And now we've kicked the crap out of GOODF for you. You're welcome.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald
2017 ABQB 124
Note that both of these decisions came from the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, the most sovereign unfriendly court in Canada and the home of Judge Rooke, author of the notorious Meads v Meads;
Meads v. Meads
2012 ABQB 571
Judge Rooke didn't write this decision, it was heard by Master Schulz. Masters are essentially the court's gatekeepers, hearing issues that don't require the services of a judge. Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, cited above, was also heard by a Master, in that case Master Schlosser.
We'll start the analysis with the beginning and end, the issues and the outcome;
 On July 7, 1997, the Defendant, William McDougald [“Mr. McDougald”] entered into a Visa credit card agreement with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [“CIBC”, or “the Bank”]. Mr. McDougald then used that credit card until he ceased making payments on June 15, 2016. CIBC terminated the credit card agreement, and on January 3, 2017 sued to collect the outstanding debt. The Bank on January 27, 2017 applied for summary judgment per Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, [the “Rules” or individually a “Rule”], Rule 7.3.
 That is the routine component of this debt collection action. There is another, less savory aspect. Mr. McDougald has unfortunately adopted several pseudolegal schemes sold by UK scam artists who operate a website with a name that does not exactly inspire much confidence: “Get Out Of Debt Free” (http://www.getoutofdebtfree.org). Mr. McDougald sent the Bank and its lawyers documents obtained from that website and attempted to “get out of debt free” by what is commonly known as the “Three/Five Letters” scheme, and a spurious promissory note. He has also counterattacked, billing for over $276 million on the basis of “Common Law Copyright” in his name.
 None of these strategies has any legal merit or effect. I therefore order judgment in favour of the Bank.
Less savory aspect! GOODF has been the savior of thousands of desperate debtors harassed by financial institutions. Well, maybe hundreds. Ok, none to date but still in there trying.
In Canada you start a lawsuit by filing a Statement of Claim with the court. This lays out how you have been injured by the defendant, the facts you are relying on to prove this, the relevant law you are arguing, and the remedies sought. This is McDougald's entire Statement of Claim;
Statement of facts relied on:
1. I have sent registered mail to CIBC showing in detail that our Supreme Law clearly indicates in Article 1 subsection 1 that our signature is our inalienable right to create money.
2. I have sent registered mail to CIBC showing that our Domestic Law in the Financial Administration Act and Bills of Exchange Act. Article 189 shows that the Government of Canada agrees with the United Nations Covenants that it is our signature that creates money.
Any matters that defeat the claim of the plaintiff(s):
4. RBC mortgages say at the top of page 1 that “This is a Promissory Note” and BMO says on their loan documents that “This is a Promissory Note”. Clearly all we do is sign it, not knowing that we just created the money.
5. The Library of Parliament 2015-51-E says that all Promissory Notes go to the Bank of Canada to be exchanged for Bank notes and digits in an account accessed by a computer or at the Branch. This document tells us that all bank debt instruments are Promissory Notes and our signatures create all of it. The bank has no money available for mortgages, loans, lines of credit or credit cards.
7. Follow the Rule of Law and close this case.
Uh, what rule of law would that be that Bill? You're supposed to tell us in the Statement of Claim. And what the hell is our "Supreme Law"?
So the Bank, instead of fighting fair by arguing against McDougald's interpretation of Supreme Law, threw GOODF into the mix;
 The Affidavit also attaches unusual communications received by the Bank and its lawyers from “Sovereign (c)William of the family McDougald Authorized Agent and Representative for WILLIAM MCDOUGALDTM.” Ms. D’Alessio deposes that she identified in those documents a sham debt elimination scheme that applied Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] (from Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (CanLII), 543 AR 215) motifs and concepts, including the “Double/Split Person”, foisted unilateral agreements, and a “money for nothing” promissory note that allegedly creates money out of thin air. The Affidavit attaches the purported “promissory note”, which the CIBC refused to accept as payment.
McDougald did his best to explain to the court how he could scrawl some words on a piece of paper and have his debts magically disappeared;
 Mr. McDougald then made submissions which I believe were intended to explain the relevance of a document titled “PROMISSORY NOTE” that he sent to Kevin Glass, the Chief Financial Officer of the CIBC, along with a letter dated January 11, 2017. Mr. McDougald said Mr. Glass had no objection or protest to the promissory note. The value stated on the note is $14,689.67, the amount for which CIBC sued. Mr. McDougald explained a promissory note is legal tender. Once Mr. Glass received the promissory note then it would be sold to the Bank of Canada, which in turn would deposit money into the CIBC Visa account. Mr. McDougald noted that had not happened, so he sent a second promissory note on February 2, 2017. Mr. McDougald said he has, in fact, paid twice, however his CIBC Visa account does not reflect that payment.
