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Quatloosian HYIP Programs > In
re Schmidt
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Rel. No. 8061 / January 24, 2002
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Rel. No. 45330 / January 24, 2002
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9402 |
 |
In the Matter of
BRIAN A. SCHMIDT
c/o Erwin Cohn, Esq.
Cohn & Cohn
77 West Washington Street, Suite 1422
Chicago, IL 60602
JOHN ARISTOTLE DILWORTH, II
630 East 144th Place
Dalton, IL 60419
and
EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITIES, INC.
P.O. Box 294458
Boca Raton, FL 33429
Opinion of the Commission
BROKER-DEALER AND CEASE-AND-DESIST PROCEEDINGS
Fraud in the Offer and Sale of Securities
Failure to Supervise
Respondents engaged in a fraudulent scheme that purported to lease United
States Treasury Bills. Broker-dealer failed to supervise associated person
to prevent his violations. Held, it is in the public interest to order both
individual respondents to cease and desist from committing or causing any
violations or future violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933; to bar respondent who was formerly associated with a broker-dealer
from association with any broker or dealer; to order associated person to
pay a civil money penalty; to order remaining respondent to pay disgorgement,
plus prejudgment interest; and to revoke registration of broker-dealer.
Appearances:
Erwin Cohn, of Cohn & Cohn, for Brian A. Schmidt.
John Aristotle Dilworth, II, pro se.
Mitchell E. Herr, for the Division of Enforcement.
Appeal filed: March 27, 2000
Last brief received: July 10, 2000
I.
Brian A. Schmidt, formerly associated with Euro-Atlantic Securities,
Inc. ("Euro-Atlantic"), which was formerly a registered broker-dealer,
and John Aristotle Dilworth, II, who allegedly participated with Schmidt in
violative conduct, appeal from the decision of an administrative law judge.1
The law judge found that Schmidt and Dilworth had willfully violated Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 19332 in connection with a scheme that purported
to lease United States Treasury Bills ("T-Bills").
The law judge ordered both Schmidt and Dilworth to cease and
desist from committing or causing any violation of Securities Act Section 17(a).
The law judge barred Schmidt from association with any broker or dealer and
ordered Schmidt to pay a civil money penalty of $100,000. He further ordered
Dilworth to pay disgorgement in the amount of $300,000, plus prejudgment interest
from August 28, 1995. We base our findings on an independent review of the
record, except with respect to those findings not challenged on appeal.
II.
These proceedings involve a new variation on a classic scheme
to offer non-existent securities. Schmidt and Dilworth, together with Darlan
Gordon and William Avent, engaged in a scheme that purported to lease T-Bills.
One of the targets of their efforts was Palmer Stoutt.
Brian Schmidt. Schmidt was hired by Euro-Atlantic in its
Chicago office in January 1994, and for a time served as temporary branch manager.
At the time of the hearing before the law judge, Schmidt was employed as an
insurance salesman. Throughout the proceeding, Schmidt's testimony contradicted
Stoutt's.
John Dilworth. Dilworth and Schmidt met through William
Avent. Dilworth testified that, in 1995, he was engaged in a venture to develop
mortgage pools for low-income families.
William Avent. In 1995, Avent owned a one-third interest
in Northern Industries, Inc., a Bahamian corporation that, according to Avent,
constructs runways and airstrips. However, Avent earned most of his income
from a part-time job in a clothing store.
Avent and Schmidt met in January 1995, when Avent approached
Schmidt with letters of credit purportedly issued by the Republic of Georgia
and certificates of deposit purportedly issued by Mexican banks. Together,
Schmidt, Gordon, and Avent attempted to authenticate these instruments and
deposit them in a margin account at a broker. They were unsuccessful.
Darlan Gordon. Gordon met Schmidt when they both worked
in Euro-Atlantic's Chicago office from January 1994 to May 1995. In May 1995,
Euro-Atlantic fired Gordon because of poor production and customer complaints.
That month he joined the Chicago office of La Jolla Capital Corporation ("La
Jolla"), a registered broker-dealer, where he was employed until the end
of July 1995.
Palmer Stoutt. Palmer Stoutt is a businessman who resides
in the British Virgin Islands. In 1995 he was president of Rancal International,
Inc., and its subsidiary, Rancal Puerto Rico, Inc. (collectively "Rancal").
Rancal was a car rental and information technology company doing business in
the British Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Before his contacts with the respondents,
Stoutt had maintained two inactive brokerage accounts and had purchased only
mutual funds. Stoutt is a graduate of the London School of Economics, where
he received a masters degree in Finance and Information Systems.
The Purported Transaction
In 1995 Stoutt sought to secure a $1.5 million loan from Banco
Popular in Puerto Rico. According to Stoutt, the bank wanted him to post $2
million in collateral, preferably in T-Bills, for the loan. Since Stoutt did
not have sufficient collateral, he began to explore ways to obtain it.
On July 14, 1995, Stoutt saw an advertisement promising "unlimited
and immediate financing." From the advertisement, he contacted Heddy Hetherington,
who operated Cal-West International in Sacramento, California, a company that
brokered commercial loans.3 Hetherington directed Stoutt to Schmidt, who Hetherington
said was knowledgeable about T-Bill "leasing" and could help Stoutt
secure collateral.
Schmidt and Stoutt spoke for the first time on a July 20, 1995
conference call with Hetherington.4 Schmidt told Stoutt that he was a licensed
broker and could obtain a lease for T-Bills.5 Schmidt claimed that T-Bill leases
were available only in $10 million increments, requiring monthly lease payments
of $300,000. Stoutt told Schmidt that he could not afford such payments and
needed only $2 million in collateral. Schmidt offered to obtain $2 million
in T-Bills to collateralize the bank loan if Stoutt agreed to pay the first
month's lease payment of $300,000 on a lease of $10 million. Schmidt claimed
that the remaining $8 million in T-Bills covered by the lease could be deposited
in a margined trading program that would generate enough revenue to cover the
lease payments for the entire $10 million in T-Bills and additional profits
for Stoutt.
