NESARA = "WEIMAR GOLD"

[co-shoot]

NESARA = "WEIMAR GOLD"

"WEIMAR GOLD"...Please excuse my distrust of gold and a golden future...you see at the level of financial peons it matters not if gold goes to a million plus Weimar dollars to buy a ounce or a few grams of yellow metal. Why you ask...LOL...your future will exist of scratching the ground for food literally...."THE GREASTEST DEPRESSION" will not move slowly around the world spanning 10 years to starting W3, it will come globally for all despite any efforts or any NESARA,
"WEIMAR GOLD"
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http://www.jsmineset.com/

Author: Jim Sinclair
My Dear Friends,

There is nothing normal about this abnormal set of circumstances.

During the Weimar Experience the "Velocity of Money" went wild on the upside.

Think about this because I vigorously disagree with the normal economic crowd that is vocal today. Under present and upcoming circumstances, monetary inflation of this kind, size, speed of injection and constancy cannot be defeated by failure of the normal chains of economic production of increasing prices.

This is not like 1929 or any other previous US liquidity credit crisis. That is why Bernanke is signing the dollar's final death sentence by following the 1929 experience in creating his reactions.

We shall see, but I warn against being emphatic that the norm is the norm now because it isn't

Respectfully,
Jim

[co-shoot]

GLG chief Emmanuel Roman warns thousands of hedge funds on brink of failure
Emmanuel Roman, the co-chief executive of Europe’s biggest hedge fund GLG, has warned that thousands of hedge funds are on the brink of failure as the global economy contracts with unexpected severity.

By Rowena Mason
Last Updated: 5:50PM BST 24 Oct 2008

Emmanuel Roman, of GLG Partners, said 25pc-30pc of the world’s 8,000 hedge funds would disappear "in a Darwinian process", either going bust or deciding meagre profits are not worth their efforts.

"This will go down in the history books as one of the greatest fiascos of banking in 100 years," said Mr Roman, who with Noam Gottesman, co-runs GLG, a former division of Lehman Brothers Holdings with assets of $24bn (£14.8bn). "There need to be some scapegoats, and the regulators are going to go hunt people. That will be good in the long run."

His views were echoed by Professor Nouriel Roubini, a former US Treasury and presidential adviser known for his accurate prediction of financial crises, who estimated that up to 500 hedge funds would fail within months.

Both men were speaking at the same hedge fund conference in London yesterday, and Prof Roubini said he would not be surprised if the US and other countries soon had to close their stock markets for more than a week to halt descent into "sheer panic".

The economist warned that the world is heading for a protracted recession that will end the US’s financial dominance.

"It’s the beginning of the decline of the US financial empire. The Great Depression ended in a massive war. I hope that’s not going to happen

but it’s pretty ugly now," Prof Roubini said.

He added that turmoil over world trade, currency markets and debt is likely to cause geopolitical tensions between the Western world and emerging superpowers such as Russia, China and "a bunch of unstable oil states".

The conference saw analysts, economists and hedge fund managers discussing the possibility that global recession could now last two years on fears that government bail-outs and nationalisations have failed to stop the markets slumping.

"We’re now paying the price for the biggest asset and credit bubble in history," Prof Roubini said, advising investors to stay clear of risky assets and keep money in cash. "The bail-outs have not worked because the markets are no longer rallying, and the policy-makers have run out of options."

The global financial meltdown accelerated this month, with the UK and US governments being forced to take stakes in some of the world’s biggest banks. Stock markets around the world have fallen sharply this month as investors’ concern switches to the impact on the wider economy.

"It’s like we’re walking blind in a minefield," said Prof Roubini. "Every situation has become risky and no one can trust each other. The banks are too big to be allowed to fail, but they’re also too big to save."

Research from Hedge Fund Intelligence (HFI) shows that despite one of the worst months on record for credit funds, US hedge funds alone still have $1.7trillion (£1trillion) in assets.

[co-shoot]

The Greek word to assay, translated to mean TEST to see what something is made of.

In this linked article I had a strange feeling of wondering what would actually take place here;

http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article6952.html

Clip))

Gold is gold, paper is paper, and "Comex gold" is nothing but paper masquerading as gold while simultaneously pretending to be the price-setting medium for actual gold in the world. Now, finally, Comex-gold is in the process of being unmasked.

[Deep Knight]

NESARA = "WEIMAR LEAD"

Wait a tic - a quick search (why is it that most conspiracy fans can't do this?) shows that Lead is selling for $0.67 a pound. While that's cheep for sash weights and sinkers, it's WAY more than NESARA is worth.