 Mr. McDougald used a Canadian $10 bill to illustrate the seven characteristics of a promissory note. The bill identifies the type of instrument (a “Bank of Canada Note”), has a document ID number, identifies the parties (the Governor and the Deputy Governor), shows the value of the note in numerals (“$10”) and words (“Ten Dollars”), has the authorized creator’s name and signature, and indicates the jurisdiction of the court for the note (the picture of the Parliament Building indicates the jurisdiction is Ottawa). These are the characteristics for a promissory note, per “UCC 3-104”.
 Mr. McDougald explained that combined, these mean all money is a promise to pay. Cash would have no meaning, unless it was a promise by the government to pay. Mr. McDougald’s promissory note is a negotiable instrument, and per Canadian legislation and treaties is an unconditional promise to pay, so that means the Bank could get its funds in that manner.
The bank wanted summary judgment which meant that the whole thig gets tossed out without a trial. This is what's required for a summary judgment;
 The test for summary judgment is well established. Rule 7.3 states:
7.3(1) A party may apply to the Court for summary judgment in respect of all or part of a claim on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) there is no defence to a claim or part of it;
(b) there is no merit to a claim or part of it;
(c) the only real issue is the amount to be awarded.
So Master Schulz went through her analysis. Firstly she concluded that the only issue in the application was whether or not McDougald had paid off his debts with promissory notes. The Master said that McDougald employed two pseudolegal debt elimination schemes;
 The first is the Three/Five Letters scam which is reviewed in Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771 at paras 55-73, 603 AR 261 [“Rogozinsky”]. That judgment attaches the documents that Ms. Rogozinsky sent to her bank. She claimed these created “private estoppel” and therefore disproved the alleged debt. Many of the documents employed by Mr. McDougald are exactly the same as those used by Ms. Rogozinsky, including the same style and formatting, which suggests Mr. McDougald purchased OPCA materials from the same source as Ms. Rogozinsky, the UK Get Out Of Debt Free website.
 The last documents sent by Mr. McDougald to the Bank was a January 11, 2017 letter that attaches a “PROMISSORY NOTE”. The text of these documents are generally reproduced following at Appendix “A” and “B”, respectively. The latter document is ‘fancied up’ with various scrolls, mandalas, coloured bars, and so on. Like the Three/Five Letters and Common Law Copyright Notice, the purported promissory note template is also from the Get Out Of Debt Free website. Mr. McDougald selected the “improved ... design” version which has “incorporated powerful sacred geometry”.
The Master decided against the first scheme in a very terse comment;
 I adopt Master Schlosser’s analysis and conclusion in Rogozinsky that the Three/Five Letters documents have no legal effect. They illegally attempt to foist various arrangements and obligations on the documents’ recipients.
However the Master got more expansive when deciding against the fake promissory notes. She didn't seem fully on board with the brilliance of the idea;
 There are many problems with this scheme.
And so the nitpicking started;
 First, the January 11, 2016 promissory note is not, by definition, a promissory note. The Bills of Exchange Act, s 176(1) definition of a promissory note indicates it is an unconditional promise to pay:
A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another person, signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer. [Emphasis added.]
 Mr. McDougald’s promissory note is not unconditional - it does not promise ‘cash up front’ if presented. Instead, it only authorizes $1,000.00 monthly payments. Further, the promissory note breaks the rule that a document of this kind may be transferred from holder to holder, each of whom has an equal right to demand payment. The promissory note instead states if it is traded “... such trade shall terminate the obligation herein.” Thus, Mr. McDougald’s document is not a promissory note per the Bills of Exchange Act. It is, at most, a kind of non-legally binding “IOU”.
Them she rambled overseas to the UK for precedent on the second problem.
 Second, Mr. McDougald’s scheme would only operate if CIBC was obliged in law to receive and accept his promissory note as a payment. It is not. The Scottish Court of Sessions (Scotland’s highest civil court) in Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Wilson, 2014 SLR 46,  CSIH 95 evaluated a promissory note scheme that in many ways parallels the one advanced by Mr. McDougald. Wilson said his promissory note paid a child support debt. It was as good as cash. Wilson explained that if he did not pay for the note then the Bank of England would, and his promissory note would become part of the national debt.
 The Court of Sessions rejected Wilson’s argument, and concluded that a creditor has no obligation to accept a promissory note, unless the option to make payment by promissory note was part of the original lending contract (para 11):
 This principle is binding on me since it was endorsed by a judge of this Court in Re Boisjoli, at paras 30-36. This is a second basis to reject Mr. McDougald’s defence. CIBC had the right to reject his promissory note and demand legal tender.