Stoutt sent Schmidt a letter of intent, as instructed by Schmidt,
and a packet of materials about Stoutt and Rancal. Stoutt included a cover
letter that, on Schmidt's instructions, stated that Stoutt would receive T-Bills
that were "PD1832s."6
Schmidt initially told Stoutt that he attempted to lease T-Bills
for him from one source, but was unsuccessful. Schmidt then told Stoutt that
he knew someone, Dilworth, who, according to Schmidt, had the legal right to
assign $10 million in T-Bills. In a conference call among Schmidt, Stoutt,
and Dilworth, Dilworth represented that he was an agent of Equity Enhancement
and Guarantee ("EEG"), which, Dilworth stated, was a private bank
headquartered in London. Dilworth claimed that EEG had over $10 billion in
assets in a trust in Ireland, and that he had the legal right to assign to
Stoutt $10 million from EEG's trust. After their telephone conversation, Dilworth
forwarded a "contract for assignment" to Schmidt, who faxed it to
Stoutt. The contract directed Stoutt to wire $300,000 into the account of "Northern
Industries," and stated that the leased T-bills would be on deposit "in
an account established for [Dilworth] to be margined and traded by La Jolla."7
Schmidt and Dilworth also represented to Stoutt that La Jolla
would confirm that the balance of $8 million of leased T-Bills would be deposited
in a margin account and used in a trading program.8 On August 8, 1995, Schmidt
faxed to Stoutt a letter from Gordon. Gordon stated that he was "personally
knowledgeable of the circumstances" surrounding "Dilworth's relationship
with the trust." Gordon represented that Dilworth had submitted paperwork
to La Jolla, and that "[a]fter careful review, my company," La Jolla,
had agreed to margin the T-Bills and "trade the cash value of the margin.
The weekly interest on this program will be 3% to 5% net."
Stoutt complained to Schmidt that none of the documents provided
that Stoutt would not be responsible for the monthly lease payments after the
initial payment of $300,000. On August 9, 1995, Schmidt faxed Stoutt a second
letter from Gordon, entitled "Pre-Trading Client Advisement." It
was nearly identical to Gordon's August 8 letter with the following additional
paragraph:
Upon Mr. Dilworth's written [acknowledgment] to La Jolla, your assigned
Ten Million U.S.D. US Treasury Bills will immediately be margined and traded.
You will not be liable to return the Deed of Assignments to the trust. You
will be given transaction reports of every trade. [Y]ield weekly for the one
year term will be at least 3%. [You] will not have any liability to the trust
for La Jolla's administration of the program. Upon opening your account, I
anticipate engaging your business.
Although both the August 8 and August 9 letters appeared to be
on La Jolla letterhead, at the hearing a comparison with authentic La Jolla
letterhead demonstrated that the stationery used for these letters was not
genuine.9
Stoutt remained unconvinced that the T-Bills in question actually
existed. Stoutt told all the parties, including Schmidt and Dilworth, that
he needed proof that EEG held the T-Bills before he would complete the transaction.
Schmidt organized another telephone conference call with Stoutt
and Avent. Schmidt described Avent as a "trader directly connected with
the trust that has the T-Bills." Avent stated that the trust had been
in existence for over 50 years and had substantial assets, including the T-Bills,
but that, because of confidentiality concerns, the trust would not provide
any of the information that Stoutt was seeking unless the trust had evidence
in the form of liquid funds that Stoutt was serious about completing the transaction.10
Schmidt suggested that Stoutt wire $300,000 into a Euro-Atlantic account to
demonstrate that he had the requisite funds. Schmidt assured Stoutt that the
money would be held in "safekeeping." Upon deposit, the trust would
release a letter to Stoutt verifying the T-Bills' existence and, upon receipt
of this "proof of assets" letter, Schmidt would release the money
to Dilworth and Avent. Schmidt further agreed to provide a letter confirming
that the money would be held in safekeeping.
After this conversation, Schmidt faxed several letters to Stoutt
on August 28, 1995. One of the letters contained wire instructions, which differed
from those contained in the original contract and did not identify an account
name. Schmidt explained the new wire instructions to Stoutt, claiming that
Euro-Atlantic had recently changed clearing firms. Schmidt also wrote that
Stoutt's "funds will be held in safekeeping and not released to the trust
until you have received the letter [verifying the assets] as you requested."11
On August 28, Stoutt sent a notarized and executed contract to
Dilworth. The contract provided that Stoutt would control the T-Bills for the
remainder of the life of the instruments and could use them in any way that
he wanted. The accompanying "deed of assignment" specified that the
maturity date of the T-Bills delivered would be December 12, 1995. The contract
provided that, when these T-Bills matured, they would be replaced with a like
amount to complete the terms of the contract. The contract itself was renewable
for another year at Stoutt's option.
Stoutt wired $300,000 to the account designated by Schmidt. Stoutt
did not know that he had wired his money to Northern Industries' account, which
was controlled by Avent. On August 30, 1995, without Stoutt's knowledge, Avent
wired $44,900 from the Northern Industries account to the account of N&J
Industries, which was controlled by a friend of Avent's. This money was then
withdrawn and divided between Avent and Dilworth. Again without Stoutt's knowledge,
on August 31, 1995, Avent wired $250,000 from Northern Industries to "Thomas
Ross."
