc. no. 262, p. 9.) The court rejects this argument as a basis for a new trial.

[LPC]

More from the order:

7. The Undersigned’s Authority to Preside.

Mr. Springer argues, as he has before, that the undersigned did not have the authority to preside over the trial.

Mr. Springer raised like arguments when he filed a motion for clarification of authority (doc. no. 30) on April 7, 2009. By order of April 22, 2009, the undersigned granted Mr. Springer’s motion for clarification and directed Mr. Springer to the Tenth Circuit’s Designation Order, sometimes referred to as Miscellaneous Order No. 23 (Misc. 23). Misc. 23 designates the undersigned as authorized to hold court in the Northern District of Oklahoma. (See, misc. 23 at doc. no. 42, Ex. “A.”) The April motion for clarification made clear that Mr. Springer’s reason for filing that motion was simply that he could not discern any legal basis for the undersigned’s assignment to this case; as he questioned the assignment, Mr. Springer sought clarification of that legal basis. After the requested clarification was provided, defendants did not move to challenge the undersigned’s assignment until the instant motion for a new trial was
filed on December 8, 2009.

A defendant cannot wait for the outcome at trial before raising a known objection to the court’s authority to preside over the trial. Accordingly, the court finds that the objection to the undersigned’s authority to preside as grounds for a new trial is untimely, and the motion is denied for this reason. [Footnote omitted] (Mr. Springer’s arguments in this portion of his motion for a new trial overlap with his arguments for disqualification discussed later in this order. See Part V, infra, for additional authorities regarding timeliness as a requirement for a motion to disqualify.) Alternatively, if the argument is a timely one, the court considers its merits.

Mr. Springer argues the undersigned cannot preside pursuant to misc. 23 because 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), which misc. 23 cites as its enabling statute, does not apply here. Section 292(b) states: “The chief judge of a circuit may, in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily any district judge of the circuit to hold a district court in any district within the circuit.” Mr. Springer argues that the designations contained in misc. 23 are not in the public interest and that they are not temporary designations.

The court rejects these arguments. Nothing requires misc. 23 to set out the specific public interest served by that order. Nevertheless, the court finds that the obvious purpose of the rule is to provide for the just and efficient administration of justice in situations such as this one, where assigning a case to a judge who regularly sits outside the district helps to avoid any appearance of impropriety given the other in-district judges’ prior contacts with the parties in prior proceedings. [Footnote omitted] Additionally, the designation included in misc. 23 is, by its terms, temporary. It states that the named judges are designated and assigned to hold court in the district listed from January 1, 2009, through December 31, 2009.

Mr. Springer also argues that § 292 is unconstitutional for various reasons, including because only the President may appoint district judges. The court rejects these arguments.

Mr. Springer further complains that Chief Judge Claire Eagan, when she assigned this case to the undersigned, cited no statute or rule which authorized that assignment, and that she lacked the authority to assign the case to the undersigned. (Mr. Springer’s related arguments that Chief Judge Eagan was disqualified and therefore could not assign the case are addressed in Part V, infra.) The court rejects these arguments. The Tenth Circuit’s Designation Order (misc. 23), and Chief Judge Eagan’s administrative authority, provide authority for the assignment.

Mr. Springer also relies on 28 U.S.C. § 292(d), arguing that a certificate of necessity was required to support the Tenth Circuit’s designation of the undersigned as stated in misc. 23. Section 292(d) allows the Chief Justice of the United States to designate and assign temporarily a district judge of one circuit for service in another circuit, either in a district court or court of appeals, upon presentation of a certificate of necessity. That section does not apply here.

The court finds that it had the judicial authority to preside over these proceedings. It rejects Mr. Springer’s arguments to the contrary as a basis for a new trial.

[LPC]

A few more sections:

Part III
Springer’s Motion to Vacate Order of December 9, 2009, to Reinstate Doc. Nos. 257 and 260, or
Alternatively, for Additional Time to Comply (Doc. no. 265.)

Mr. Springer asks the court to vacate its order of December 9, 2009. (“The December order,” doc. no. 264). The December order granted the government’s motion to strike certain filings because the filings did not comply with page limitations set out in the local court rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. [Footnote omitted] The specific filings Mr. Springer asks to have reinstated are document nos. 257 (his reply to the prosecution’s response to Mr. Springer’s motion to reconsider or to dismiss or to declare a mistrial), and document no. 260 (his motion for judgment of acquittal).

