Moderator: Burnaby49
In brief, no.LordEd wrote:I was trying to reason out whether by declaring themselves peace officers in a courthouse if they were creating a risk by being untrained or "not that kind of peace officer".
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Can you think of any parallel that would apply to claiming to be a peace officer in a courthouse? (No is a perfectly acceptable answer).
Officerships of any kind are commissioned by a recognized authority, not bought.alexticule wrote:Yes I have paid for the Peace Officer thing and I think the document I have been given is not perfect, but that doesn't mean that I don't have the right to claim myself to be a Peace Officer.
Oh ho! Now I get it. The government is a corporation, and you aren’t going to enforce corporate policies, because government/corporate policies are coercion, deception and fraud. You’re just going to enforce a homemade version of peace policies that seems good to you, derived I’m sure from whatever you believe existed “back in the days.”I wasn't trying to pass myself as a Government Peace Officer. I was offering peace not coercion, deception and fraud. I claimed myself a Peace Officer at court because I believe that I was. Peace Officers back in days were there to keep the peace and not enforce corporate policies. I had no intention in enforcing corporate policies.
Worth asking anyway.Hilfskreuzer Möwe wrote:In brief, no.
LordEd wrote:Suffices to say that society generally wants their doctors to actually be doctors, and their peace officers to be peace officers.
Curious how that works!!!!!
Should we wait for somebody to be HIV diagnosed before shutting him down?
I'd be more worried about them not maintaining proper sterile procedures, and not reusing instruments that haven't been sterilized, or needles that they used previously. There have been two too many of those recently.
I will comment on parts of your post, then bold-out the questions for you for easy-finding.alexticule wrote: Please make me a list of questions and I will answer it to the best of my knowledge.
My family's safety is harmed when an uninsured operates on the road. One slip on some ice and that driver may take me out when I'm walking on the sidewalk.alexticule wrote:First of all driving drunk is a breach of the peace. Obviously your safety is harmed.
Question: What does "no harm" mean to you?alexticule wrote:Do you even know what no harm means?
Question: Who are "they", and provide an example of how they are harming me.alexticule wrote:They are harming you in so many ways
Question: Who will determine the result of this court? Who will determine whether someone's "words and action" are cause for liability.alexticule wrote:It quite sad that you don't even know what a court of Inherent Jurisdiction is and still pursue on talking smack about it. It is a court of PUBLIC RECORD and everyone is liable for their own words and actions.
Question: others as in your co-defendants, or somebody else?alexticule wrote:Peace Officers are really about keeping the peace. The others might have took a different approach, but that doesn't mean that I think like them.
How so? If someone who is drunk drives from A to B without incident no one has suffered any harm. In a system where the law is "cause no harm or loss" harm from drunk driving only occurs when there is an accident.alexticule wrote: First of all driving drunk is a breach of the peace.
But, there is no injured party.Obviously your safety is harmed.
My understanding is that courts of inherent jurisdiction are a category of court that obtains its authority as descendents of the English Royal Courts. These are a class of court that has the authority to intervene in any matter to protect the rights of persons in Canada. I’m just going to quote a number of Supreme Court of Canada judgments that discuss these courts, their special characteristics, and history.alexticule wrote:… It quite sad that you don't even know what a court of Inherent Jurisdiction is and still pursue on talking smack about it. It is a court of PUBLIC RECORD and everyone is liable for their own words and actions. …
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 SCR 626: http://canlii.ca/t/1fqt9There is, however, another and more fundamental aspect to this issue. The provincial superior courts have always occupied a position of prime importance in the constitutional pattern of this country. They are the descendants of the Royal Courts of Justice as courts of general jurisdiction. They cross the dividing line, as it were, in the federal-provincial scheme of division of jurisdiction, being organized by the provinces under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act and are presided over by judges appointed and paid by the federal government (sections 96 and 100 of the Constitution Act). As was said by Pigeon J. in R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction Co. (1958) Ltd. et al., 1979 CanLII 187 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695, at p. 713:
Earlier in his judgment Pigeon J. quoted from Chief Justice Ritchie in Valin v. Langlois (1879), 3 S.C.R. 1, at pp. 19-20:
- It must be considered that the basic principle governing the Canadian system of judicature is the jurisdiction of the superior courts of the provinces in all matters federal and provincial. The federal Parliament is empowered to derogate from this principle by establishing additional courts only for the better administration of the laws of Canada.