On August 29, 1995, Stoutt executed and faxed to Schmidt a document
titled "Irrevocable Master Pay Order" ("MPO"). The MPO
consisted of two separate pay orders: one order provided for a commission of
1.5 percent on every trade, to be split equally among Schmidt, Hetherington,
and William Dedman.12 The other authorized a $25,000 commission payable to
Schmidt and Hetherington for arranging the $10 million T-Bill lease.13
By September 6, 1995, Stoutt was concerned that he did not have
his $300,000, any T-Bills, an executed proof of assets letter, or a brokerage
account at La Jolla. He called Schmidt. By letter, Schmidt confirmed that Stoutt's
funds had been received on August 30, and that the funds were wired out on
August 31 per the instructions of Avent and Dilworth, "the holders of
the account."14 Avent and Dilworth also sent Stoutt a letter, stating
that they had received Stoutt's funds from Euro-Atlantic, that Dilworth would
be traveling to Texas to complete the finalization of the lease, and that the
transaction would be completed by September 8, 1995.
These letters provided the first notice to Stoutt that his funds
were not in fact in safekeeping. Stoutt complained to Schmidt and, on September
7, wrote requesting an explanation. In response, Schmidt, Dilworth, and Avent
made a series of misrepresentations to Stoutt that the transaction would be
completed or that his money would be returned. On several occasions Stoutt
spoke or exchanged faxes with Dilworth, Avent, and Schmidt, but never received
a satisfactory answer to his concerns.
Stoutt continued to negotiate with Schmidt, Avent, and Dilworth
to obtain the collateral that he needed. On September 26, Stoutt demanded his
money back. Both Schmidt and Dilworth continued their attempts to delay and
deceive Stoutt, telling him that they were in the process of opening an account
for him at another broker-dealer. Stoutt then hired an attorney to help him
retrieve his $300,000. The attorney made several attempts to obtain Stoutt's
money from Schmidt, Dilworth, and Avent. Each time they promised to pay the
money back by a date certain and then failed to do so. Stoutt never received
repayment of his $300,000.
Schmidt and Dilworth made misrepresentations to Schmidt's employer,
Euro-Atlantic, about the scheme. Schmidt's branch manager, John Madden, noticed
that Stoutt's funds had been wired into Euro-Atlantic and quickly thereafter
he saw instructions to wire them out again. Madden asked for a letter from
Dilworth and Avent explaining the transaction. On September 6, 1995, Dilworth
and Avent wrote to Madden, stating that Stoutt's $300,000 deposit represented "proceeds
from a transaction performed at La Jolla Capital (clearing through Paine Webber)" between
Rancal and Northern Industries. This letter was false because there was neither
a La Jolla account for Stoutt nor a transaction at La Jolla. Schmidt provided
the letter to Madden. Schmidt admitted that he read the letter and knew it
was false, but did nothing to correct it.
In October, Avent and Dilworth wrote to Euro-Atlantic's compliance
officer, James Sinclair. In this letter, they claimed that Northern Industries
had acted as "escrow agent for the two parties" in what the letter
termed the "contract" between Dilworth and Stoutt. They represented
that the conditions of the escrow had been satisfied, and that Schmidt had
no role in "any solicitation or promoting to Rancal." The letter
further claimed that Dedman, the attorney in California, had introduced Stoutt
to them. This letter too was false.
There is no evidence that either Schmidt or Dilworth had any
basis for their representations to Stoutt. Dilworth claims that he conducted
due diligence by researching the issue of T-Bill leasing for five hours. He
testified that he asked an unidentified woman in the office of a broker-dealer
to conduct an inquiry, which Dilworth described as a "soft probe" of
the specific CUSIP numbers on the deed of assignment. According to Dilworth,
the broker-dealer representative had to conduct the "soft probe" through
her firm's London office, because the firm's "American operation" did
not know much about T-Bill leasing. Dilworth also stated that he received a
legal opinion from Lesley Valdez, whom he described as La Jolla's "legal
counsel." However, Valdez was in fact a paralegal at La Jolla who did
not even work in the legal department.
Schmidt previously attempted to lease T-Bills to several other
parties using some of the same tactics employed with Stoutt. In 1995 Schmidt
offered to lease T-Bills to persons introduced to him by Hetherington. He represented
that the T-Bills would be placed in a trading program and would generate three
to five percent interest a week. Later in 1995, he again attempted with Avent
to solicit prospective investors to lease T-Bills. At that time, Schmidt represented
that Avent had $25.5 million in four accounts at Euro-Atlantic when Schmidt
knew that the balance in Avent's four accounts was zero. That same year, Schmidt
again offered to lease T-Bills to a prospective lessee, telling him that the
minimum amount for a T-Bill lease was $5 million, but that the excess T-Bills
could be leveraged and used to generate profits for the lessee. In a fourth
attempt, Schmidt and Gordon attempted to lease T-Bills to an acquaintance of
Gordon's.
III.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 makes it unlawful
in the offer or sale of securities, using the jurisdictional means, to: 1)
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 2) obtain money or property
by any untrue statement of or omission of a material fact necessary to make
the statement not misleading; or 3) engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which is or would be a fraud on the purchaser. T-Bills are
securities.15
As discussed below, neither the T-Bills nor the transaction offered
to Stoutt actually existed. In SEC v. Lauer, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that representations made by a promoter can be
sufficient to invoke the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act.16 In Lauer,
the promoters offered to sell what they termed "prime bank instruments," which
were in reality what the Court described as a "non-existent high yield
security."17 The Court concluded that "[i]t would be a considerable
paradox if the worse the securities fraud, the less applicable the securities
laws," since "[a] central purpose of the securities laws is to protect
investors and would-be investors in the securities markets against misrepresentations."18
Since Schmidt and Dilworth represented to Stoutt that Dilworth controlled T-Bills
and would lease those T-Bills to Stoutt, it is their representations that we
look to in determining whether they engaged in the offer or sale of a security
and whether they violated Section 17(a).