Mr. Springer’s primary argument is that it is improper to hold him to the page requirements of LCvR7.2, which provides that no brief shall be submitted that is longer than twenty-five typewritten pages without leave of court. Mr. Springer argues that N.D. LCR 1.2, which incorporates LCvR7.2 by specific reference, states that LCvR 7.2 applies “Where appropriate in a criminal context....” Mr. Springer argues, essentially, that the rules did not give him fair notice that his situation was one such “criminal context” in which it would be “appropriate” to apply the page limitations. He argues that his rights were violated by the court’s enforcement of the page limitations. Mr. Springer’s protestations ring hollow for many reasons.

First, he focuses on the introductory phrase of N.D. LCR 1.2 -- (“Where appropriate in a criminal context”) -- to argue that this criminal rule fails to give adequate notice that the page limitations set forth in LCvR7.2 apply. LCvR7.2 is specifically identified in N.D. LCR 1.2, by rule number and by subject matter as a rule that pertains to “Briefs.” If Mr. Springer truly thought that the “where appropriate” language created a question about the applicability of the page limits, then, instead of unilaterally filing lengthy papers, he should have asked the court about those page limitations. He did not.

Second, the violations in question are not slight ones. The non-conforming papers greatly exceed the page limits.

Third, although Mr. Springer appears pro se, he has been a litigant in a number of federal court proceedings. He has a much greater knowledge of court rules than the typical pro se litigant.

Fourth, in a prior brief the government expressly pointed out to the defendants that the page limitations of LCvR7.2 applied through N.D. LCR 1.2. (Doc. no. 80, p. 4 n.1.) Mr. Springer argues that the government’s brief provided no notice to him because it was stricken by the court. Stricken or not, the brief called the page limits in question to the attention of the reader. Given that the brief was stricken, the court does not place much weight on this point but it is worth noting.

Fifth, another provision of the criminal rules, N.D. LCR 12.1(B), supports striking the filings. Importantly, this provision does not depend upon incorporation by reference of any other rules. Nor is it qualified by the “where appropriate language.” This provision, N.D. LCR 12.1(B), is perfectly clear. It provides that: “All motions and responses thereto must be accompanied by a concise brief citing all authorities upon which the movant or respondent relies.” Mr. Springer’s 51-page reply brief (doc. no. 257), and his 79-page motion for judgment of acquittal (doc. no. 260), can hardly be characterized as concise. The stricken filings violate this court rule. [Footnote omitted]

Sixth, at trial, both Mr. Springer and Mr. Stilley moved, twice, for judgment of acquittal. Each defendant moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case, and each defendant renewed his motion at the close of the case. These motions were denied. Accordingly, defendants have had other opportunities to state their arguments in support of acquittal.

Seventh, in addition to the motion for judgment of acquittal, the other filing which Mr. Springer asks the court to reinstate is a reply brief. His motion does not identify any specific issues raised in the stricken reply brief that were not addressed or could not have been addressed in his moving brief.

Eighth, the ability to enforce reasonable page limits is critical to the court’s ability to move a complex case like this one to final resolution in a just and efficient manner. This is especially true here, as defendants have filed numerous motions, including a number of motions based on legal propositions the court has already rejected. The court’s ability to strike non-complying papers is a necessary tool if the court is to maintain control over its docket and ensure the progress of a case. Page limitation rules are an important tool for carrying out the just and efficient administration of justice.

Despite all of the above, the court stops short of finding that the rule violation was intentional. It presumes, in fact, that it was not. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for reinstating the stricken papers which clearly did not comply with the rules. Mr. Springer’s request that the court vacate its December order and reinstate the stricken papers is denied.

Mr. Springer asks for additional time within which to file conforming versions of the stricken papers in the event that the court declines to vacate the December order, as it has now done.
A court is not required to allow a futile filing. See, e.g., E.Spire Communications, Inc. v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, 392 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004) (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying request for leave to amend complaint, where proposed claim would be futile). Thus, the initial question is whether allowing new, conforming papers would be a futile act. To answer this question the court has reviewed the content of each of the stricken documents to determine whether re-stating any of the arguments made in any of these papers would serve a purpose, or whether new filings would be futile and wasteful of the party’s and the court’s resources.