Maybe Peruvian Guano?

[co-shoot]

Tuesday, October 28, 2008
John Embry: Gold’s Game-Changing Moment Could be Fast Approaching

In a recent Business News Network interview, Amanda Lang talks with John Embry, Chief Investment Strategist at Sprott Asset Management, about his position on precious metals (bullish) and base metals (bearish). While hesitating to make a definitive prediction in the midst of such widespread asset destruction, Embry nonetheless looks beyond the carnage to what he suggests could be the seminal event for gold—the possibility of default on physical delivery for the December futures contract. He also explains why gold has failed to rise to the occasion of the worst-case financial scenario in history. Below are some excerpts from the interview, edited for length and clarity.

Amanda Long: People say gold really should be doing better than it is now and that actually becomes a justification for not buying it. It’s not doing what it should be doing in a crisis and, therefore, I don’t want to own it.

John Embry: That is a wonderful analysis because that is exactly the mindset the guys who are driving the price down are trying to create. Gold doesn’t work so keep away from it. They’re able to control the price quite easily in the paper markets because the paper markets are so huge in comparison. “The guys” – the central banks and their bullion bank accomplices—have a lot of power and a lot of money, so they can overwhelm the other side. But what’s happening is that the physical supply is diminishing dramatically. It’s getting harder and harder to purchase gold and silver through traditional avenues. You can’t get it in coin shops to any extent. You can’t get it through your banks. The physical side is really constricted by supply. That, to me, is the reality. The paper stuff is just the illusion.

AL: Now the problem, of course, for investors is that the paper market is the one you’ve got to play and, for the most part, it affects the price. How will that be resolved?

JE: What will have to happen is the people that are on the long side of the paper market in, say, on Comex, are going to have to call for delivery. When they call for delivery and there isn’t enough gold available to meet that call, the game changes. That is probably going to be the event that changes the perception. There’s a suggestion that something may happen around the time of the maturity of the December contract.

AL: Would you expect them to do that out of fear? In other words, they’d literally want to take delivery so that they have gold in their vaults?

JE: I would think that would be the best reason to do it for the simple reason that I want physical gold today. I mean that is the one thing you can trust. Paper gold, who knows? You may have a force majeure in the sense that people in the end will settle for paper and you won’t have the gold protection you think you have. You’ll get your money’s worth, but you’ll have paper. So that to me is the reason why I think somebody’s going to say, wait a minute, I want the gold. [Ed. Note: Force Majeure is a common clause in contracts that essentially frees both parties from liability or obligation when an extraordinary event or circumstance beyond the control of the parties, such as war, strike, riot, crime, act of nature (e.g., flooding, earthquake, volcano), prevents one or both parties from fulfilling their obligations under the contract.]

AL: In that transaction people ask for delivery. Will that trade crush a lot of people? Are there a lot of people who are short this market?

JE: Yes, without question. For the people who are short this market, there will be a force majeure and they will have to settle in paper because they can’t meet the requirements of gold. That is going to be the seminal event that defines this whole situation.

Continue @ link;
http://envast.blogspot.com/2008/10/john ... oment.html

Clip))
JE: At this stage of the game, gold and silver are monetary metals. All the rest of the commodities are industrially driven. I’m not a long-term bear in base metals. I’m a short-term bear based on the fact that I think we’re in considerable demand destruction at the same time that there were some significant positions held by leveraged hedge funds in London and the U.S. that are being unwound. As you know, the hedge fund business, particularly the leveraged ones, are just getting slaughtered.

AL: When will that be over? When will the margin call stop being a major factor in daily trade?

JE: It’s happening so fast that I’d hoped it would be over sooner rather than later. I’m really reluctant to make hard and fast predictions because we’re dealing with a situation that we’ve never seen before. We’ve never had this much leverage in the system and it’s been amped up by derivatives. The authorities have a huge task on their hands trying to recapitalize the banking system and getting this thing moving in the other direction, but time will tell.

[Arthur Rubin]

JE: At this stage of the game, gold and silver are monetary metals.

If anyone is interested in facts, silver is primarily industrial, at this point. Only gold, and to a lesser extent Platinum, are monetary.

[co-shoot]

Just in case your looking to buy some real WEIMAR GOLD .... a list of hotels in case your looking ...LOL.

