Why?

Why?
Not really - there's no similarity either in the arguments nor in the style of language used.
Hmmmm, piqued my interest, definitely a little bit kinky, somehow an attempt to tie trust law to sexDnatural wrote: ↑Sun Aug 18, 2019 10:09 pm Perhaps let's start with basics concerning the two types (capacities) of persons involved in this dialogue.<br/>
I will attempt to do this through the creation of a scenario... (my sarcasm I love and is in response to some of your comments to the participant named Parzival).<br/>
SCENARIO: Parzival creates a character named 'Ilander Goodin'hard', via a very erotic & spicy sex novel that has your woman reach orgasm and so becomes an international success. (woman count for 80% of the household spend after all).
getting even betterwrote: Why WALMART vs. PARZIVAL can be seen as equal in law (equity).
You've lost me now. I was hoping for something interesting and all I can say I'm totally bored. If you can't write a good erotic, or even slightly sexy or kinky post to Quatloos I will go back to PornHub.wrote: Quatloos'ers are trying to circumvent reason through the advent of the fiction thereby putting the fiction before the law... like saying processed food can make organic food... cart before the horse.<br/>
if everyone practices real property law so well, then where does property law come from, and what is the doctrine of estates in possession, remainder and reversion?Pottapaug1938 wrote: ↑Mon Aug 12, 2019 11:39 pm Save your breath, parzival. Until and unless you do as you were told to do, and give us a succinct and literate statement of your purpose in spewing out all of this legal verbiage -- if you can, your words do not merit a further response from anyone on this site -- especially those of us who are or were lawyers, and who (like me) practiced real proerty law.
so the issue is the estates you speak of, that only class of subjects can obtain.BOOK 2, CHAPTER 11
Of Estates in Possession, Remainder, and Reversion
https://lonang.com/library/reference/bl ... d/bla-211/
HITHERTO we have considered estates solely with regard to their duration, or the quantity of interest which the owners have therein. We are now to consider them in another view; with regard to the time of their enjoyment, when the actual pernancy of the profits (that is, the taking, perception, or receipt, of the rents and other advantages arising therefrom) begins. Estates therefore, with respect to this consideration, may either be in possession, or in expectancy: and of expectancies there are two sorts; one created by act of the parties, called a remainder; the other by act of law, and called a reversion.
I. Of estates in possession, (which are sometimes called estates executed, whereby a present interest passes to and resides in the tenant, not depending on any subsequent circumstance or contingency, as in the case of estates executory) there is little or nothing peculiar to be observed. All the estates we have hitherto spoken of are of this kind; for, in laying down general rules, we usually apply them to such estates as are then actually in the tenant’s possession. But the doctrine of estates in expectancy contains some of the nicest and most abstruse learning in the English law. These will therefore require a minute discussion, and demand some degree of attention.
III. An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out by him.40 Sir Edward Coke41 describes a reversion to be the returning of land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over. As, if there be a gift in tail, the reversion of the fee is, without any special reservation, vested in the donor by act of law: and so also the reversion, after an estate for life, years, or at will, continues in the lessor. For the fee-simple of all lands must abide somewhere; and if he, who was before possessed of the whole, carves out of it any smaller estate, and grants it away, whatever is not so granted remains in him. A reversion is therefore never created by deed or writing, but arises from construction of law; a remainder can never be limited, unless by either deed or devise. But both are equally transferable, when actually vested, being both estates in praesenti, though taking effect in futuro.
In order to assist such persons as have any estate in remainder, reversion, or expectancy, after the death of others, against fraudulent concealments of their deaths, it is enacted by the statute 6 Ann. c. 18. that all persons on whose lives any lands or tenements are held, shall (upon application to the court of chancery and order made thereupon) once in every year, if required, be produced to the court, or its commissioners; or, upon neglect or refusal, they shall be taken to be actually dead, and the person entitled to such expectant estate may enter upon and hold the lands and tenements, till the party shall appear to be living.
once again dodged the point, that is SETTLED LAND ACT APPLIES AND IS PART OF THE COMMON LAW....morrand wrote: ↑Mon Aug 12, 2019 11:49 pmWhich professor? Did you mean: John C Irvine, Unsettled Estates: Manitoba's Forgotten Statute and the Chupryk Case, 2011 35-1 Manitoba Law Journal 49, 2011 CanLIIDocs 240, http://www.canlii.org/t/2c7v, retrieved on (your date here)? Because your URL is munged in a way that not only renders it useless, but also gives away that it was copied and pasted from somewhere, most probably a web forum.parzival wrote: ↑Mon Aug 12, 2019 9:02 pm so this professor at law is wrong?