After review of the stricken motion for acquittal, the court concludes that Mr. Springer’s motion would be denied for basically the same reasons that caused the court to deny his dispositive motions during the trial. The court also concludes that Mr. Springer’s stricken reply brief would change none of the results stated in this order. Many of the arguments contained in the stricken papers rely on legal propositions that have already been rejected. Continually reshaping rejected arguments into new motions and briefs is not Mr. Springer’s remedy; his remedy is to take his arguments up with the Court of Appeals. Striking the non-conforming papers, and declining to give Mr. Springer a second chance to file the same arguments in shorter papers when those arguments would ultimately be denied by this court in
any event, does not impair Mr. Springer’s ability to seek review.

Considering all of the circumstances, the court finds that providing additional time for Mr. Springer to file conforming papers would be futile. Accordingly, Mr. Springer’s request for additional time to file conforming papers is denied.

For all of these reasons, Mr. Springer’s motion to vacate the court’s order of December 9, 2009 and to reinstate the stricken documents or alternatively allow additional time to comply with the rules, is DENIED.

Part IV.

Mr. Stilley’s Motion to Reconsider The Court’s Order Striking Pleadings, and To Reinstate All Pleadings Stricken (Doc. no. 267)

In this motion and its accompanying brief, Mr. Stilley joins in Mr. Springer’s motion to vacate, discussed immediately above. He asks that all of the stricken filings referenced in the court’s December order be reinstated.

Some of what Mr. Stilley includes in his supporting brief can only be described
as a rant. Leaving that material aside, the additional arguments which Mr. Stilley makes on the subject of whether the court’s December order striking non-complying filings should be reconsidered and vacated, include the following.

Mr. Stilley argues that the deficient nature of N.D. LCR 1.211 is apparent because that rule purports to incorporate several civil court rules that no longer exist. Those other rules, however, are not material to the issues before the court.

Mr. Stilley argues that he had no notice that for purposes of the page limitations, the court would construe his motion for judgment for acquittal (doc. no. 261, which was 19 pages long, plus exhibits), along with his brief in support of that motion (doc. no. 263, which was 14 pages long), as one filing. Court rules cannot reject, explicitly, every possible ruse a litigant might think up to get around those rules. Here, Mr. Stilley’s motion and brief are both clearly argumentative and it was appropriate to construe them together. If the court did not have the discretion to do so, rules regarding page limitations would be easily circumvented.

The same findings that the court has made with respect to its reasons for denying Mr. Springer’s motion to vacate apply equally to Mr. Stilley’s motion to reconsider. Moreover, although Mr. Stilley appears pro se, he is, [color=redor was,[/color] an attorney and he clearly understands the importance of complying with local court rules. With respect, specifically, to Mr. Stilley’s stricken documents, the court finds that the December order was appropriate and that no grounds have been shown for vacating that order, for reinstating the stricken filings, or for allowing additional time to submit conforming filings now. After consideration of the content of each of the stricken filings, the court finds that allowing additional time for Mr. Stilley to submit his stricken motion for acquittal, his stricken supporting brief, and his stricken reply brief, would be futile. Nothing argued in these documents would change any results with respect to Mr. Stilley. Mr. Stilley’s remedy lies with a higher court, not with restating his stricken arguments to the undersigned.

Mr. Stilley’s motion to reconsider the court’s December order and to reinstate all stricken pleadings is DENIED.

[notorial dissent]

Sounds rather like that sleazy auto loan commercial, except the chant is denied, denied, denied.

After wading through all that nonsense, did he actually raise anything that was really reviewable? If he did, I completely missed it. Everything that I identified was either shot down as not germane at the court, or just plain wrong in relation to the matter at hand, and that he really didn't have anything to appeal as far as the trial was concerned, except that he didn't like the outcome-i.e. losing.

The closest I saw him come was over some of the housekeeping stuff that is only incidental and not critical, and all of which had been disposed of by the court beforehand.

[Judge Roy Bean]

If memory serves, this is a pretty fundamental premise:

A defendant cannot wait for the outcome at trial before raising a known objection to the court’s authority to preside over the trial.

Again - when in trouble, when in doubt, run in circles, scream and shout.

I nominate Friot for "Most Patient Jurist" of the month.

[wserra]

I nominate Friot for "Most Patient Jurist" of the month.

I was thinking "decade".

[grixit]

New rule--

The clerk will read each filing, but only up to the point where a previously denied argument is refuted. At that point the appellant will be fined, and told to try again. If the clerk makes it all the way through without finding a discredited argument, and the document is otherwise within the rules-- only then will it be given to the judge.

[LPC]

We're nearing the magic number, and so I'm locking this thread.

Next time Springer files some crap (Monday?), we can start a new thread.

Or is it time for a thread on sentencing?