From € 70 Grand Hotel Russischer Hof
Goetheplatz 2, Weimar Show map

This magnificent 5-star hotel enjoys a central location on the Goetheplatz, in the heart of the World Heritage city of Weimar. More…

From € 48 Park Inn Weimar
Kastanienallee 1, Weimar - Legefeld Show map

This easily accessible hotel lies just 1 kilometre from the A4 motorway, to the south of Weimar. More…

From € 47.50 Acarte Hotel
Marcel-Paul-Str. 48d, Weimar Show map

This brand-new hotel enjoys a convenient location in the north of Weimar, offering easy access to the cultural attractions of Goethe’s home town. More…

From € 57 Amalienhof Hotel und Apartment
Amalienstr. 2, Weimar Show map

This historic 3-star hotel in Weimar’s old quarter is just 100 metres from the Goethehaus and 200 metres from the Theaterplatz square, National Museum, and Goethe and Schiller Memorial. More…

From € 49 Hotel & Apartments Fürstenhof
Rudolf-Breitscheid-Str. 2, Weimar Show map

Centrally located in the town of Weimar, this 3-star, family-run hotel is a short walk away from famous attractions, such as the Goethe Museum, Schiller’s House and Weimar Town Castle. More…

From € 114 Hotel Elephant Weimar
Markt 19, Weimar Show map

This world-famous hotel, an international address of choice for artists, intellectuals and statesmen for more than 300 years, boasts immediate proximity to Weimar’s congress centre and German National... More…

[co-shoot]

Was Weimar’s Hyperinflation Triggered By An Increased Velocity Of Money Or A General Loss Of Confidence?
Posted: Nov 18 2008 By: Jim Sinclair Post Edited: November 18, 2008 at 2:12 am

Filed under: General Editorial

Dear CIGAs,

First it was a currency in Crisis, then the “Mother of All Crises.”

The following is the ratio of marks to the dollar through the Weimar experience:

July 1914 - 4.2 marks to the dollar
January 1919 - 8.9
July 1919 - 14.0
January 1920 - 64.8
July 1920 - 39.5
January 1921 - 64.9
July 1921 - 76.7
January 1922 - 1919.8
July 1922 - 493.2
January 1923 - 17,972
July 1923 - 353,412
August 1923 - 4,620,455
September 1923 - 98,860,000
October 1923 - 25,260,208,000
November 15, 1923 - 4,200,000,000,000 (Yes, trillion)
(Source: Gordon Craig, "Germany 1866-1945")

As you can see from the chart below the velocity of money began an upward trip towards hyperinflation as the currency was trading at 76.7 in June/July of 1921. That indicates a significant decline in confidence but not a wholesale rollover of confidence.



The chart below is a good indicator of business activity as it represents unemployment. It must be noted this record comes from Trade Union so it would be somewhat prejudice to the low side as these workers are the most skilled at that time.



The conclusion I come to is the argument that business must be flat to improving in order for the process of hyperinflation to start is not an axiom. It was not true in the Weimar experience as well as most of the modern experiences generally limited to a country or closely allied trade area.

Excerpts From Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperinflation

1. Since hyperinflation is visible as a monetary effect, models of hyperinflation center on the demand for money. Economists see both a rapid increase in the money supply and an increase in the velocity of money. Either one or both of these encourage inflation and hyperinflation. A dramatic increase in the velocity of money as the cause of hyperinflation is central to the "crisis of confidence" model of hyperinflation, where the risk premium that sellers demand for the paper currency over the nominal value grows rapidly. The second theory is that there is first a radical increase in the amount of circulating medium, which can be called the "monetary model" of hyperinflation. In either model, the second effect then follows from the first — either too little confidence forcing an increase in the money supply, or too much money destroying confidence.

2 “Governments will often try to disguise the true rate of inflation through a variety of techniques. These can include the following:

- Outright lying in official statistics such as money supply, inflation or reserves.
- Suppression of publication of money supply statistics, or inflation indices.
- Price and wage controls.
- Forced savings schemes, designed to suck up excess liquidity. These savings schemes may be described as pensions schemes, emergency funds, war funds, or something similar.
- Adjusting the components of the Consumer price index, to remove those items whose prices are rising the fastest.
None of these actions address the root causes of inflation, and in fact, if discovered, tend to further undermine trust in the currency”

3. In the confidence model, some event, or series of events, such as defeats in battle, or a run on stocks of the specie which back a currency, removes the belief that the authority issuing the money will remain solvent — whether a bank or a government. Because people do not want to hold notes which may become valueless, they want to spend them in preference to holding notes which will lose value. Sellers, realizing that there is a higher risk for the currency, demand a greater and greater premium over the original value. Under this model, the method of ending hyperinflation is to change the backing of the currency — often by issuing a completely new one. War is one commonly cited cause of crisis of confidence, particularly losing in a war, as occurred during Napoleonic Vienna, and capital flight, sometimes because of "contagion" is another. In this view, the increase in the circulating medium is the result of the government attempting to buy time without coming to terms with the root cause of the lack of confidence itself.

