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ORIGINAL **IRELL & MANELLA LLP** S. Thomas Pollack (47070) Ian Slotin (224544) 1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900 Los Angeles, California 90067-4276 Telephone: (310) 277-1010 (310) 203-7199 Facsimile: DEPUTY Attorneys for Defendant Monte Mellon, M.D. 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 04-CV-2184 LAB (AJB) 12 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND Plaintiff, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 13 DEFENDANT MONTE MELLON'S v. OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY 14 L. DONALD GUESS, et al., INJUNCTION, APPOINTMENT OF A 15 RECEIVER AND REPATRIATION OF Defendants. FOREIGN ASSETS 16 December 3, 2004 Date: 17 Time: 1:30 p.m. Ctrm: Hon. Larry A. Burns 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Case No. 04-CV-2184 LAB (AJB)

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#### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Government's moving papers offer no rationale for Dr. Monte Mellon's inclusion in its request for injunctive relief, other than that Dr. Mellon is a director of Doctors Benefit Insurance Company ("DBIC"). The Government's memorandum of points and authorities sweepingly includes Dr. Mellon in its allegations of wrongdoing: "The France and Marien declarations describe in great detail how defendants Guess, Buck, David Jacquot ("Jacquot"), Monte T. Mellon ("Mellon"), G. Thomas Roberts ("Roberts") and other have engaged in a scheme to cause doctors to place hundreds of millions of dollars into fraudulent tax reduction insurance trust and charitable contribution schemes . . . " Government Memorandum, p. 17. But the declarations of Messrs. Marien and France -- the Government's exclusive evidentiary support for its requested relief, upon which the temporary restraining order was granted, and the preliminary injunction is sought -- do not back up the allegations of the memorandum. Thus, Mr. Marien does not make a single mention of Dr. Mellon in his 14 page declaration. Mr. France omits Dr. Mellon from his scope of inquiry: he states that he has been involved in the investigation of Messrs. Guess, Buck Jacquot and Roberts, and that the investigation has focused on whether Messrs. Guess, Buck, Jacquot and Roberts "operated xelan, Inc. and its affiliated entities as a criminal enterprise." Declaration of Timothy D. France, at ¶ 3. No mention is made of Dr. Mellon. In his 42 page declaration, the only reference to Dr. Mellon is that he is a director of DBIC, and sent a letter to DBIC's policyholders on August 6, 2004 (attached as exhibit 8 to the France declaration).

Based on that single reference, and nothing more, the Government sought and got an order freezing Dr. Mellon's bank account, and an order requiring him to turn over his United States passport. While Dr. Mellon has served as a director of DBIC since being appointed to the board in June, 2004, Dr. Mellon's primary occupation is as an emergency room physician, and he has recently served as Chairman of the Emergency Medicine Department at Scripps Memorial Hospital in La Jolla. The Government has totally failed to make any showing why Dr. Mellon's bank account should be frozen, or why his passport should be seized, and the request for

preliminary injunctive relief as to Dr. Mellon should be denied.<sup>1</sup>

I.

# THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT IS INSUFFICENT TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF AGAINST DR. MELLON

## A. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT IT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON ITS FRAUD OR CONSPIRACY CLAIMS TO MERIT AN INJUNCTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1345

Based on its allegations that Dr. Mellon violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and/or 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government asks the Court to order broad relief: (1) enjoin Mellon from selling, assigning, hypothecating, pledging, withdrawing, transferring, removing, dissipating, or disposing of any or all of his interest in property he allegedly obtained as the result of any alleged fraudulent conduct; (2) appoint a receiver to take control of any property subject to number (1); (3) repatriate all property generated from the allegedly fraudulent activity; and (4) enter a writ of *ne exeat republica* requiring Mellon to turn over his passport and enjoining him from leaving the country. Compl. ¶¶ 46-50. To secure injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1345, the Government must first show that it is likely to succeed on the merits. Thus, the Government must show that it is likely to prove: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of the mails in order to further the fraudulent scheme and (3) specific intent to defraud. *United States v. Munoz*, 233 F.3d 1117, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracy to defraud the United States, the Government must prove (1) an agreement with one or more persons; (2) to obstruct a lawful function of the Government; (3) by deceitful and dishonest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In addition to the arguments advanced in this brief, Dr. Mellon adopts and incorporates by reference herein the memorandum of law, declarations and exhibits filed by defendants DBIC and Doctors Benefit Insurance Holdings Ltd. in opposition to the Government's preliminary injunction motion ("DBIC's Brief").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the Government must show that the defendant (1) engaged in a scheme to defraud; (2) used wire transmission in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) had the specific intent to deceive or defraud. *United States v. Shipsey*, 363 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2004).

means; and (4) an overt act committed by one of the co-conspirators in furtherance of the agreement's objective. *United States v. Caldwell*, 989 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1993).