Paragraphs 38 to 53 cover McDougald's arguments that he can just sign his name and create money. I won't review it in detail, read it yourself, suffice to say that the analysis starts with this;
 A third critical issue is that Mr. McDougald’s argument his signature creates money is false. First, there are problems with the various authorities he presented. For example, he points to international bill of exchange treaties, but Canada is not a party to the 1930 Convention and has signed but not ratified the UN Convention.
The critical issue 3 analysis ended with;
 These “money out of thin air” concepts misrepresent how the fractional banking system operates, see Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703 at paras 68-85, 28 Alta LR (6th) 104. None of these schemes, including Mr. McDougald’s variation, are correct in law.
Then on to a paradox;
 A fourth defect with Mr. McDougald’s scheme is that he effectively says he is paying for his debt with a promise to pay for his debt. After all, a promissory note is a promise to make a payment. Mr. McDougald’s promissory note says he will pay for it (though he falsely claims the Bank of Canada will). Therefore, the January 11, 2017 document replaces one debt with an IOU for the same debt.
And a new dance craze;
 Re Boisjoli at para 35 points out the fundamental illogic of this so-called payment approach. “Wouldn’t this then inevitably lead to a conga line of promissory notes, each purporting to satisfy the debt of the note one step up the cue?”
Then a comparison of Canada with a failed state;
 Mr. McDougald’s January 11, 2017 letter simply underlines how his overall scheme is a flight of fantasy. “Self-determination” comes from “freedom”. “Freedom” needs “confidence”. You can buy “confidence” if you have “all the money we need to buy everything we want.” We therefore must have a right to “[c]reate your own money with your signature when you need it.”
 As Milton Friedman observed “There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” An unlimited right to ‘buy what you want’ and ‘create money’ combines into only one thing. Unbridled, uncontrolled inflation. The more money there is, the less it buys. Fortunately, Canada is not Zimbabwe, and while some may argue over our nation’s currency policies, at least we are not carrying around 100 trillion dollar banknotes. That, however, is the only possible end-point of Mr. McDougald’s ‘money buys you self-determination’ scheme.
The Court ended the decision with a warning about following stupid advice;
 I order Mr. McDougald pay CIBC the amount claimed as at September 6, 2016, of $14,435.42, interest at 24.99% for 157 days being $1,551.16, plus interest on the principle amount at that rate until the date of this decision, interest in accordance with the Judgment Interest Act thereafter, and solicitor-client indemnity costs to be assessed.
 This action has been expensive for Mr. McDougald. He has incurred over $1,500.00 in interest that could have avoided if he promptly paid his outstanding debt. In addition Mr. McDougald will be paying CIBC’s legal bill, which will likely be another substantial expense. Then there was whatever Mr. McDougald paid for the materials from the Get Out Of Debt Free website. He was “ripped off” even if they were free.
 All this could have been avoided. It is easy to get tangled in a web of legal concepts, legislation, and rules, but really, this comes down to a question of common sense. Does it make any sense that a debtor can simply fill in a piece of paper, let alone an IOU, and say “here, go away, you have been paid”? Of course not. I doubt Mr. McDougald would accept his employer paying him in that manner. If something seems too good to be true, it probably is.
 I do not know Mr. McDougald’s personal financial circumstance. He may be having money issues. Many Albertans are. But there are better alternatives than websites that promise free money mantras and magic documents. I hope Mr. McDougald will choose better in the future. Doing otherwise can be very expensive.
And what would a GOODF decision be without a mention of one of its hallmark tenets, name copyrighting?
 The July 15, 2016 ‘conditional acceptance’ also attaches a “Common Law Copyright Notice” from the Get Out Of Debt Free website. This is the same document reproduced in Rogozinsky at Appendix “E”. In brief, the “Common Law Copyright Notice” purports to require anyone who uses Mr. McDougald’s name must pay him $1 million per use. “Common Law Copyright” is also asserted over Mr. McDougald’s bodily characteristics, such as fingerprints, retinal image data, DNA, tissue samples, and even to his “semen, urine, faeces, excrement, other bodily fluids and matter of any kind”. Master Schlosser in Rogozinsky at paras 80-87 rejected this “bizarre, inexplicable claim” as having no legal effect. In Meads v Meads Rooke ACJ at paras 501-504 rejects foisted unilateral copyright claims as having “an overwhelmingly juvenile character” and no effect in law. I agree with these conclusions.
August 31, 2016 - a ‘third notice’ is sent by Mr. McDougald to the Anderson Sinclair law firm. This document is largely the same as the one reproduced in Rogozinsky at Appendix “C”, except that Mr. McDougald’s version omits the introductory paragraph, and attaches a “previously agreed upon invoice” that bills the law firm $276.072 million, most of which relates to 276 $1 million “unauthorized Trademark Infringements from June 2013 to July 2016 nunc pro tunc.”