Unsettled Estates: Manitoba's Forgotten Statute and the Chupryk Case
https://commentary.canlii.org/w/canlii/ ... cs240.pdf
I would contend first that the 1856 Act is part of Manitoba law by reason of the fundamental rules governing the reception of English statutes in the settled colonies. Those rules as laid out by Blackstone, were explained and applied by the Manitoba Court of Appeal itself in Meanwell v Meanwell in 1941,34 but the fullest and clearest analysis of the doctrine of reception, both as to statute and judge-made law is surely that of Mr. Jean Côté, as he then was, in his justly-famous articles in the Alberta Law Review, in 1964 and 1977 respectively
I mean, basic decency, never mind the principles of intellectual honesty and academic rigor, would seem to demand that you at least name the professor at law who may or may not be wrong, if not give the full citation—which, by the way, CanLII prints at the head of the article when you open it, as you should know if you had clicked the link.
Also, Professor Irvine summarizes the facts of the Chupryk case as follows (at 50): "On the death of his wife, Michael Chupryk found himself (or so the Court determined) the life tenant of a dilapidated and deteriorating property; he was also the holder of a one-third share in the remainder interest, the other two-thirds being vested in Sophie Haykowski, Mr. Chupryk’s god-daughter and relative by marriage." It is hard to square this summary with your assertion that
for if all citizens are life tenants, for what reason was it necessary for Mr Chupryk's status as a life tenant to have been determined by the court? For what reason, further, was it necessary for this esteemed professor of law to state that fact?parzival wrote:you so agree, that all citizens are life tenants........
Oh, by the way, in at least 98% of cases, as soon as you start citing the Cestue Que Vie Act, you are losing the argument.
[/quote]I would contend first that the 1856 Act is part of Manitoba law by reason of the fundamental rules governing the reception of English statutes in the settled colonies. Those rules as laid out by Blackstone, were explained and applied by the Manitoba Court of Appeal itself in Meanwell v Meanwell in 1941,34 but the fullest and clearest analysis of the doctrine of reception, both as to statute and judge-made law is surely that of Mr. Jean Côté, as he then was, in his justly-famous articles in the Alberta Law Review, in 1964 and 1977 respectively
https://www.canlii.org/en/mb/mbca/doc/1 ... pletePos=1In Doe d. Hanington y. McFadden, (c 836) z N.B.R. z6o (Berton's
Reports), Chipman, C.J., at p. 267, says:
The rule laid down by Blackstone is that "Colonists carry with them
only so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation
and the condition of an English colony; such, for instance, as the
general rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries:"
The same doctrine is maintained by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Vaughan,
(1769) 4 Burr. 2494; Campbell v. Hall, (1774) Lofft, 655; 20 Howell's
State Trials ; 239. In the case of The Attorney-General v. Stewart, (1817)
2 Mer. 143, in which the question was whether the Statute of Mortmain
(9 Geo. 2, ch. 36) extended to the Island of Grenada, Sir William
Grant, M.R., also adopts substantially the same rule, and makes the
determination of the point to depend upon this consideration—"Whether
it be a law of local policy, adapted solely to the country in which it was
made, or a general regulation of property, equally applicable to any
country in which it is by the rules of English law that property is
governed." He comes to the conclusion that the Mortmain Act is
quite inapplicable to Grenada or any other colony, because "in its
causes, its provisions, its qualifications, and its exceptions, it is a law
wholly English; calculated for purposes of local policy, complicated
with local establishments, and incapable, without great incongruity in
the effect, of being transferred as it stands into the code of any other
country."
that is not what blackstone saysNYGman wrote: ↑Tue Aug 13, 2019 11:13 am I think I finally get it. He believes that the government is the trustee, and we are life tenants, who are bound by some tacit trust agreement we all asced too when born, where we are somehow granted a life tenancy, and this is where all law comes from. Therefore somehow property law is relevant, and provides the basis for the government to assert its rule.
How he is connecting trusts to property ownership I have no clue, more do I care to have it explained, as the premise is absurd, and really isn't worth entertaining at all.
Clearly all the professed self study and readings he has done have been with out the necessary understanding of legal concepts. Another unlearned self taught know it all, who gets it so wrong. There is a reason lawyers go to law school, and this is a great example of why. I am not saying you can't understand this stuff unless you go to law school, but it's clear that parzival has never gone, and has no understanding of how legal analysis works.