The Government fails to offer any evidence to support the elements of these offenses. All of Mr. France's references to Dr. Mellon relate to an August 6, 2004 letter sent by Dr. Mellon to policyholders of DBIC. That letter, which is exhibit 8 to the France declaration, on its face is in response to a letter sent to policyholders by an attorney who formerly represented some of the doctors under audit. The letter was drafted by John Patton, DBIC's third party administrator and an attorney, and reviewed by Steve Gaines, DBIC's United States counsel, before being mailed out over Dr. Mellon's signature. See Patton Decl. ¶ 33., filed in support of DBIC's brief. The purpose of the letter was to respond to misrepresentations made by Mr. Suverkrubbe in an earlier letter to the doctors, and to give the doctors a status report on matters affecting DBIC. Id. The letter addressed some of the misrepresentations made by that lawyer; discussed the bankruptcy of certain xelan entities; discussed DBIC's solvency and intent to continue in business; and discussed the state of the ongoing IRS audits. With respect to the latter, doctors who were being audited were informed that DBIC had agreed to pay the legal fees of a Washington D.C. attorney, Michael Durney, who had formerly been the assistant attorney general for the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. The letter went on to say that any policyholder under audit could, if he or she wanted, avail themselves of Mr. Durney's services at no cost. The letter also attempted to address certain questions that had been raised in light of the xelan bankruptcies and the IRS audits.

That is the extent of the "evidence" proffered as to Dr. Mellon.

Based on this letter, Mr. France draws certain conclusions. Thus, he states his opinion, unsupported by any facts or expertise, that by agreeing to pay only for the fees of a single attorney, the letter "provides yet another example of xelan improperly using the doctors' funds to control the individual doctor audits, in order to control the flow of information to the IRS . . . . " France declaration, ¶ 79. In fact, as discussed at length in the DBIC brief, DBIC was entitled to retain a single lawyer to represent doctors under audit who wished to use counsel provided by DBIC. A corporation is entitled to exercise its business judgment in assessing how to allocate funds to cover business expenses. See, e.g., Lee v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern

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California, 50 Cal. App. 4th 694, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming dismissal of policyholders' 10 11 12 13 14

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suit to require disposal of surplus funds in a particular way and stating that "[w]e can hardly disagree with the proposition that decisions as to strategies for managing the surplus funds of an insurer are quintessential exercises of business judgment."). That latitude extends to a corporation's decision about whether paying a third party's attorneys' fees is in the best interest of the corporation. See Beehan v. Lido Isle Community Assn., 70 Cal. App.3d 858, 865-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to overturn homeowners' association's decision not to pay attorney fees incurred by member in enforcing CC & R's, because decision was protected by the business judgment rule). DBIC's business decision to pay the attorney fees of clients who are being audited by the IRS is also proper and does not constitute fraud. Additionally, the DBIC Board's decision to pay legal fees only for a single attorney was not improper. The central issue in all of the audits was the same -- whether DBIC's disability insurance is insurance for tax deductibility purposes -and appointing one law firm to handle these essentially duplicative cases was an efficient way to allocate the funds earmarked for that purpose.

Mr. France claims that Dr. Mellon's representation in the letter that DBIC is "independent" and owned by doctors is false. France Decl. ¶ 82 n. 51. As discussed in DBIC's brief, and the declaration of Steve Gaines filed therewith, Dr. Mellon's representation was correct. DBIC is wholly owned by a Barbados holding company, which in turn is owned by thirteen doctors. See DBIC's Brief, p.4.

Mr. France also maintains that the funds allocated to pay the doctors' attorneys' fees are "the doctors' funds." As the DBIC memorandum explains, the actuarial calculations confirm that DBIC has redundant reserves - funds in excess of those necessary to pay all of its present and future obligations - and that the funds allocated for the doctors' attorneys' fees are therefore not "the doctors' funds" at all. See DBIC Brief at 14-16.3

For this same reason, it was not fraudulent for Dr. Mellon to "reasssur[e] doctors that their investments in DBIC are safe, and that the funds the doctors have saved with Xélan are still available to pay their insurance claims." France Decl. ¶ 88. DBIC's ample reserves confirm that the doctors' funds are safe.

Based on nothing more than these interpretations of the letter, and the fact that Dr. Mellon is a director of DBIC, the Government states extraordinary relief should be granted.

In fact, the letter does not establish any of the elements of mail fraud, wire fraud, or conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect to Dr. Mellon, and the Government has wholly failed to show that it is likely to succeed on these claims. On its face, the letter does not show that Dr. Mellon engaged in a scheme or artifice to defraud, had the specific intent to deceive, or had an agreement with some other person to obstruct a lawful function of the Government by deceitful means. Additionally, none of Mr. France's references to that letter illuminate any fraud or fraudulent intent.