4. Since hyperinflation is visible as a monetary effect, models of hyperinflation center on the demand for money. Economists see both a rapid increase in the money supply and an increase in the velocity of money. Either one or both of these encourage inflation and hyperinflation. A dramatic increase in the velocity of money as the cause of hyperinflation is central to the "crisis of confidence" model of hyperinflation, where the risk premium that sellers demand for the paper currency over the nominal value grows rapidly. The second theory is that there is first a radical increase in the amount of circulating medium, which can be called the "monetary model" of hyperinflation. In either model, the second effect then follows from the first — either too little confidence forcing an increase in the money supply, or too much money destroying confidence.

In the confidence model, some event, or series of events, such as defeats in battle, or a run on stocks of the specie which back a currency, removes the belief that the authority issuing the money will remain solvent — whether a bank or a government. Because people do not want to hold notes which may become valueless, they want to spend them in preference to holding notes which will lose value. Sellers, realizing that there is a higher risk for the currency, demand a greater and greater premium over the original value. Under this model, the method of ending hyperinflation is to change the backing of the currency — often by issuing a completely new one. War is one commonly cited cause of crisis of confidence, particularly losing in a war, as occurred during Napoleonic Vienna, and capital flight, sometimes because of "contagion" is another. In this view, the increase in the circulating medium is the result of the government attempting to buy time without coming to terms with the root cause of the lack of confidence itself.

In the monetary model, hyperinflation is a positive feedback cycle of rapid monetary expansion. It has the same cause as all other inflation: money-issuing bodies, central or otherwise, produce currency to pay spiralling costs, often from lax fiscal policy, or the mounting costs of warfare. When businesspeople perceive that the issuer is committed to a policy of rapid currency expansion, they mark up prices to cover the expected decay in the currency’s value. The issuer must then accelerate its expansion to cover these prices, which pushes the currency value down even faster than before. According to this model the issuer cannot "win" and the only solution is to abruptly stop expanding the currency. Unfortunately, the end of expansion can cause a severe financial shock to those using the currency as expectations are suddenly adjusted. This policy, combined with reductions of pensions, wages, and government outlays, formed part of the Washington consensus of the 1990s.

Whatever the cause, hyperinflation involves both the supply and velocity of money. Which comes first is a matter of debate, and there may be no universal story that applies to all cases. But once the hyperinflation is established, the pattern of increasing the money stock, by whichever agencies are allowed to do so, is universal. Because this practice increases the supply of currency without any matching increase in demand for it, the price of the currency, that is the exchange rate, naturally falls relative to other currencies. Inflation becomes hyperinflation when the increase in money supply turns specific areas of pricing power into a general frenzy of spending quickly before money becomes worthless. The purchasing power of the currency drops so rapidly that holding cash for even a day is an unacceptable loss of purchasing power. As a result, no one holds currency, which increases the velocity of money, and worsens the crisis.

That is, rapidly rising prices undermine money’s role as a store of value, so that people try to spend it on real goods or services as quickly as possible. Thus, the monetary model predicts that the velocity of money will rise endogenously as a result of the excessive increase in the money supply. At the point when ordinary purchases are affected by inflation pressures, hyperinflation is out of control, in the sense that ordinary policy mechanisms, such as increasing reserve requirements, raising interest rates or cutting government spending will all be responded to by shifting away from the rapidly dwindling currency and towards other means of exchange.

During a period of hyperinflation, bank runs, loans for 24 hour periods, switching to alternate currencies, the return to use of gold or silver or even barter become common. Many of the people who hoard gold today expect hyperinflation, and are hedging against it by holding specie. There may also be extensive capital flight or flight to a "hard" currency such as the U.S. dollar. This is sometimes met with capital controls, an idea which has swung from standard, to anathema, and back into semi-respectability. All of this constitutes an economy which is operating in an "abnormal" way, which may lead to decreases in real production. If so, that intensifies the hyperinflation, since it means that the amount of goods in "too much money chasing too few goods" formulation is also reduced. This is also part of the vicious circle of hyperinflation.