A. Offer or Sale of a Security
Respondents do not dispute that T-Bills are securities. The record
further establishes that Schmidt and Dilworth proposed and purported to engage
in a transaction in T-Bills. Respondents assert, however, that their transaction
did not involve "the offer or sale of a security."
Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines the sale
and offer of a security as:
[e]very contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest
in a security , for value. The term "offer to sell," "offer
for sale," or "offer" shall include every attempt or
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value.19
In order to determine whether novel transactions involving securities
are offers or sales and thus subject to the antifraud provisions, courts examine
the characteristics of the transaction and its relationship to the security.
For purposes of Securities Act Section 17(a), an offer or sale can occur even
if the purchaser does not receive title to the security.20 In Rubin v. United
States, stock was pledged as security for a loan. The Supreme Court held that "obtaining
a loan secured by a pledge of shares of stock unmistakably involves a disposition
of [an] interest in a security, for value.' Although pledges transfer less
than absolute title, the interest thus transferred nonetheless is an interest
in a security.'"21 The Court further observed that "[i]t is not essential
under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the transaction
to be an offer' or a sale,'"22 noting that the value of a pledge is tied
to the value of the underlying securities.23
Forward contracts for GNMA certificates also have been held to
be contracts to purchase or sell securities under the Act. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has held that the antifraud provisions apply to GNMA
forward contracts because these contracts have a "sufficient nexus with
the underlying GNMA certificates."24
Here, the "lease" documents purported to grant Stoutt,
in return for his lease payments, the power to use or dispose of the subject
T-Bills in any manner that he deemed appropriate. Although the transaction
did not purport to give Stoutt absolute title to them, because of the duration
of the agreement and the option to extend that term Stoutt's control of the
initial T-Bills or their replacements would have extended for the instruments'
entire existence.25 Thus, the "lease" effectively transferred the
unfettered right to dispose of the T-Bills. We conclude that this transaction
was an offer of a security.
B. Scheme to Defraud
The transaction Schmidt and Dilworth purported to engage in was
fraudulent. They further made numerous misrepresentations to Stoutt to induce
him to enter into the "lease." The T-Bills they proposed to lease
to Stoutt did not exist. The deed of assignment Schmidt and Dilworth provided
to Stoutt specified the leased T-Bills as "PD1832s." Enforcement's
expert witness testified that a PD1832 is a form used internally by the United
States Department of the Treasury ("Treasury Department") to correct
mistakes in the terms of assignments, ownership, or title of ownership for
government securities. It is used only in connection with registered certificates
and is valid only when the registered certificate to which it pertains is attached
to the form. It cannot be used to create book-entry T-Bills.26 Enforcement's
expert witness testified that he had never seen a legitimate T-Bill leasing
transaction.
Schmidt admits that he failed to investigate the purported transaction.
He also failed to investigate his colleagues in the transaction, Dilworth and
Avent. Schmidt did not have any basis for recommending this transaction to
Stoutt.27
Dilworth and Schmidt each maintain they reasonably believed the
transaction was legal. Schmidt introduced no evidence as to the basis of his
belief. To the contrary, he admits he made no inquiry about the transaction.
Dilworth claims that he investigated the transaction by conducting the so-called "soft
probe" of the T-Bills.28 He also claimed to have received a legal opinion
from an employee of La Jolla's who, in fact, was not an attorney.29 Particularly
given that Dilworth represented that he controlled deeds of assignment for
EEG's T-Bills when in fact he did not, we do not believe his inquiries constituted
any basis for his representations.
Schmidt and Dilworth made various material misrepresentations
about the transaction to Stoutt. Both Schmidt and Dilworth claimed that the
T-Bills existed and that Dilworth controlled the disposition of the T-Bills.
They further represented that the balance of the T-Bills would be deposited
in a trading program at La Jolla. They instructed Gordon to write bogus letters
regarding the La Jolla trading program. When Stoutt expressed concern about
the existence of the T-Bills, respondents and Avent induced him to send them
his $300,000 to demonstrate his "good faith" and intent to do business
with them. They represented, both orally and in writing, that his funds would
be held in "safekeeping," when this was not true. They then immediately
transferred his money out of Avent's account.30
Schmidt claims that his role in this scheme was that of a "gofer."31
This characterization belies his central role in the scheme. Schmidt claimed
to Stoutt that he could arrange T-Bill leases. Schmidt introduced Dilworth
and Avent to Stoutt and made misrepresentations to Stoutt about their duties
and business background. Schmidt participated in telephone calls and transmitted
documents. Schmidt and Dilworth coordinated with Gordon to transmit false letters
to Stoutt on fraudulent La Jolla stationery, with the intent to assuage Stoutt's
concerns about the transaction. Schmidt arranged for the funds transfer, faxing
Stoutt the account number to which the money was wired, and promised, both
orally and in writing, that the funds would be held in "safekeeping." The
funds were transferred almost immediately upon receipt.32
C. Scienter
We must find scienter to conclude that there was a violation
of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.33 Scienter is "a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."34 Reckless
conduct can be sufficient to establish scienter,35 and has been defined as "an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . which presents
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it."36 Scienter
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.37 Schmidt's and Dilworth's misrepresentations
to Stoutt and their actions were at best reckless and resulted in the loss
of Stoutt's funds. They continued to attempt to lull both Stoutt and Euro-Atlantic
after they received Stoutt's money.38
D. Defenses
Schmidt and Dilworth argue that Stoutt is to blame for the loss
of his $300,000 because he is a sophisticated investor who graduated from the
London School of Economics. Despite his advanced degree Stoutt had no experience
trading securities, and testified that, when he described himself as having
worked in "financial services and investment management," he was
referring to work in real estate. Even if respondents' assertions about Stoutt's
level of sophistication were correct, a sophisticated person is entitled to
the protection of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.39
Respondents claim that Stoutt was the wrongdoer in the transaction
and was involved in a scheme to defraud the bank in Puerto Rico, which led
to his arrest. In the fall of 1995 Stoutt was arrested in Puerto Rico in connection
with the $300,000 withdrawal that Stoutt made to transfer funds from his line
of credit at the bank to Euro-Atlantic. The case against him was dismissed.