- ... These courts [provincially organized superior courts] are surely bound to execute all laws in force in the Dominion, whether they are enacted by the Parliament of the Dominion or by the Local Legislatures, respectively. They are not mere local courts for the administration of the local laws passed by the Local Legislatures of the Provinces in which they are organized. They are the courts which were the established courts of the respective Provinces before Confederation, . . . They are the Queen's Courts, bound to take cognizance of and execute all laws, whether enacted by the Dominion Parliament or the Local Legislatures ...
So as you see, a court of inherent jurisdiction is a provincial court, but one that has its judge appointed by the Federal government. It is a court whose jurisdiction cannot be excluded unless another court has been allocated a ‘domain’ of law. It is a constitutional court that has authority directly from the Crown – not Parliament - and as a consequence is a distinct and separate branch of government.25 At this point, it is necessary to explore more carefully the concept of “inherent jurisdiction” to determine how it operates to give the provincial superior court remedial jurisdiction, and why this would require that the Federal Court, described as a “statutory court”, would be bound by a very strict and narrow reading of its authorizing statute which effectively would deprive it of jurisdiction over an area where it is otherwise explicitly given extensive powers of supervision. Indeed, the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction has been used in this case as a corollary for the proposition that a federal statute granting authority to the Federal Court should be read narrowly. Whether the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction supports that approach merits closer inspection.
26 In Roberts v. Canada, 1989 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, at p. 331, Wilson J. articulated the narrow view:
What is this notion of inherent jurisdiction which is used to justify a strict approach to the interpretation of the Federal Court Act? The notion of inherent jurisdiction has developed from the role of provincial superior courts in Canada’s legal system. The unique historical feature of provincial superior courts, as opposed to the Federal Court, is that they have traditionally exercised general jurisdiction over all matters of a civil or criminal nature. This general jurisdictional function in the Canadian justice system precedes Confederation, and was expressly continued by s. 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867, “as if the Union had not been made”. Under s. 92(14), the provinces exercise authority over the “Administration of Justice in the Province”, including the “Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization” of provincial superior courts. The unique institutional feature of these courts is that by s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, judges of provincial superior courts are appointed by the Governor General, not by the provinces. Responsibility for s. 96 courts is thus shared between the two levels of government, unlike either inferior provincial courts, or courts created under s. 101. Estey J., in Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, 1982 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, at pp. 326-27, explained the unique nature of provincial superior courts in the following way:
- The statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament to the Federal Court is contained in the Federal Court Act. Because the Federal Court is without any inherent jurisdiction such as that existing in provincial superior courts, the language of the Act is completely determinative of the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.
- The provincial superior courts have always occupied a position of prime importance in the constitutional pattern of this country. They are the descendants of the Royal Courts of Justice as courts of general jurisdiction. They cross the dividing line, as it were, in the federal-provincial scheme of division of jurisdiction, being organized by the provinces under s. 92(14) of the [Constitution Act, 1867] and are presided over by judges appointed and paid by the federal government (sections 96 and 100 of the [Constitution Act, 1867]).
27 In addition to s. 129 providing for the post-Confederation continuation of provincial superior courts, s. 96 also impliedly contemplates their continued existence. The constitutional fact of their continued existence endorses their general jurisdiction and, in effect, guarantees a traditional core of superior court jurisdiction (Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, 1981 CanLII 24 (SCC), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714; McEvoy v. Attorney General (New Brunswick), 1983 CanLII 149 (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 704; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725. See also Valin v. Langlois (1879), 3 S.C.R. 1, at pp. 19-20; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pembina Exploration Canada Ltd., 1989 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 206, at p. 217; Hogg, “Federalism and the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts” (1981), 30 U.N.B.L.J. 9).
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32 The notion of “inherent jurisdiction” arises from the presumption that if there is a justiciable right, then there must be a court competent to vindicate the right. The issue addressed in Board v. Board was whether a failure to grant jurisdiction should be read as implicitly excluding jurisdiction. In that context, the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction requires that only an explicit ouster of jurisdiction should be allowed to deny jurisdiction to the superior court. In my view, the case does not stand for the fundamentally different proposition that statutes which purport to grant jurisdiction to another court should be read narrowly so as to protect the jurisdiction of the superior court. That is not the purpose of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction, which is simply to ensure that a right will not be without a superior court forum in which it can be recognized. Although certain language in Board v. Board could be taken to stand for the former proposition, a reading of the entire case indicates that a choice was not being made between the jurisdiction of the s. 96 court and the jurisdiction of the federal court (which was extremely narrow at the time). The Privy Council simply did not consider the possible jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court in Board v. Board. The case was not an attempt to answer the question “which court?”, but rather “is there a court?” The former question can only be determined by considering the constitutional, statutory and historical factors which I have canvassed above, while the latter can be dealt with by means of the simple presumption that only an express ouster will deny jurisdiction to the superior court to hear such a case.
