Great Moorish Estate Express Trust

[LPC]

The names sound familiar, but I haven't taken the time to do any checking.

Tanya Bennett-Bey v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-00328 (U.S.D.C. D.C. 1/20/2010).

TANYA BENNETT-BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOUGLAS SHULMAN,
Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se plaintiff Tanya Bennett-Bey has sued the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service1 ("IRS") for a refund of taxes withheld from her paycheck and to enjoin the Commissioner to change her tax status. The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint. Because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Bennett-Bey's refund claim, and because Bennett-Bey has otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. REFUND

Bennett-Bey appears to be seeking a refund of taxes that have been withheld from her salary. (See Compl. at 7 (requesting that defendant be required to "repay all nlawfully [collected debts]); Pl.'s Mot. of Opp'n to Dis. Compl. at 1 (arguing that "the I.R.S. had no right to remove funds from my salary").)

On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, "the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction." Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2007). "Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the claim, . . . the court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 475 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). Pro se plaintiffs are not free from the requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims. See Briggs v. State Dep't Fed. Credit Union, Civil Action No. 05-1344 (GK), 2006 WL 1444009, at *2 (May 25, 2006).

A district court has subject matter jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). However, a district court's jurisdiction is limited to tax claims for which the plaintiff has first filed a refund claim with the IRS. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) ("No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the [IRS.]"); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601-02 (1990). Bennett-Bey has not alleged in her complaint that she filed a claim for a refund with the IRS before bringing this suit. Thus, she has failed to establish that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claim for a refund.

II. EXEMPTION

Bennett-Bey alleges that she is exempt from paying federal income taxes because she is a beneficiary of the Great Moorish Estate Express Trust, which makes her "a Moorish American Citizen" who has "[s]overeign mmunity as a [c]itizen of that [n]ation." (Compl. ¶ 1.) She also seeks to enjoin the defendant from "unlawfully conducting business on the Trust Estate." (Id. at 7.) While Bennett-Bey has not pleaded a basis for the court's jurisdiction over this claim, it is unnecessary if there is a recognizable basis for jurisdiction within the complaint. See Kornegay v. AT&T, Civil Action No. 05-1 (PLF), 2006 WL 825622, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2006) (noting it possible to find jurisdiction even if the complaint fails to cite a statutory basis "where 'facts alleged in [the complaint] are sufficient to establish . . . jurisdiction and the complaint appeared jurisdictionally correct when filed" (alteration in original) (quoting Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 608 n.6 (1978))). Bennett-Bey seems to be claiming a religious exemption from paying taxes under the Free Exercise clause (see Pl.'s Mot. to Suppl. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dis. ¶ 1 (stating that the plaintiff's "rights are being violated according to the Constitution [o]f [t]he United States[,] in particular . . . the [F]irst . . . Amendment")), a claim that arises under the First Amendment and for which a federal district court has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution[.]").

However, a complaint must also contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). For a plaintiff to demonstrate that she is entitled to relief under the Free Exercise Clause, she must plead, as an initial matter, that the government has placed "'a substantial[ ] burden' on [her] exercise of religion 'even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability[.]'" Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)) (first alteration in original). Because Bennett-Bey does not allege anywhere in her complaint that paying federal income taxes will impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of her religion, she has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

CONCLUSION

Under even a liberal construction of her pro se complaint, Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (D.D.C. 2006), Bennett-Bey is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

SIGNED this 20th day of January, 2010.

Richard W. Roberts
United States District Judge

FOOTNOTE

[1] Douglas Shulman is substituted for Linda Stiff under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

END OF FOOTNOTE

[LPC]

A good explanation of the Moorish Trust scam can be found here: http://theultimatetrust.org/businessplan.htm

[Nikki]

The name probably sounds familiar because of the "-Bey" suffix.

Although this is Tanya's first foray into lala-land, over the past 10 years there have been many other -Bey and -El members of one of the many Moorish nations who have swallowed the snake oil.

Unfortunately, their attempts were equally futile.

[LPC]

More background on the Moorish trust scam can be found in an opinion of the Maryland Supreme Court, Frank Lewis El Bey v. Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc., No. 37, Sept. Term, 2000, reversing and remanding, El Bey v. Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc., 130 Md. App. 543, 747 A.2d 241 (2000).

Noble Drew Ali founded the Moorish Holy Temple of Science in 1913 in Newark, New Jersey, as a vehicle to advance the tenets of the Islamic faith, as he viewed them to be, in the United States. He subsequently incorporated the Temple in 1926 under Illinois law as a civic corporation. In 1928, Noble Drew Ali changed the name of the corporation to the Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc., and changed the purpose of the organization from civic to religious. During his leadership of the Temple, Noble Drew Ali served as the Moderator (the head of the Temple) and also was referred to as the Prophet, a title of religious, but not legal, significance within the corporation. [Noble Drew Ali died in 1929.]

[...]

Respondent, in its complaint, alleged that Petitioner fraudulently was collecting money in the Temple’s name, disseminating false and misleading information about his status as a trustee of the corporation, and attempting to recruit Temple members; this conduct, it argued, would embarrass and tarnish Respondent’s reputation and good name.

The best stuff is in a footnote:

During the 17 December 1998 trial, discussed infra, the Circuit Court asked Petitioner
whether he could document his appointment as the trustee of the Temple. The following testimony ensued:

THE COURT: And [the trust documents] were presented to you when?
[PETITIONER]: In 1978.
THE COURT: By whom?
[PETITIONER]: By Moor.
THE COURT: By who?
[PETITIONER]: A Moor. A Moor named Lars Rossi (phonetic) gave me the actual
deed of conveyance that culminated my appointment as the trustee.
THE COURT: You were appointed trustee in 1978?
[PETITIONER]: No, I received the documents [the Holy Koran, portions of which the
Petitioner later had read into evidence], Your Honor, in 1978.
THE COURT: When were you appointed trustee?
[PETITIONER]: When the trust was—when I obtained knowledge of the trust, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: When were you appointed and who appointed you?
[PETITIONER]: In 1978 I received—
THE COURT: When were you appointed—well, first of all, who appointed you a
trustee and when were you appointed?
[PETITIONER]: My appointment, Your Honor—as I said, my appointment was a legal appointment in 1928 under Illinois law . . . .
* * *
[PETITIONER]: I received my appointment directly from the prophet, Noble Dru Ali [sic], according to the requirements of Illinois in the appointment of a trustee to represent an expressed trust estate.
THE COURT: So you received this appointment directly from the prophet—
[PETITIONER]: Noble Dru Ali [sic].
THE COURT: —who was dead long before you were born? Is that what you are
saying?
[PETITIONER]: That’s what I am saying, Your Honor. . . .

[LPC]

One more comment: The original scamster, Frank Lewis El Bey, died in 2003, so someone else must be running the show now.

[Joey Smith]

Beware the Moors!

[Dr. Caligari]

Me say BEY!
Me say Bey, me say Bey, me say Bey-O!
Beylight come and me want go home.

[Demosthenes]

Beware the Moors, lad. Stick to the road!

[dr poormouth]

A C Doyle wrote
As you value your life or your reason keep away from the moor.

The word "moor" only was printed in ink.

"Now," said Sir Henry Baskerville, "perhaps you will tell me, Mr. Holmes, what in thunder is the meaning of that, and who it is that takes so much interest in my affairs?"