There is, of course, an entire section of the
Tax Protester FAQ devoted to the inapplicability of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to the collection of income tax.
And several courts have had to deal with the issue:
“In his attack on the summonses, plaintiff first alleges that the summonses violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (‘FDCPA’), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 through 1692p. The FDCPA applies to ‘debt collection practices by debt collectors.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). A ‘debt’ is defined as ‘any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). A ‘debt collector’ is a person engaged in ‘the collection of debts’ and the definition specifically excludes ‘an officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.’ 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6), 1692a(6)(C). Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, therefore, federal taxes are not a debt, and the IRS is not a debt collector. The FDCPA does not apply.” Kirk Bandy v. United States, 2008 TNT 82-83, No. 6:07-cv-01386 (U.S.D.C. Kan. 4/24/2008) (motion to quash summons dismissed).
“[T]o the extent the Israels' pleadings may have set forth a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, that claim is dismissed because the Israels' tax deficiencies do not qualify as a ‘debt,’ nor do the IRS or its agents constitute ‘debt collectors’ for the purposes of that Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(5) (classifying a ‘debt’ as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes’); 1692a(6)(C) (noting that only a ‘person’ can qualify as a ‘debt collector,’ then exempting ‘any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties’).” Kenneth L. Israel et ux. v. Mark Everson, 2005 TNT 222-18, No. 4:05-cv-00184-JEG (U.S.D.C. S.D. Iowa 10/14/2005).
“We likewise reject Al-Sharif's due process claims under the FDCA [Fair Debt Collection Act] and FTCA. The FDCA was designed ‘to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). However, the term ‘debt collector’ does not include an ‘officer or employee of the United States … to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties[.]’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). Al-Sharif therefore has no right of action against the individual IRS agents under the FDCA.” Al-Sharif v. United States, KTC 2008-493, No. 08-10741 (11th Cir. 2008), aff’ng KTC 2008-150, No. 07-00050-cv-1 (U.S.D.C. S.D. Ga. 2008).
See also, Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1980) ("at a minimum, the statute contemplates that the debt has arisen as a result of the rendition of a service or purchase of property or other item of value. The relationship between taxpayer and taxing authority does not encompass that type of pro tanto exchange which the statutory definition envisages"); Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 401 (3rd Cir. 2000) (homeowner's property tax obligations do not constitute "debts" under the FDCPA); IRS v. Westberry, 215 F.3d 589, 591 (6th Cir. 2000) (income taxes should not be considered consumer debt for purposes of the §1301 co-debtor stay); Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511, 512 (2nd Cir. 1998) (tax on automobiles not a "transaction" for purposes of the FDCPA because "the tax is not levied upon the purchase or registration of the vehicle per se, but rather upon the ownership of the vehicle by the citizen").