In any event, Stoutt's problems in Puerto Rico do not excuse respondents' conduct.
Respondents also assert that Stoutt did not rely on their representations
and instead relied on the advice of Dedman, the attorney in California, and
Hetherington. Stoutt's reliance on respondents' misrepresentations is not an
element of an administrative proceeding alleging violations of Section 17(a).40
Respondents also assert that Hetherington, Dedman, and Ross violated the securities
laws and that they should have been the subjects of these proceedings. Whether
they too participated in the scheme to defraud Stoutt has no impact on Schmidt
and Dilworth's liability.41
* * *
Based on the record described above, we conclude that Schmidt
and Dilworth willfully violated Securities Act Section 17(a).
IV.
A. Agencies have substantial discretion in assessing administrative
sanctions.42 Exchange Act Section 15(b)(6) authorizes the Commission to censure,
place limitations on, suspend, or bar a person associated with a broker-dealer,
when such sanction is in the public interest.43 Exchange Act Section 21B authorizes
the Commission to impose a money penalty in any proceeding instituted pursuant
to Exchange Act Section 15(b) when such penalty is in the public interest.44
Exchange Act Section 21C authorizes the Commission to issue a cease-and-desist
order when a person has violated, or had been a cause of the violation of,
the federal securities laws or regulations.45
1. Schmidt participated in a fraudulent scheme that purported
to lease non-existent T-Bills, when T-Bills cannot be leased. He made repeated
misrepresentations about the transaction, his expertise, the abilities of others
involved in the scheme, and the existence of EEG and a trading program and
account at La Jolla. He induced Stoutt to send Euro-Atlantic $300,000 representing
that the funds would be held in safekeeping. In fact Stoutt's funds were placed
in Avent's account, and Schmidt immediately permitted their transfer to third
parties. Schmidt attempted to cover up this scheme, conveying letters to his
employer that he knew contained misrepresentations. He has not taken responsibility
for his actions and appears to lack contrition. The bar from association with
any broker or dealer and the cease and desist order46 are, therefore, warranted.
Schmidt contends that he should not be required to pay a civil
monetary penalty because he lacks the ability to pay. For the first time in
these proceedings he offers sworn financial statements purporting to document
his financial situation.
Schmidt did not raise this issue before the law judge. We have
previously held that, since the respondent carries the burden of demonstrating
inability to pay, financial information supporting that argument must be presented
before the law judge, who may then require the filing of sworn financial statements.47
Respondents who fail to raise this issue before the law judge may be considered
to have waived this issue unless, pursuant to Commission Rule of Practice 452,
we grant the party leave to submit additional evidence.48 Schmidt has not filed
such a motion.
Exchange Act Section 21B enumerates the factors we are to consider
in determining whether a penalty is in the public interest.49 Ability to pay
is but one of these factors.50 We have examined the financial statements submitted
by Schmidt. Even taking them at face value, we nonetheless find that the egregiousness
of Schmidt's conduct far outweighs any consideration of his ability to pay
the civil penalty.
Schmidt's actions were fraudulent and deceitful. He misrepresented
himself not only to Stoutt but also to his employer, Euro-Atlantic. His actions
led to Stoutt losing $300,000, money which has not been recovered. Schmidt
acted with scienter, and continues to deny any responsibility for his misconduct.
Moreover, Schmidt has a history of attempting other T-Bill leasing schemes.
Schmidt's conduct is a classic example of the type of behavior against which
Section 17(a) was intended to protect, and a severe penalty against him is
necessary to deter others from committing such acts in the future. We therefore
impose a $100,000 civil penalty.51
2. The law judge ordered Dilworth to disgorge, jointly and severally
with Avent and Gordon, the entire $300,000 removed from Stoutt's account.52
Like Schmidt, Dilworth also purported to lease non-existent T-Bills, when T-Bills
cannot be leased. He made representations about his relationship with EEG and
about EEG's existence and its financial situation with no basis for such representations.
He helped convince Stoutt to wire his money to Euro-Atlantic, and then profited
from its withdrawal. While Dilworth directly received some of the proceeds
of Stoutt's $300,000, he claims that the balance of the funds cannot be traced
to him because Avent wired the funds out of Avent's account and sent them to
Thomas Ross.
The purpose of disgorgement is to deprive a person of "ill
gotten gains" and to prevent unjust enrichment.53 Courts have held that
when assessing liability for disgorgement of multiple wrongdoers, it is appropriate
to hold all jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the obligation
unless the liability is reasonably apportioned.54 Thus, in Hughes Capital,
the court held that it can be difficult or impossible to apportion liability
among collaborators in a fraudulent scheme because they engage in complex and
heavily disguised transactions, and often "move funds through various
accounts to avoid detection,[and] use several nominees to hold . . . improperly
deprived profits."55 The court reasoned that any risk of uncertainty should
fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created that uncertainty. The court
therefore ordered joint and several disgorgement.56
Dilworth induced Stoutt to wire his funds. Since Dilworth was
a participant in the scheme, Dilworth had the responsibility to show he did
not receive any of this money. Dilworth did not call Ross as a witness, or
provide any evidence regarding Ross's identity or otherwise demonstrate that
Dilworth did not benefit by this wrongdoing. Therefore, the law judge held
Dilworth jointly and severally liable with Avent and Gordon. We concur. We
believe that Dilworth properly is jointly and severally liable for the entire
$300,000. We further find that a cease-and-desist order is warranted because
of Dilworth's role in this fraudulent scheme.