P. S. Life tenants in fee simple means absolutely nothing. You are mixing ownership rights with the right to access/use, and it doesn't work that way. In fact fee simple is absolute, life estate has limitations, you hold one or the other, not both.
BOOK 1, CHAPTER 6
Of the King’s Duties
I PROCEED next to the duties, incumbent on the king by our constitution; in consideration of which duties his dignity and prerogative are established by the laws of the land: it being a maxim in the law, that protection and subjection are reciprocal.1 And these reciprocal duties are what, I apprehend, were meant by the convention in 1688, when they declared that king James had broken the original contract between king and people. But however, as the terms of that original contract were in some measure disputed, being alleged to exist principally in theory, and to be only deducible by reason and the rules of natural law; in which deduction different understandings might very considerably differ; it was, after the revolution, judged proper to declare these duties expressly; and to reduce that contract to a plain certainty. So that, whatever doubts might be formerly raised by weak and scrupulous minds about the existence of such an original contract, they must now entirely cease; especially with regard to every prince, who has reigned since the year 1688.
THE principal duty of the king is, to govern his people according to law. Nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas [kingly power is neither free nor unlimited], was the constitution of our German ancestors on the continent.2 And this is not only consonant to the principles of nature, of liberty, of reason, and of society, but has always been esteemed an express part of the common law of England, even when prerogative was at the highest. “The king,” says Bracton,3 who wrote under Henry III, “ought not to be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the law makes the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law has invested in him with regard to others; dominion, and power: for he is not truly king, where will and pleasure rules, and not the law.” And again;4 “the king also has a superior, namely God, and also the law, by which he was made a king.” Thus Bracton: and Fortescue also,5 having first well distinguished between a monarchy absolutely and despotically regal, which is introduced by conquest and violence, and a political or civil monarchy, which arises from mutual consent; (of which last species he asserts the government of England to be) immediately lays it down as a principle, that “the king of England must rule his people according to the decrees of the laws thereof: insomuch that he is bound by an oath at his coronation to the observance and keeping of his own laws.” But, to obviate all doubts and difficulties concerning this matter, it is expressly declared by statute 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2. that “the laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof; and all the kings and queens who shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to administer the government of the same according to the said laws; and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same: and therefore all the laws and statutes of this realm, for securing the established religion, and the rights and liberties of the people thereof, and all other laws and statutes of the same now in force, are by his majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal and commons, and by authority of the same, ratified and confirmed
accordingly.”
https://archive.org/download/areadablee ... df#page=53A Readable Edition of Coke Upon Littleton pdf page 53
A lawful or pure inheritance] Here it is well put in the disjunctive lawful or pure, for every fee-simple is not lawful. A disseisor, abator,intruder, usurper, &c. Have a fee-simple, has it either by purchase or descent. If by wrong, then either by disseisin, intrusion,abatement,usurpation, &c.
Pg 511 pdf
But since Littleton wrote, all uses are transferred by act of parliament into possession, so that the case which littleton here puts is thereby altered. Yet it is necessary to be known what the common law was before the making of the statute, [otherwise the application of the statute could not be discovered]
nota. A use is a trust or confidence reposed in some other, which is not out of the land, but as a thing collateral thereto and annexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, scilicet, that Cestui Que us shall take the profit, and that the ter-tenant shall make an estate according to his direction. So that cestui que use had neither jus un re nor jus ad rem, but only only a confidence and trust, for which he had no remedy by common law, but for breach of trust his only remedy was by subpena in chancery.
In all these instances, of limitations or conditions subsequent, it is to be observed, that so long as the condition, either express or implied, either in deed or in law, remains unbroken, the grantee may have an estate of freehold, provided the estate upon which such condition is annexed be in itself of a freehold nature; as if the original grant express either an estate of inheritance, or for life, or no estate at all, which is constructively an estate for life. For the breach of these conditions being contingent and uncertain, this uncertainty preserves the freehold;18 because the estate is capable to last for ever, or at least for the life of the tenant, supposing the condition to remain unbroken. But where the estate is at the utmost a chattel interest, which must determine at a time certain, and may determine sooner, (as a grant for ninety nine years, provided A, B, and C, and the survivor of them, shall so long live) this still continues a mere chattel, and is not, by its uncertainty, ranked among estates of freehold.