Perhaps the passage above is inaccurate?Okay so my court case pretty much went like this... Me "Are you Judge Walters?" Judge "Yes." Me " I would like to thank you for your hospitality, especially for the sandwich. It was good. On and for the public record. I'm here regarding that matter. My name is Alexander Ream. I am the Grantor & Sole Beneficiary of my legal name. I am here under protest & duress. I do not consent to the court proceedings, which is why I didn't stand up earlier. I am here to dismiss the charges. While you are all upholding your own court. I am convening my own court in Inherent Jurisdiction, which is a court of public record. I swear before God that I have not harmed anyone and that I have broken no contract. Crown, are you claiming otherwise and do you have sworn evidence? ...(awkward silence for 7 long seconds). We have an agreement of the parties. Clerk I would like to ask you... actually I am telling you to dismiss this case. I am being harmed every second and the harm will be aggravate if this case is not dismissed. I will seek remedy for the damages done to me." …
It is should be dismissed because I clearly showed that I was the boss and by that I mean only I have authority over my own business. The "Judge" decided to rule over me anyway. The "Judge" have set another court date and immediately a sheriff handed me some papers and a DVD and I was led back downstairs to my solitary confinement cell. …
I have identified the passages in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine that evaluate what the Supreme Court of Canada considers as an absence of harm, and the relevance of that. It seems to me that if you were to say, in court, that “I committed no harm”, then the relevance of that statement would be tested according to that case.alexticule wrote:Do you even know what no harm means?
I have previously identified court judgments that indicate that the state is not a corporation, and your consent to be tried is immaterial. Here are a few more:alexticule wrote:… I did not consent to their corporate court services. …
Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740: http://canlii.ca/t/flw8w[37] The Respondents have repeatedly delivered nonsensical documents to the applicants. … A recent further example is an Affidavit of Linda Liong filed on March 6, 2006, in which she deposes the truth of the following:
- AFFIDAVIT
Linda Kua Liong
Denial or corporate existence and Claim of Right
I, Linda Kua Liong, a.k.a. Linda Liong, of 7347 – 12th Avenue, in the city of Burnaby, on the land mass known as British Columbia:
DO VERILY BELIEVE, AND MAKE OATH AND SAY THAT
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2. I, Linda Kua Liong, as a free will full liability woman do not participate in any commercial activity of the de facto corporate CANADA or with the Crown in right of British Columbia; but remains as the authorized representative and owner of the legal entity known as LINDA KUA LIONG, or any variation thereof.
3. I, Linda Kua Liong, have made no voluntary contract with the Crown in right of British Columbia, or with the Crown in right of Canada to be a subject of, or a corporate member of such Crown, a limited liability corporation. Further, any assumed contract of servitude to the Crown based upon evidence obtained from my previous acts of obedience to Acts applicable only to subjects of the Crown performed through my ignorance and fear which resulted from propaganda and/or directives the Federal Government of Canada or the Crown in right of Canada
O’Brien v. Murchland, 2013 ONSC 4576:[23] Mr. Bydeley, as agent for his wife, the defendant, kindly provided the court with a copy of his closing submissions at the time he presented them. In them, he raises four main points: …
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- iv. the HTA cannot be applied to the defendant without her consent.
[56] It may well be the defendant’s wish not to be governed by the HTA, or any other statute, for that matter. It may offend her personal beliefs, which she is obviously entitled to have. But, if she does not wish to be subject to the HTA, the solution is quite clear. She simply need not drive. The HTA, whether the defendant likes it or not, governs her conduct when she is the driver of a vehicle on a highway in the Province of Ontario. The HTA applies to the defendant, as it applies to every other individual person using the highway. As early as 1926, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in the case of Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., (1926), 59 O.L.R. 8, [1926] 3 D.L.R. 254, confirmed that the HTA is a collection of duties and obligation imposed on motor vehicle drivers based on the operation of motor vehicles upon public highways.