Like Schmidt, Dilworth contends for the first time in these proceedings
that he is unable to pay the ordered disgorgement, and he too offers sworn
financial statements purporting to document his financial situation. Dilworth
did not raise this issue before the law judge, and he has failed to file with
us a motion to submit additional evidence.57
While Dilworth's financial statements, on their face, indicate
that he is impecunious, the egregiousness of his conduct outweighs any consideration
of his ability to pay. Dilworth's actions were fraudulent and deceitful. He
represented to Stoutt that the T-Bills existed and that he controlled their
disposition. He represented that the T-Bills would be deposited in a trading
program, and he instructed Gordon to write false letters intended to induce
Stoutt to wire his money, money which has not been recovered.58
V.
The Commission may impose sanctions on a broker-dealer if the
Commission finds that the broker-dealer engaged in any of the conduct enumerated
in Exchange Act Section 15(b)(4). Among other provisions, Section 15(b)(4)(E)
permits the Commission to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer if the
Commission finds that the broker-dealer failed reasonably to supervise a person
subject to its supervision with a view to preventing that person's violations.
Euro-Atlantic defaulted in this proceeding by failing to appear
or defend at the hearing below. Under Rule of Practice 155(a),59 the Commission
may determine the proceeding against a defaulting party upon consideration
of the record, including the order instituting proceedings, the allegations
of which may be deemed to be true. The Order Instituting Proceedings ("OIP")
alleged that Euro-Atlantic had failed to supervise Schmidt. However, when the
law judge revoked Euro-Atlantic's registration, the law judge failed to make
a finding with respect to whether Euro-Atlantic's conduct provided a basis
for sanction under Exchange Act Section 15(b). As a result, we were unable
to issue a notice of finality with respect to Euro-Atlantic. We find, pursuant
to Rule 155(a), that Euro-Atlantic has admitted the allegations of the OIP
that it failed reasonably to supervise its associated person, Schmidt, with
a view to preventing his violations, and revoke Euro-Atlantic's registration
as a broker-dealer.
An appropriate order will issue.60
By the Commission (Chairman PITT and Commissioners HUNT and UNGER).
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Rel. No. 8061 / January 24, 2002
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Rel. No. 45330 / January 24, 2002
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9402
In the Matter of
BRIAN A. SCHMIDT
c/o Erwin Cohn, Esq.
Cohn & Cohn
77 West Washington Street, Suite 1422
Chicago, IL 60602
JOHN ARISTOTLE DILWORTH, II
630 East 144th Place
Dalton, IL 60419
and
EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITIES, INC.
P.O. Box 294458
Boca Raton, FL 33429
ORDER IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS
On the basis of the Commission's opinion issued this day, it
is
ORDERED that Brian A. Schmidt and John Aristotle Dilworth, II
be, and they hereby are, ordered to cease and desist from committing or causing
any violations or future violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933; and it is further
ORDERED that Brian A. Schmidt be, and hereby is, barred from
association with any broker or dealer; and it is further
ORDERED that Brian A. Schmidt pay to the United States Treasury
a civil money penalty in the amount of $100,000, within 21 days of the issuance
of this Order; and it is further
ORDERED that John Aristotle Dilworth, II pay disgorgement in
the amount of $300,000, plus prejudgement interest from August 28, 1995, through
the last day of the month preceding the month in which payment of disgorgement
is made. Interest shall be paid at the rate established under 26 U.S.C. §6621(a)(2),
compounded quarterly.
Payment of the civil penalty and of disgorgement shall be made
to the United States Treasury within 21 days of the issuance of this order.
The disgorgement shall be: (a) made by United States postal money order, certified
check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order; (b) made payable to the Securities
and Exchange Commission; (c) mailed or delivered by hand to the Comptroller,
6432 General Green Way, Alexandria, VA 22312; and (d) submitted under cover
letter that identifies the particular respondent in these proceedings, as well
as the Commission's case number. A copy of this cover letter and money order
or check shall be sent to J. Cindy Eson, Southeast Regional Office, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 1401 Brickell Avenue, Suite 200, Miami, FL 33131;
and it is further
ORDERED that, within 60 days after funds have been turned over
by John Aristotle Dilworth, II in accordance with this order and any appeals
of the disgorgement order have been waived or completed or appeal is no longer
available, the Division of Enforcement shall submit a proposed plan for the
administration and distribution of disgorgement funds, a provided in Rules
of Practice 610 through 614, 17 C.F.R. §§201.610-614.
ORDERED that the registration of Euro-Atlantic Securities, Inc.
be, and hereby is, revoked.
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
-
In the Matter of Euro-Atlantic Securities, Inc., Initial Decision Rel.
No. 161 (Feb. 25, 2000), 71 SEC Docket 2391. The Order Instituting Proceedings
("OIP") also named John T. Madden, Euro-Atlantic, Darlan E.
Gordon, and William Avent as respondents. Madden settled the charges
against him.
John T. Madden, Securities Act Rel. No. 40891 (Jan. 7, 1999) 68 SEC Docket
2788.
Euro-Atlantic did not appear or defend in the case below, and the law
judge revoked its registration as a broker-dealer.
The law judge found that Gordon and Avent violated Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933. They were held jointly and severally liable (along with Dilworth)
for disgorgement in the amount of $300,000, plus prejudgment interest from
August 28, 1995. They did not petition for review of the initial decision,
which became final as to them on March 23, 2000.