Once the vicious circle of hyperinflation has been ignited, dramatic policy means are almost always required, simply raising interest rates is insufficient. Bolivia, for example, underwent a period of hyperinflation in 1985, where prices increased 12,000% in the space of less than a year. The government raised the price of gasoline, which it had been selling at a huge loss to quiet popular discontent, and the hyperinflation came to a halt almost immediately, since it was able to bring in hard currency by selling its oil abroad. The crisis of confidence ended, and people returned deposits to banks. The German hyperinflation of the 1920s was ended by producing a currency based on assets loaned against by banks, called the Rentenmark. Hyperinflation often ends when a civil conflict ends with one side winning. Although wage and price controls are sometimes used to control or prevent inflation, no episode of hyperinflation has been ended by the use of price controls alone. However, wage and price controls have sometimes been part of the mix of policies used to halt hyperinflation.

As noted, in countries experiencing hyperinflation, the central bank often prints money in larger and larger denominations as the smaller denomination notes become worthless. This can result in the production of some interesting banknotes, including those denominated in amounts of 1,000,000,000 or more.

* By late 1923, the Weimar Republic of Germany was issuing fifty-million Mark banknotes and postage stamps with a face value of fifty billion Mark. The highest value banknote issued by the Weimar government’s Reichsbank had a face value of 100 trillion Mark (100,000,000,000,000; 100 billion on the long scale).[6] [7]. One of the firms printing these notes submitted an invoice for the work to the Reichsbank for 32,776,899,763,734,490,417.05 (3.28×1019, or 33 quintillion) Marks.[8]

* The largest denomination banknote ever officially issued for circulation was in 1946 by the Hungarian National Bank for the amount of 100 quintillion pengő (100,000,000,000,000,000,000, or 1020; 100 trillion on the long scale). image (There was even a banknote worth 10 times more, i.e. 1021 pengő, printed, but not issued image.) The banknotes however didn’t depict the number, making the 500,000,000,000 Yugoslav dinar banknote the world’s leader when it comes to depicted zeros on banknotes.

* The Z$100 billion agro cheque, issued in Zimbabwe on July 21, 2008, shares the record for depicted zeroes (11) with the 500 billion Yugoslav dinar banknote.

* The Post-WWII hyperinflation of Hungary holds the record for the most extreme monthly inflation rate ever — 41,900,000,000,000,000% (4.19 × 1016%) for July, 1946, amounting to prices doubling every thirteen and one half hours.

One way to avoid the use of large numbers is by declaring a new unit of currency (an example being, instead of 10,000,000,000 Dollars, a bank might set 1 new dollar = 1,000,000,000 old dollars, so the new note would read "10 new dollars".) An example of this would be Turkey’s revaluation of the Lira on January 1, 2005, when the old Turkish lira (TRL) was converted to the New Turkish lira (YTL) at a rate of 1,000,000 old to 1 new Turkish Lira. While this does not lessen the actual value of a currency, it is called redenomination or revaluation and also happens over time in countries with standard inflation levels. During hyperinflation, currency inflation happens so quickly that bills reach large numbers before revaluation.

Some banknotes were stamped to indicate changes of denomination. This is because it would take too long to print new notes. By time the new notes would be printed, they would be obsolete (that is, they would be of too low a denomination to be useful).

Metallic coins were rapid casualties of hyperinflation, as the scrap value of metal enormously exceeded the face value. Massive amounts of coinage were melted down, usually illicitly, and exported for hard currency.

Governments will often try to disguise the true rate of inflation through a variety of techniques. These can include the following:

* Outright lying in official statistics such as money supply, inflation or reserves.
* Suppression of publication of money supply statistics, or inflation indices.
* Price and wage controls.
* Forced savings schemes, designed to suck up excess liquidity. These savings schemes may be described as pensions schemes, emergency funds, war funds, or something similar.
* Adjusting the components of the Consumer price index, to remove those items whose prices are rising the fastest.

None of these actions address the root causes of inflation, and in fact, if discovered, tend to further undermine trust in the currency, causing further increases in inflation. Price controls will generally result in hoarding and extremely high demand for the controlled goods, resulting in shortages and disruptions of the supply chain. Products available to consumers may diminish or disappear as businesses no longer find it sufficiently profitable (or may be operating at a loss) to continue producing and/or distributing such goods, further exacerbating the problem.

To read more on Hyperinflation on Wikipedia click here

To read more on the Weimar Republic on Wikipedia click here

[Arthur Rubin]

(return to reality)

The Wikipedia article on hyperinflation is even more questionable than most Wikipedia articles, as it's been the subject of two distinct edit wars in the past month.

(return to NESARA)

[co-shoot]

Yeah,
The trouble with the world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of doubt.