These express conditions, if they be impossible at the time of their creation, or afterwards become impossible by the act of God or the act of the feoffor himself, or if they be contrary to law, or repugnant to the nature of the estate, are void. In any of which cases, if they be conditions subsequent, that is, to be performed after the estate is vested, the estate shall become absolute in the tenant
in the end, after the debate is over, the topic will get changed to confused capacities and agreements and be its own forum.....
https://commentary.canlii.org/w/canlii/ ... ocs240.pdfBut redundant it undoubtedly is. Until 1983 when, as explained below, all life tenants were made willy-nilly the beneficiaries (and usually also the trustees) of a legislatively imposed trust,49 the 1856 Act might be of use when a life tenant under a common law settlement felt the need to make a sale or lease of the fee simple.[/color] That would not be often, since express settlements are not commonly created these days, and when they do occur, are usually effected under a trust; which brings into play the extensive facilities for Court-approved dispositions of all kinds, afforded in Manitoba by the Trustee Act, s 58(1).50
Um, why do I give notice to what Blackstone has said, when it is not a legal source I can place any reliance on. That and it appears you are quoting older versions which makes it more irrelevant.
Let me clearly undodge this for you, NO IT ISN'T. In the US it has absolutely no relevance at all. NONE, ZERO, ZIP, NADA, NUNC PRO TUNC. It is meaningless.once again dodged the point, that is SETTLED LAND ACT APPLIES AND IS PART OF THE COMMON LAW....
when the basics are incorrect everything you build on top will collapse
Maxims of law are irrelevant in law and have no valueWithout using the lawyer trained-brain we then can develop a type of syllogism (a law maxim to which equity is void of using common law maxims) whereby fiction can come from law but law cannot come from fiction, to which <I> Parzival is forming his/her argument.
Laws can be replaced or repealed or superceded, that is the nature of things. Law changes, evolves, and grows as we do. The distinction you are making between fiction and living man is a fiction in itself and is not relevant.BUT the law [before equity] can never be repealed by the fiction as this would be a contradiction in relative (not abstract) terms and would logically serve to dissolve any & all agreements made therefrom... no employment for our livery of 'Roman Church' created [union] lawyers I'm afraid.
does this mean anything? It certainly looks like words, but is totally meanglessLawyers can only argue the processed food, the fiction created therefrom, so they are birthed into shortsightedness which eludes the reality of TRUE common sense and the notice of organic food (law).
Again, NO. Now your are completely wrong here and seem to have made all this shit up. Your fiction/legal person BS has been debunked over and over. This isn't anything new and you have added nothingIn law the fiction (deed poll/birth CERTIFICATE) acts as a conduit to enter into agreements IN ORDER to exchange bargain and sale properties annexed to the land, but not the land itself, as a fiction (again logic here) can never obtain allodium title (droit, droit) to land, as a fiction is a creation of man... not real in law or nature... real begets real = law. Fiction begets fiction = equity (In fact a lawyer can prove that Santa Claus does in fact have a right to property and next they are [currently] working on pedophiles having the right to have sex with children.. cannot make this shit up... so far from moral & ethical foundations we have, in order to exchange [fictional] promises for value).
Birth record is just that, a record of birth nothing more.The live birth record acts as an indenture with denotes an agreement between guardians (quasi trustees) to safeguard the rights to the strict statutory land-trust created in order for the infant's interest to be used in equity – those interest that lawyers have rights to, the equitable use which then splits into [equitable] legal and equitable titles, that then grant privileges to tenants aka citizens, in order to obtain mortgage and also annul the entails protected under common law.
Seems the ignorance is not with us, but with you. The whole post seems ignorant of how the law actually works.So I suspect that most of you suffer from a lack of knowledge (ignorance of the law), and in law this is no excuse to be in violation of the law but in equity it is noticed if all agree to the ignorance... and all are equally affected by the scheme.
And that's is the basis of your problem, the above isn't true, correct, or even relevant.All laws – including the fact that English law is unlawful, evidenced by the unlawful usurpation of land in AD 1066 (against the will of man) – which have branched from the feudal era, to then arrive at the 'use of' land, which then became the trusts of today, are all in effect when an individual (NOT A GROUP) no longer fails, neglects or refuses to bring the law into light, before a competent judge who can see both sides...
Bullshit!A LAWYER CANNOT SEE BOTH SIDES B/C THEY ARE RESTRICTED BY THEIR AGREEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT OATH to a union and/or livery. <br/>