-
15 U.S.C. §77q.
-
At the time of the hearing, Hetherington worked in the admissions office
of a local California college.
-
Stoutt never met any of the people with whom he was doing business.
All interaction was via telephone, facsimile transmission, and mail.
-
The law judge did not credit Schmidt's testimony about his role in
the events at issue.The credibility determination of an initial fact-finder
is entitled
to considerable weight and deference, since it is based on hearing
the witnesses' testimony and observing their demeanor. Keith L. DeSanto,
52
S.E.C. 316,
319 (1995), petition denied, 101 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 1996) (Table).
Such determinations can be overcome "only where the record contains substantial evidence'
for doing so." Anthony Tricarico, 51 S.E.C. 457, 460 (1993).
-
See infra, discussion in text accompanying note 27.
-
This contract went through several revisions to satisfy Stoutt.
During the revision process, Schmidt transmitted the revisions
between Stoutt
and Dilworth.
Schmidt told Stoutt that La Jolla would direct the trading because
Euro-Atlantic did not have the mechanism to lease T-Bills.
-
The law judge found that Dilworth did not offer any credible
evidence to exculpate himself with respect to his role in this
scheme.
-
Gordon's employment with La Jolla had ended in July, 1995.
While Gordon denied creating the letterhead and authoring
and sending
the letters,
and Schmidt testified that he had nothing to do with either
of the letters, Avent testified
that he and Schmidt directed Gordon to prepare both letters,
and that Gordon
wrote both of them.The law judge determined that Gordon has "not offered
any credible evidence to exculpate" himself with respect to
the scheme directed at Stoutt.
-
The law judge determined that Avent has "not offered any credible
evidence to exculpate" himself with respect to the scheme directed
at Stoutt.
-
Although Schmidt denied promising Stoutt that his money
would be held in safekeeping, Schmidt admitted sending
this letter,
which he
wrote as
a "courtesy." He
claimed that, by using the term "safekeeping," he did not
mean that the funds would be in escrow, but rather that Stoutt's
money would be
held
safely in an account at the clearing firm. The law judge specifically
did not credit Schmidt's testimony on this point.
-
Dedman is an attorney in California who was recommended
to Stoutt by Hetherington. Dedman reviewed various
documents related
to the
transaction for Stoutt, and
drafted the MPO. In lieu of fees for service, Dedman
was to be paid a commission.
-
A separate agreement among Schmidt, Dilworth, and
Avent provided that Schmidt would also receive an
additional $5,000 finder's
fee.
-
Avent was the sole owner of the account. Schmidt
claimed that, at the time he wrote this letter, "things had gotten muddy," and
he mentioned Dilworth in error.
-
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1).
Security is defined by Securities Act Section 2(a)(1) as:any note, stock, treasury
stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,. . . investment
contract,. . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
-
52 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
-
Id. at 669.
-
Id. at 670.
-
15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(3) (emphasis added).
-
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1981). See also Harmsen v. Smith,
693 F.2d 932, 947 (9th Cir.
1982) (a
pledge of
stock is an
offer to
purchase or sell even though plaintiff
had less than a complete interest in the pledged shares);
United
States v. Kendrick,
692 F.2d 1262,
1264 (9th Cir.
1982), (pledge of securities used as
collateral for loans subject to the antifraud provisions
because lender acquired
interest
in securities when
it agreed to
accept pledged securities as collateral).
-
Rubin, 449 U.S. at 429-30. In Pinter
v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1988),
which involved
the
sale of
fractional undivided interests
in oil and gas
leases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that a person may offer or sell property
without
necessarily being the person who
transfers title to, or
other interest in, that property,
and that, with respect to Securities
Act Section
17(a), "transactions
other than traditional sales of securities are within the scope of
Section 2(3) and passage of title is not important."
-
Rubin, 449 U.S. at 429-30.
-
Id. at 431.
-
Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec.,
737 F.2d 582, 587 (7th Cir.
1984). A forward
contract
for a GNMA
certificate
is
a cash market
transaction
that requires
the buyer to take delivery
at a specified date in the future or assign its
rights and obligations
under
the
contract
to another party.
-
Richard J. Teweles & Edward S. Bradley, The Stock Market 59 (John Wiley & Sons
7th Ed. 1998) (describing Treasury Bills).
-
This information is available
on the Treasury Department's
web site
at: http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/cc/ccphony2.htm#rent,
updated
November
26,
1999. The information contained
therein was admitted into
evidence by the
law judge.
-
See Quinn and Co. v.
SEC, 452 F.2d 943, 947
(10th Cir.
1971)
(brokers and securities
salesmen
are under
a duty
to investigate);
Donald T.
Sheldon, 51
S.E.C. 59, 71 (1992)
(registered representative
has a duty to have a
reasonable basis for his recommendations),
aff'd,
45 F.3d
1515
(11th Cir. 1995).
-
Dilworth used the
term "soft probe" at the hearing
below, but did not describe what it means.
-
Had the source
of this alleged opinion
been a
La Jolla attorney
Dilworth still
could not
rely on
her
advice because
the attorney
was not Dilworth's
counsel. Harold B.
Hayes,
51 S.E.C. 1294, 1299
n.16 (1994)
(one cannot
rely on
advice of another's
counsel
because
counsel cannot
be relied
upon to give
disinterested advice).
See SEC v. Savoy
Indus., Inc.,
665 F.2d
1310,
1314 n.28
(D.C. Cir.
1981)(setting forth
the criteria required
for
a defense
of reliance
on advice of counsel).
Moreover, advice
of counsel is not
a complete defense
but merely one factor
for
consideration. Markowkski
v.