Perhaps you can identify a Canadian judgment that says otherwise?[8] He went on to enumerate the indicia of OPCA litigants; their strategies; their concepts and arguments. One such argument is that the litigant is not subject to statutory law. Justice Rooke noted:
[9] Another argument is that obligation requires the litigant’s agreement. On this point, Justice Rooke observed:
- [325] Another ‘immunity’ ‘magic hat’ is an argument that the litigant is only subject to a different form of law than that which would otherwise apply to the present action. This category is arguably a facet of the ‘restricted court authority’ immunity group.
[326] It is helpful at this point to make a few comments on the manner in which OPCA litigants often use the term “common law”. OPCA litigants often draw an arbitrary line between “statutes” and “common law”, and say they are subject to “common law”, but not legislation. Of course, the opposite is in fact true, the “common law” is law developed incrementally by courts, and which is subordinate to legislation: statutes and regulations passed by the national provincial governments. The Constitution Act provides the rules and principles that restrict the scope and nature of legislation, both by jurisdiction and on the basis of rights (i.e. the Charter).
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- [405] ... A second common variant of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ category is a belief that a person is immune if they simply say they have not consented to be subject to the law and the courts. Of course, this concept has not met with success. [Cases and citations omitted.]
[16] Further, the plaintiff’s argument that he is bound only by the common law is similarly devoid of merit. An individual cannot choose whether he is subject to statutory laws, which take precedence over the common law. The state is free to impose laws subject to Charter compliance and the relationship between the state and the individual is not contractual in nature: Meads, supra.
[17] Finally, the argument that a statute does not apply to a person because that person chooses not to have it apply is a jurisdictional argument which is bereft of merit: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 (CanLII), 2008 ONCA 767, 93 O.R. (3d) 81; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused (2009), 260 O.A.C. 398. ...
I perhaps should have taken a little more time to explain why I commented from the presumption that the information in the RCMP disclosure document was accurate – if you found that offensive, then my apologies. I did that on the basis that was the Crown’s side of the story, and that information represented the case that you will face at trial. You may testify that the events of November 15 and December 12, 2012 are very different. However, as far as I know to date you have not denied that you were in the Victoria, Vancouver, and New Westminster courthouses, and that you or your compatriots identified yourselves as “Peace Officers”. I would naturally be interested to hear what occurred if that is not what actually transpired.alexticule wrote:… I don't use your words and twist it against you so please don't do it on me. … You are the one that mentioned to not use assumptions, but holy shit do you use a lot. ...
I will attempt to clarify. The document posted to your Facebook page does not merely say that you swear to keep the peace, it uses a title: “British Columbia in the Matter of Peace Officer" and then continues "… I Alexander of Ream family … will fulfill my duties as a sworn peace officer … as a Peace Officer … I will defend the exercise of those rights against any and all who may transgress the law. …” [emphasis added].alexticule wrote:… Peace Officer sworn to keep the peace. Why are you so upset about it. There is a lot more serious things happening than me handing a piece of paper to sheriffs saying that I sworn an oath to keep the peace. …
It seems to me that you aim to do more than simply be a passive observer, but that your intention, as a Peace Officer, is to be active. I also note that you here recognize that the term “Peace Officer” has a specific meaning in Canadian law, what you label a “Policy Enforcement Officer”, and that those “Policy Enforcement Officers” have special duties. I find it hard to believe you would not therefore understand that saying you are a “Peace Officer” would have a very particular meaning to Canadians, civilian or otherwise.… I also see that your legal commercial perspective is blinding you to what really matters. I will not participated in your twisted commercial legal game of assumptions and presumptions. Other than I have used symbols that resemble your twisted commercial legal world... do you have any facts or evidence that I was performing a commercial legal activity? Or that I was personating a Policy Enforcement Officer in any way? In the legal corporate world a Peace Officer is actually a Policy Enforcement Officer. I am not a Peace Officer in the commercial legal world, but in the real world to preserve our liberties. I do not have a quota to meet.
He has a lot to think about. His view of the world has been significantly challenged. I am still impressed that he sought out information from this site. Most prefer to frequent sites that only provide positive feedback to their approaches.Ream please just get a lawyer. If the government is as corrupt as you think it is, why would they let you off because of some untested common law - sovereign citizen defense? And if it isn't as corrupt as you think it is, then getting a lawyer is the right decision.
In either case, getting a lawyer is the best decision.