Mr. France's interpretations of the letter are the sum-total of the Government's case against Dr. Mellon. This does not come remotely close to establishing any involvement by him in a scheme or conspiracy to defraud. In *The Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos*, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit provided an example of the type and quantity of evidence necessary to find a likelihood of success in this context. In that case, the Republic alleged that Ferdinand Marcos and his wife engaged in mail fraud, wire fraud, and related activities. On the Republic's motion for a preliminary injunction to freeze the defendants' assets, the district court examined voluminous evidence that the Marcoses had transported considerable sums of money from the Philippines to Hawaii and that they had set up and were using substantial bank accounts in California under assumed names. *Id.* at 1362-63. The Republic also offered evidence showing that the Marcoses had moved large amounts of money to a Swiss bank and an American foundation they set up for the benefit of their children. *Id.* at 1363. On this extensive evidentiary record, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Republic was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. *Id.* ("The Republic has put forward enough to show a fair chance of succeeding with its proof.").

By contrast, the Government has offered no evidence, only allegations and interpretations, that Dr. Mellon himself has engaged in any of the activities alleged in the complaint. Far from showing that Dr. Mellon has transferred money beyond the reach of the Government, the pleadings and supporting documents in this case suggest only that Dr. Mellon, in his capacity as a

director of DBIC, sent a single letter, prepared and reviewed by counsel, to policyholders about DBIC's current condition and circumstances. The Government has made no showing that Dr. Mellon has control over the assets of DBIC, has moved the assets of DBIC, has engaged in any scheme to defraud, or had agreements with anyone to obstruct the lawful function of the Government. The Government has completely failed to show that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its fraud case against Dr. Mellon.

## B. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 7402

The Government also cannot show that an injunction, a receiver, repatriation of assets or writ of *ne exeat republica* is "necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws" under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). The Government's memorandum alleges that the "defendants" can move DBIC funds "out of the reach of the doctors and the United States." Gov't Brief at 22. There is no allegation, however, that Dr. Mellon has ever moved DBIC funds, or even that he has the ability to do so. While Dr. Mellon's personal bank account was frozen by the court's order, the Government has presented no evidence that any funds of DBIC were wrongfully diverted to that account. While Dr. Mellon may have received fees from DBIC on account of serving as a director and helping to operate the company, the Government has made no showing that any such fees were wrongfully paid, and therefore should be frozen. The Government has also failed to show how freezing Dr. Mellon's bank account is "necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws." Thus, the Government is not entitled to any of the requested relief under 26 U.S.C. § 7402.

### C. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS STRONGLY FAVORS DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The balance of hardships in this case plainly favors Dr. Mellon, who stands to lose his constitutional right to travel as well as control over his personal bank accounts if the requested relief is granted. The Government has made no showing that Dr. Mellon intends to leave the country, or that it is at risk if Dr. Mellon does leave the country, nor has it shown that any DBIC monies paid to him for his service to DBIC is the product of fraudulent conduct, or that it would

be harmed if those monies were not frozen. See DBIC's Brief, § VI.

## D. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW GROUNDS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF NE EXEAT REPUBLICA AS TO DR. MELLON

The Government's request for an order requiring Dr. Mellon to relinquish his passport and preventing him from traveling outside the United States is entirely unsupported by the evidence submitted by the Government. "[F]reedom of travel is a constitutional liberty," the right to which cannot easily be taken away. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964). Where a writ of ne exeat republica is sought, the burden of proof is even higher than it would be for ordinary injunctive relief. See United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1971) ("A party seeking to support the issuance of an extraordinary writ [of ne exeat republica] has the burden of showing exceptional circumstances warranting the relief requested."). Noting that a writ of ne exeat republica is "an extraordinary writ which should issue only in exceptional cases," the Shaheen court vacated such a writ even where the defendant had shipped all of his personal possessions out of the country and had flown to Europe with his family. Id. at 12. Indeed, where such writs are issued, they are typically based on extensive and unequivocal evidence that the defendant has or intends to flee the country immediately. See, e.g., United States v. Clough, No. C-73-2105-SW, 1977 WL 1196, at \*3-4 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 1977) (granting writ where "[t]he need for the writ of ne ex republica is demonstrated by this defendant's untimely flight from this jurisdiction to a foreign country to avoid this court's orders"); United States v. Lipper, No. C-81-1222-RPA, 1981 WL 1762, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1981) (granting writ where defendant twice "stated to federal officials that he intended to leave the country, and admitted that he was liquidating all his personal assets so he could 'live in France in style'").

The Government has made no such showing with respect to Dr. Mellon. Accordingly, there is no basis for the extreme relief of a writ restricting Dr. Mellon's right to travel. *See Lipper*, 1981 WL 1762, at \*6 ("[b]ecause of the exigent circumstances which must be shown, Writs of Ne Exeat Republica are rarely utilized by the courts.").

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1 II.
2 <u>CONCLUSION</u>
3 For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Mellon respectfully to

For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Mellon respectfully requests that the Court deny the Government's motion for a preliminary injunction, for appointment of a receiver, repatriation of assets and for a writ of ne exeat republica.

Dated: November 19, 2004

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