SEC, 34 F.3d 99,
105 (2d Cir. 1994).
-
Schmidt and Dilworth's
misrepresentations
were material.
Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988);
TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway,
Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) (The test
for materiality
is whether
there
is a substantial
likelihood
that under all
the circumstances, a
reasonable person
would consider
the omitted or
misstated information significant
in
making
an investment decision.).
-
Schmidt also
claims that his
representations
do not
violate the securities
laws because
he did not owe Stoutt
any fiduciary
duty.
Stoutt did not
have to be Schmidt's
client to
make Schmidt's
misrepresentations
a violation
of Section
17(a). See Jay
Houston
Meadows,
52 S.E.C. 778,
783-4 (1996)
(salesman
made fraudulent
statements and
omitted material
facts to friends
in connection
with the offer
and sale
of securities),
aff'd,
119 F.3d
1219 (5th Cir.
1997).
-
We are aware
of the decision
in SEC
v. Zandford,
238 F.3d
559 (4th
Cir.),
cert. granted,
122 S. Ct.
510 (2001),
which
held that
misappropriation
of
client funds
generated by
a securities
transaction
was not a fraud "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of a security. The decision in Zandford conflicts
with other cases holding that the "in connection with" standard
is satisfied when the deceptive practice touches the sale of securities.
See,
e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 10 (1971). See also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655
(1997) (misappropriation
of insider information was in connection with subsequent trades);
Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding churning is a deceptive
device).In any event, this case is distinguishable from Zandford.
In this case the fraud
involved proposing a securities transaction that was entirely fictitious.
Zandford, in contrast, involved misappropriation of the proceeds
of a securities transaction.
-
Aaron v.
SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 697
(1980).
The Court
in Aaron
also held
that scienter
is not
required
for violations
of Securities
Act
Sections
17(a)(2)
and 17(a)(3).
-
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
-
SEC v.
Steadman,
967 F.2d
636,
641-42
(D.C. Cir. 1992);
Hollinger
v. Titan
Capital
Corp., 914 F.2d
1564,
1568-69 & n.6 (9th Cir.
1990); David Disner, 52 S.E.C. 1217, 1222 (1997).
-
Hollinger,
914
F.2d at 1569-70
(citations
omitted).
-
Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983);
Pagel, Inc. v. SEC, 803 F.2d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 1986); Meyer Blinder,
50 S.E.C.
1215, 1229-30 (1992).
-
Schmidt,
moreover, as
discussed above,
acted as
a principal
in other
attempts to
lease T-Bills
to several
other parties
using some
of the
same tactics
employed with
Stoutt. This
repeated pattern
is further
evidence of
Schmidt's scienter
and his
central role
in the
scheme at
issue here.
See Jonathan
Feins, Securities
Exchange Act
Rel. No.
41943, (Sept.
29, 1999)
70 SEC
Docket 2116
(respondent not
charged with
some fraudulent
trades, but
similarity of
pattern provides
further circumstantial
support for
the fraud
findings as
to the
other trades).
-
See Adena
Exploration Inc.
v. Sylvan,
860 F.2d
1242, 1251
(5th Cir.
1988) (citing
Nor-Tex Agencies
Inc. v.
Jones, 482
F.2d 1093
(5th Cir.
1973)); Stier
v. Smith,
473 F.2d
1205, 1207
(5th Cir.
1973) (sophisticated
investors, like
all others,
are entitled
to the
truth); Jay
Houston Meadows,
52 S.E.C.
at 785
(rejecting arguments
that the
antifraud provisions
do not
apply to
customers who
are experienced
or sophisticated).
-
SEC v.
Blavin, 760
F.2d 706,
711 (6th
Cir. 1985);
Hanly v.
SEC, 415
F.2d 589,
595-96 (2d
Cir. 1969).
-
See Richard
J. Puccio,
52 S.E.C.
1041, 1046
(1996) (holding
that the
fact that
proceedings have
not been
brought against
other [wrongdoers]
is irrelevant.
To the
extent that
respondents claim
selective prosecution,
a respondent
must demonstrate
not only
that he
was unfairly
singled out,
but that
his prosecution
was motivated
by improper
considerations such
as race,
religion, or
the desire
to prevent
the exercise
of a
constitutionally protected
right).
-
Butz v.
Glover Livestock,
411 U.S.
182, 187
(1973); Valicenti
v. SEC,
198 F.3d
62, 66
(2d Cir.
1999), cert.
denied, 530
U.S. 1260
(2000).
-
15 U.S.C. §78o(b)(6).
-
15 U.S.C. §78u-2. Section 21B provides that, in determining
the public interest, we may consider whether the violation involved
fraud, deceit,
manipulation,
or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement;
the harm to others resulting from the violation; the extent of the
violator's unjust
enrichment;
the violator's disciplinary history, and the need for deterrence.
Id.
-
15 U.S.C. §78 u-3. Section 21C (e) provides that, in any
cease-and-desist proceeding, the Commission may enter an order requiring
disgorgement. Id.
-
15 U.S.C. §77h-1(a)
-
Terry T.
Steen, Exchange
Act Rel.
No. 40055
(June 2,
1998) 67
SEC Docket
837, 847.
-
Id.; 17
C.F.R. §201.452.
-
The factors
we may
consider
in
determining
whether
a penalty
is in
the public
interest
are:
(1)
whether
the
act involved
fraud, deceit,
manipulation,
or
deliberate
and
reckless
disregard
of a
regulatory
requirement;
(2)
the
harm
to other
persons
resulting
from the
conduct;
(3)
the
extent
to
which
any
person
was
unjustly
enriched;
(4)
whether
the
person
previously
has
been
found
by
the
Commission
or
other
regulatory
agency
to
have
violated
the